1.
Reducing Russia’s nuclear stockpile and maintaining
its security has been one of the most challenging undertakings of the post-Cold
War period. Until 1991, the Soviet
Union had produced over 40,000 nuclear weapons and quantities of fissile
material (highly enriched uranium and plutonium) that could be used to produce
at least 40,000 more nuclear warheads. Over the past decade, arms control and
co-operative security agreements between the United States and the countries of
the former Soviet Union, have substantially reduced that enormous arsenal. These initiatives have also succeeded in
eliminating all nuclear weapons left in Newly Independent States (NIS) such as
Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine.
2.
According to recent estimates, Russia ‑ which
is dismantling about 2,000 warheads annually ‑ has about 10,000 active
nuclear weapons and as many retired or non-deployed warheads awaiting
dismantlement. The quantities of
fissile material have been estimated at up to 1,365 tons of highly enriched
uranium (HEU) and 156 tons of plutonium.
Small quantities of fissile material also remain in Belarus, Kazakhstan,
Ukraine, and Uzbekistan.
3.
Despite considerable efforts, mainly by the United
States, to protect, secure and dispose of weapons and weapons-usable material,
much remains to be done to address the problems of the former Soviet nuclear
military complex. The economic and
financial situation of the Russian Federation increases risks. The country can not afford to protect
adequately some of its nuclear sites and laboratories, nor to regularly pay all
employees and scientists of its huge complex.
Breakdowns in military command structures have included units that
control weapons or fissile material.
Therefore the threat of diversion of nuclear weapons materials, by
either insiders or outsiders, is a reality.
Although in the last ten years no nuclear weapons or quantity of fissile
material have been successfully stolen or smuggled, many attempts to do it have
been stopped by Russian and international police operations.
4.
Serious security concerns stem also from the state
of Russia’s nuclear submarines. Risks
of proliferation of either missile technology, or fresh and spent submarine
fuel (containing HEU or plutonium) are extremely high, considering the poor
security conditions. Accidents, like
the one involving the Kursk in August
2000, can occur again, with serious environmental consequences.
5.
The Science and Technology Committee addressed the
problem of protecting, securing, and dismantling the Soviet nuclear arsenal in
several reports and meetings from 1992 to 1995. Ten years after the dissolution of the Soviet Union, however,
many dangers and challenges posed by that formidable nuclear arsenal remain
unsolved. This report will try to
briefly describe the state and the security of Russian nuclear weapons. Particular attention will be devoted to
fissile material security in Russia and the NIS, including an analysis of the
most serious efforts to steal or divert these materials. We will also try to assess the most
important Western co-operation and non‑proliferation initiatives dealing
with these problems in Russia and NIS.
Finally, we will offer a few policy recommendations with a view to
making these initiatives more effective.
6.
We believe that both the United States and Russia,
as the world’s major nuclear powers, have a responsibility to examine and
address this major security threat, each within its own financial ability and
in accordance with their mutual disarmament commitments. For its international dimension, the threat
should also be properly addressed in the context of multilateral non-proliferation
initiatives. Other NATO allies may also
assume a bigger share of the costs of initiatives that will enhance their
security as well.
7.
Under the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaties (START)
Russia and the United States have undertaken to make phased reductions in their
strategic offensive nuclear forces.
START I was signed by the Soviet Union and the United States in 1991 and
entered into force in 1994. Russia
assumed the Soviet Union’s obligations under the treaty. The final limits of START I, to be met by
each side before the end of 2001, are:
·
1,600 strategic nuclear delivery vehicles, i.e.
intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), submarine-launched ballistic
missiles (SLBMs) and heavy bombers;
·
6,000 accountable warheads on these systems, of
which no more than 4,900 may be on ballistic missiles;
·
ballistic throw weight (lifting power) limited to
3,600 tons.
8.
START II, signed in January 1993 by Russia and the
United States, was ratified three years later by the US Senate and only in
April 2000 by the Russian Duma, which had long criticised it for its allegedly
unfair impact on the country’s strategic posture and defence budget. The basic terms of the treaty establish
that, by 31 December 2007, each side is to deploy no more than 3,000 to
3,500 strategic nuclear warheads on ICBMs, SLBMs, and heavy bombers. Also, by the end of 2003, the sides are to
deactivate all strategic nuclear delivery vehicles to be eliminated under the treaty
(a deactivation agreement was codified in 1997). Additional limits were included in START II, such as no
multiple warheads may be deployed on land based missiles and no more than 1,700
to 1,750 warheads may be deployed on SLBMs.
9.
In 1997, Presidents Clinton and Yeltsin reached an
agreement in Helsinki on the framework of a START III that would mandate
further cuts in their strategic forces.
The new treaty would reduce strategic nuclear warheads to 2,000-2,500
for each of the parties. In bilateral
talks that started after the Duma’s START II ratification, Russia reportedly
suggested bringing the START III warhead ceiling down to 1,500 or less. Deeper reductions became increasingly
attractive in the Russian parliament because of the growing realization that a
rapid downsizing of their strategic nuclear forces was almost unavoidable given
the chronic budget shortfalls. In fact,
Russian nuclear forces will probably decline well below the START II limits by
2010 because of the ICBMs, SLBMs and heavy bombers reaching the end of their
service lives.
10.
In the following paragraphs we will try to quantify
current Russian nuclear forces.
According to the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace (CEIP),
there are several different ways to do this.
For instance, the Memoranda of Understanding (MOU) provided under START
I define “deployed weapons” as the total number of strategic launch vehicles
deployed, even if warheads have been removed or the launchers are simply
waiting dismantlement. Because of this,
START I MOU figures for nuclear forces are normally higher than actual
operational numbers. These rules of
account were changed in START II, which established "real" account. Most analysts define
“deployed weapons” as only those delivery vehicles that are operational and
armed with nuclear warheads. In this
report (and in the table in Appendix A), we have adopted the latter definition.
11.
The Russian ICBM force is the stronghold of the
Russian strategic forces. ICBM forces
are operated by the Strategic Rocket Forces (SRF), a separate armed service of
the Russian military. The
Commander-in-Chief of the SRF is General Vladimir Yakovlev, who was appointed
to the post by President Yeltsin in June 1997.
12.
Russia has currently deployed five different types
of ICBMs with a range greater than 5,500 kilometres. SS-18s (NATO designation: Satan) and SS-19s (Stiletto), first deployed in 1975, both carry multiple
independently targetable re-entry vehicles (MIRV). START I requires Russia to retain only 154 SS-18s from the
original 204, all of which should be eliminated under START II. Also, 105 single warhead SS-19s may be
retained by Moscow under START II from the original 170. In July 2000, Russia had 180 SS-18s and
150 SS-19s deployed.
13.
The SS-24s (Scalpel)
and SS-25s (Sickle) constitute the
latest generation of Russian ICBMs. Of
the 46 SS-24s, the last MIRVed ICBMs built by Moscow, 36 are rail-based and
considered non-operational, the remaining 10 should be eliminated under START
II. To replace MIRVed ICBMs, Russia
will rely on single-warhead SS-25s and on a new variant of it, the SS-27 or
Topol-M, which is currently the only Russian strategic weapon still in
production. Topol-Ms were first put on
“trial service” in 1997, then 10 of them were deployed in 1998, and 10 others
in 1999. In 1998, Gen. Yakovlev
announced that Russia planned to make 20-30 SS-27s operational each year for
the next three years, and 30‑40 for the three years after that. For obvious economic reasons, these
schedules are not being met. According
to the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists,
“a more realistic rate of production is 10-15 missiles a year, with perhaps
some 60-80 fielded by the end of 2005”.
14.
The deactivation and retirement of Russian ICBMs
and launchers consists of four stages: (1) removal from alert status by
electrical and mechanical procedures; (2) removal of warheads from the missile;
(3) withdrawal of the missile from the silo; and (4) destruction of the silo.
15.
The future of Russia's SSBNs – once the largest
fleet in the world – is very much in doubt.
Almost two-thirds of the submarines have been withdrawn from operational
service and most of the current fleet is at or nearing retirement. The effective lifetime of an average Russian
nuclear-powered submarine is approximately twenty years.
16.
Officially, 21 SSBNs of three different classes are
operational: 11 Delta IIIs, seven Delta IVs, and three Typhoons. They are equipped with three different types
of SLBMs, all MIRVed. According to
Russian sources, however, two Typhoons are “unfit for combat” and the third was
already withdrawn in 1998. Nonetheless,
in November 1999 the Russian navy fired two ballistic missiles from a
Typhoon-class submarine in the Barents Sea successfully hitting targets 4,900
kilometres away on the Kamchatka Peninsula.
According to press reports, the navy currently maintains one SSBM on
patrol in the Atlantic and one in the Pacific, with at least one more in each
fleet on pier-side alert. In 1996,
Russia had laid the keel of the first new Borey-class SSBM, but construction
was suspended in 1998.
17.
Two types of Russian aircraft carry air-launched
cruise missiles (ALCMs) armed with nuclear warheads. Tu-95 Bear bombers have
two variants, H6 and H16 (indicating the number of warheads they can
respectively carry), and are deployed in two different locations. Only six Tu-160 Blackjack bombers are currently deployed, but the Russian Ministry
of Defence recently ordered six others from an aircraft company of the Tupolev
group. According to experts of the
Natural Resources Defense Council, five of those have been completed and are
being tested.
18.
24 Bear and
17 Blackjack bombers are still
present in Ukraine, but are poorly maintained and not considered
operational. According to press
sources, some of these aircraft may have already been transferred from Ukraine
to Russia as payment for part of Kiev’s debt for Russian natural gas.
19.
The composition and number of Russian non-strategic
(or tactical) nuclear forces are extremely difficult to assess.
They are not subject to any arms control agreement but
only to non-binding unilateral, parallel declarations made by former Presidents
George H. W. Bush and Mikhaïl Gorbachev in 1991 and reiterated by
President Yeltsin in 1992. Although
these declarations appear to have been largely observed (and thousands of
tactical nuclear weapons have been eliminated), they are not legally binding,
and do not provide for data exchanges, nor for verification mechanisms. Some information, however, has been
exchanged at meetings of the NATO-Russia Permanent Joint Council (PJC). Moreover, the 1997 Helsinki framework agreement
for START III allowed for the exploration of measures related to tactical
nuclear weapons.
20.
Non-strategic forces include surface-to-air
missiles, and warheads from ships, submarines, and aircraft. These are relatively small, short-range
systems designed for use in battlefield or theatre‑level operations. According to estimates, a rough total of
4,000 non-strategic nuclear weapons are still deployed by Moscow.
21.
The United States and Russia have undertaken the
destruction of strategic nuclear weapons in the countries of the former Soviet
Union under the Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) programme (also called
“Nunn-Lugar” after the two senators who co-sponsored it) established by the
Soviet Nuclear Threat Reduction Act of 1991.
Begun under the administrative auspices of the US Department of Defense
(DOD), the original CTR programme’s main objectives included:
(1) transporting nuclear warheads from the Soviet successor states to
Russia; (2) destroying and dismantling weapons systems; (3) ensuring custodial
safety of the former Soviet nuclear material; (4) assisting the
destruction of chemical and biological weapons; and (5) supporting
demilitarisation. Since 1993, the
programme has evolved to encompass a wider range of non‑proliferation and
demilitarisation activities across the former Soviet Union, involving the DOD,
the Department of Energy (DOE), and other governmental agencies.
22.
During the first five years, the CTR programme was
primarily concentrated on transferring strategic nuclear weapons from Belarus,
Kazakhstan and Ukraine to Russia (task successfully completed in 1996, avoiding
the emergence of three new nuclear weapon states), and putting in place an
organisational structure. In the period
between 1996 and the present, the programme attained considerable success in
assisting the dismantling of Russian nuclear weapons and improving
significantly the security of such weapons and materials. Overall, from 1992 to 1999 the United States
has obligated $2.7 billion to CTR initiatives in the former Soviet Union, $1.7
billion of which went for efforts in Russia.
Through 1999, the US Congress authorised some $3 billion for CTR
programmes, as part of the Clinton Administration’s Expanded Threat Reduction
Initiative (ETRI), which proposes to spend $4.5 billion more up until 2005.
23.
According to Sen Lugar, as of December 1999, these
programmes had helped deactivate 4,854 nuclear warheads, destroyed 373
long-range ballistic missiles, eliminated 354 silos, sealed 191 nuclear
test tunnels, and dismantled 12 nuclear submarines.
24.
Under the Strategic Offensive Arms Elimination
(SOAE) programme, where most CTR funds had been obligated, the DOD has provided
training, logistics, facility construction and US-made equipment for
eliminating ICBMs and associated launch facilities, SLBMs and their submarine
launchers, and bombers, as well as for transporting and disposing of toxic
liquid fuel for rocket engines. The
SOAE and the complementary nuclear Weapons Protection, Control, and Accounting
(WPC&A) project are making good progress in meeting their goals. There are, however, areas where the projects
in both Russia and Ukraine are meeting delays and bureaucratic difficulties.
25.
According to most analysts, the level of physical
protection at Russian nuclear weapon storage sites raises increasing concern. The old Soviet security systems seem no
longer adequate under the new conditions in Russia. However, because of the level of secrecy imposed on all issues
pertaining to nuclear weapons in Russia, it is extremely difficult to assess
the actual security conditions. All
indications are that further upgrades and repairs are urgently needed.
26.
Among the most critical tasks of CTR are the
activities related to the dismantling of nuclear submarines. Until 1991, no pre-planning existed in the
Soviet Union for dismantling them, once they were decommissioned. Up to 179 Russian nuclear submarines, 36 of
which are SSBNs, are in a status of accelerated decommissioning. The dismantling process is complex and
costly: $8-10 million per SSBN, and $5-7 million per nuclear-powered attack
submarine (SSN). CTR programmes are
helping dismantle the 36 SSBNs, and there has been considerable progress in the
general process. But there is not enough
money to dismantle the remaining SSNs, 87 of which still have nuclear fuel aboard. The problem of consolidating fresh and spent
submarine fuel, which contains HEU or plutonium, is particularly serious.
27.
Several other problems have emerged in the current
dismantling: there is no plan for long-term storage of reactor compartments, not
enough storage facilities for spent fuel or liquid waste, and limited budget
for salaries, power and resources at Russian shipyards and the Navy. In the Kola Peninsula, spent nuclear fuel
has been temporarily placed in concrete tanks or aboard floating service
vessels. The European Union, Japan, and
Norway are partially contributing to SSN dismantlement, but so far all these
additional foreign aid efforts have lacked the necessary co-ordination. On the Russian side, the Ministry of Atomic
Energy (Minatom) has recently taken over from the Navy the responsibility for
decommissioned submarines.
28.
The Russian Federation is also facing a number of
complicated environmental problems in the management of radioactive waste
accumulated as a result of past production of nuclear weapons, use of nuclear
energy for peaceful purposes, and as a result of the reductions in nuclear
arms. In the past, radioactive wastes
have been dumped into the Kara and Barents Seas, as well as into lakes in
Siberia, creating serious environmental damage. A Russian Federal Waste Management Programme for 1996-2005,
approved by the government in 1996 to solve the country’s most urgent problems,
could not be implemented for lack of funds.
An international initiative under the auspices of the International
Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), the Contact Expert Group (CEG), was set up in 1996
to work with Russia in solving the most urgent problems. According to IAEA officials who met in
Vienna in March 2000 with members of this Committee, the CEG is lacking funds
to implement even the most urgent projects and is trying to call on the G-7
countries to find new donors.
29.
There are no publicly available official figures of
the amount of weapon-usable fissile material in the countries of the former
Soviet Union. For weapon-usable fissile
material we intend plutonium (Pu) and highly enriched uranium (HEU), containing
more than 20% of the isotope U-235 (natural uranium contains 0.7% U-235 and
99,3% U-238). HEU can also be defined
as weapon-grade uranium (WGU) when containing more than 90% U-235. Production of HEU was halted by the Soviet
Union in 1989, while Russia stopped producing Pu for nuclear weapons in 1992. This material is scattered throughout
military and civilian facilities, including nuclear weapon research, design,
and production facilities; nuclear fuel production plants; and research,
educational, and industrial facilities.
Most of these institutes and plants are located in Russian territory,
but a few are in other NIS, including Belarus, Kazakhstan, Latvia, Ukraine, and
Uzbekistan.
30.
According to various sources, the total HEU
stockpile in Russia can be estimated at between 735 and 1,365 tons. The Russian military plutonium has been
estimated at 106 to 156 tons. According
to a 1998 study conducted jointly by the CEIP and the Monterey Institute for
International Studies (MIIS), weapons-usable material is known to be present in
at least 33 sites in the Russian Federation.
Most of it, however, is located in the nuclear-weapon facilities of the
10 closed “nuclear cities” (see below) created by the Soviet Union and now
managed by Minatom.
31.
In Belarus, weapon-usable fissile material
(approximately 40 kg of WGU, 330 kg of HEU, and 15 kg of Pu) is located at one
facility near Minsk. Some 100 kg of HEU
are located at two facilities in Tashkent, Uzbekistan. Three sites in Kazakhstan are storing HEU,
but the amounts are unknown. Among
these, the breeder reactor in Aktau also stocks some weapon-grade Pu in spent
nuclear fuel. In Ukraine, HEU is stored
on three locations, one of them, the Institute of Nuclear research in Kiev,
keeps small amounts of Pu as well. An
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) report includes Latvia on the list
because of an unknown quantity of HEU still stored on a decommissioned research
nuclear reactor site.
32.
The most important US programme dealing with the
security shortcomings identified at many of the facilities storing fissile
material is the Material Protection, Control and Accounting (MPC&A)
programme. Managed by DOE since 1994,
the programme concentrates on enhancing the security of material at current
locations, transferring material to secure sites, and trying to consolidate it
at facilities where improved security systems are in place.
33.
According to the recent Report Card on the DOE’s Non-proliferation Programs with Russia,
drafted by a bipartisan group of US legislators and experts, “security
improvements have begun for approximately 80 percent of the current estimate of
the Russian stockpile of nuclear weapons-usable material not contained in
nuclear weapons”. Comprehensive
long-term security upgrades, however, “have covered only a modest fraction” of
the same material. Moreover, disputes
between US and Russian officials over access to sites with large quantities of
material undermine the overall co‑operation programme. In general, MPC&A projects have also
been quite successful in upgrading the security of fissile material in Belarus
and Uzbekistan. Concerns remain about
one facility in Kazakhstan and one in Ukraine.
34.
An important CTR-funded project is the construction
of a storage facility at the Mayak Production Association in Russia for the
secure and environmentally safe consolidation of fissile material. The facility, meant to alleviate the
country’s shortage of secure storages for nuclear‑weapons material, could
also be used to store spent reactor fuel from nuclear submarines.
35.
Another DOE programme is the 1994 HEU Agreement
which authorised the United States to purchase, over 20 years, 500 tons of HEU
from dismantled Soviet nuclear weapons and convert them to low enriched uranium
(LEU) to be used as civilian reactor fuel.
The deal was originally valued at $12 million, but a subsequent collapse
of the price of uranium led to a prolonged re-negotiation of it. In 1999, DOE and Minatom signed a new accord
reviving the HEU agreement.
36.
A more recent US programme aims at reducing
weapon-usable Pu in step with the US Pu disposition programme. Signed in 2000, the agreement establishes US
and Russian commitment to dispose of 34 tons of excess military Pu. Approximately $2 billion will be
necessary to implement the agreement and convert excess Pu in order to produce
mixed oxide fuel (MOX) to be used in nuclear power reactors. The United States plans to immobilise
through vitrification at least 9 tons of that Pu and is now also seeking
international financing. The European
Union, which in the context of its Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP)
has launched a Joint Action for Non-proliferation and Disarmament, will
contribute to the programme.
37.
Related to the security of fissile material is the
problem of combating illicit trafficking across Russia’s borders and those of
other NIS countries. The Second Line of
Defense (SLD) programme, started in 1998, encompasses a series of initiatives
led by a number of US governmental agencies and aimed at helping NIS countries
cope with these problems. These
initiatives focus mainly on export control assistance, improving border
controls and strengthening overall capacity to detect and deter illicit
trafficking. Although it is difficult
to assess the effectiveness of these US assistance programmes, there is general
agreement that overall risks of illicit trafficking have been mitigated. But some challenges remain and proliferation
risks are not totally eliminated.
38.
In Russia ten “nuclear cities”, home to 750,000
people, today remain closed off from the outside world, protected by security
forces and barbed wire. They were built
by the Soviet Union for the sole purpose of designing and producing nuclear
weapons and fissile material. Minatom
still employs more than 120,000 people in these cities’ nuclear facilities, but
plans to reduce the staff by half over the next six or seven years. Several problems derive from the necessary
downsizing of this huge complex, which Russia can not afford anymore:
·
the physical security of nuclear weapons and
fissile material still stored on-site;
·
the “brain drain” problem, or the risk that the
number of already underpaid and soon‑to-be unemployed nuclear weapon
scientists, engineers, and technicians turn to illicit activities or to work
for a state of concern;
·
the risks deriving from operating the last three
unsafe plutonium-production reactors in the nuclear cities of Tomsk-7 (now
Seversk) and Kasnoyarsk-26 (now Zheleznogorsk);
·
the re-conversion of nuclear weapon facilities to
civilian purposes.
39.
Several Western initiatives have tried to help
Russia cope with some of these urgent problems. The Initiatives for Proliferation Prevention (IPP), in place
since 1994, seek to prevent brain drain by creating non-weapons-related work
for Russian scientists and technicians.
Under this project, DOE’s national laboratories and their counterparts
in Russia develop projects with commercial potential. The complementary Nuclear Cities Initiative (NCI), established by
DOE in 1998 in partnership with Minatom, Western companies and private
foundations, offers opportunities for short-term contract employment to
scientists that have lost their jobs.
NCI also assists Russian nuclear cities in creating the municipal and
telecommunications infrastructures necessary to attract and establish long-term
business opportunities.
40.
An additional initiative is the International
Science and Technology Centre (ISTC), funded by the US Department of State, the
European Union, Canada, and Japan. Its
purpose is to provide short-term grants and contracts engaging former Soviet
weapon scientists and experts in non-military research projects. Since 1994, ISTC, with its two Centres in
Moscow and Kiev, has granted some 120 million euros to over 1,000 projects
involving about 30,000 scientists.
41.
Since 1995, NATO’s Scientific and Environmental
Affairs Division is also contributing to scientific co-operation in
weapons-related areas through its Security‑Related Civil Science and
Technology (SST) programme. The
programme has so far engaged over 2,700 scientists. In four different support mechanisms (expert visits,
collaborative linkage grants, advanced study institutes, and advanced
workshops).
42.
Many of the problems related to dismantling and
securing former-Soviet Union nuclear weapons and fissile material have already
been highlighted in the previous sections.
Major proliferation risks derive from the still insufficient security of
this vast nuclear stockpile. Threats
could come from insiders, such as underpaid and demoralised military or
security staff, or outsiders, such as terrorist groups or criminal
organisations.
43.
While most analysts generally rule out the
possibility of theft and transport outside of Russia of a nuclear weapon,
attacks on the weapons themselves or their storage sites seem more
plausible. Several incidents of Russian
soldiers attacking their comrades have been reported throughout the country:
similar incidents could occur at nuclear bases or storage sites. The impoverished condition of the Russian
armed forces, as well as their decaying ethics cause concern. According to media reports, there is a
general increase of drug-related crimes in the SRF, while organised crime has
infiltrated the Northern Fleet and minor corruption is almost endemic in the
military and the public administration.
44.
The possible smuggling of nuclear materials across
NIS borders is probably the most pressing proliferation threat coming from the
former Soviet Union territory. In the
early 1990s, when security at most facilities had not yet been improved by CTR
programmes, several attempts to smuggle quantities of fissile material were
stopped by Russian and international police operations. More recently, in 1998, the Russian Federal
Security Service stopped an attempt by a group of employees from one of the
Minatom nuclear facilities in Chelyabinsk-70 to steal 18.5 kilograms of fissile
material.
45.
Social conditions in nuclear cities can pose
particularly serious problems. Early in
1998, the mayor of Krasnoyarsk-45 wrote to the Republic’s governor, Alexander
Lebed, warning that a social explosion in the city was unavoidable unless some
action was taken. Gen Lebed had earlier
proposed that Moscow let the regions take responsibility for nuclear forces and
facilities on their territories, but the Russian government has never agreed to
the proposal. Later the same year,
3,000 workers went on strike at Chelyabinsk-70, protesting “constant
under-nourishment, insufficient medical service, and inability to buy clothing
and footwear for children or to pay for their education”.
46.
The poor security conditions of the Russian naval
nuclear fuel are, in the words of one Minatom official, an “accident-prone
situation”. Some 70 tons of fuel
containing HEU reside in operational nuclear submarines, icebreakers, and
cruisers, as well as in the number of decommissioned submarines that still
contain operating reactors. According
to an expert at the Center for Nonproliferation Studies in Monterey, “possible
theft, diversion or sale of fissile material is the greatest proliferation and
security risk arising from current conditions in the Russian naval nuclear fuel
cycle”.
47.
Russian submarines are armed with many
sophisticated weapons requiring careful handling. According to the latest news, the Kursk tragedy was caused by a torpedo that malfunctioned or was
mishandled by the crew. The Kursk was an Oscar II class nuclear
submarine carrying cruise missiles, not an SSN or SSBN armed with even more
sophisticated weapons. Equipment at
Russian navy facilities is often aging and unsafe and can cause accidents. In June 2000, at a naval base near
Vladivostock, a crane scheduled for retirement in 1995 dropped an unarmed
SLBM. The fall caused the release of
the missile’s oxidizer, killing 12 sailors.
48.
The risk of theft or diversion of sensitive weapons
components or technologies also deserves attention because of the advantage it
would give to potential proliferators.
An example of this is the quite well-known case of the missile guidance
gyroscopes and accelerometers from Russian SLBMs discovered in Iraq in 1995 by
UNSCOM. Removed from dismantled
missiles, the components were probably illegally sold to Iraq by the employees
of a Russian dismantlement facility. In
December 1998, a member of the staff at Russia’s nuclear weapons
laboratory in Sarov (formerly Arzamas-16) was arrested while attempting to sell
nuclear weapons designs to Iraqi and Afghani agents.
49.
These are only a few examples of dozen of actual
incidents. It is clear that Russia, ten
years after the end of the Soviet Union, still has a weakened ability to
protect and secure its legacy.
50.
The co-operative security activities that were put
in place between Washington and Moscow to tackle the proliferation problems in
Russia and the NIS represent a unique and sensitive agenda. Initiated during George H.W. Bush’s
presidency, the development of most of these initiatives was the product of the
Clinton-Yeltsin years. The friendship
between the two men certainly gave a political stimulation to activities that
the Russian bureaucracy might have preferred to limit to non-sensitive
areas. Over the years, some in the
United States questioned the help the US government was giving Russia in such a
difficult undertaking and accused Moscow of not making a sufficient commitment
to threat reduction. Some answers to
this have been offered by the cited Report
Card. “Currently”, it observed,
“Russians cannot accomplish these projects without US assistance”. Also, “quite simply, an unstable Russia –
economically, politically or security-wise – is not in the national security
interest of the United States”.
51.
However, the political circumstances that supported
the initiation and development of the co-operative security activities have certainly
changed, probably signalling the beginning of a new era of US-Russian
relations. While political problems
have periodically threatened support for non-proliferation and disarmament
efforts on both sides, no major programmes were cancelled during the NATO
bombing in the Former Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) in 1999. The Russian military campaign in Chechnya
brought only a few US legislators to call for a reduction of co-operation
funds.
52.
In the last few months, several developments have
pointed to a deterioration of the relationship between Russia and the United
States. Russia is genuinely concerned
about US plans to build a ballistic missile defence system, or National Missile
Defense (NMD), that could lead to a decision by Washington to abrogate the ABM
Treaty. Russian officials, including
President Vladimir Putin, have repeatedly declared that a NMD deployment would
lead Moscow to consider increasing the number of warheads on its ICBMs, or even
withdrawing from START II. In February
2001, Russia also sent a clear message by launching an array of missile tests
from sea, air, and land. President
Vladimir Putin has engaged in a diplomatic offensive, aimed at European NATO
allies, against the US missile defence plans.
Moreover, Russian officials have several times expressed their hostility
to a possible enlargement of NATO in 2002, especially if it will include former
Soviet territories such as the Baltic States.
53.
Some quarters in Russia have criticised the
co-operative security agenda, pointing at the penetration of US specialists at
sensitive facilities and questioning the financial benefits of this
co-operation. President Putin, however,
has made no political statement on it and has expressed support for the HEU
purchase agreement. In fact, Russians
derive significant benefits from these co-operative initiatives: governmental
agencies and research centres receive vital financing, and a number of
technicians, engineers and scientists are able to continue their work.
54.
In the United States, although co-operative
security programmes have been consistently supported by a bipartisan majority
during the last 10 years, a number of studies and reports have criticised
them. In recent times, critics have
increased in number. US government
officials have regularly expressed their frustration at making these programmes
work in Russia amidst an array of bureaucratic and technical difficulties. Others have accused the programmes of
spending too much in Russia and not enough on US contractors; of spending too much
on US experts' trips and on personnel, and not enough on improving conditions
at nuclear facilities in Russia; and of indirectly supporting Russian
rearmament and weapons modernisation.
55.
Stronger political concerns are sparked by Russia’s
continued co-operation with Iran in the nuclear energy field. The US government is convinced that the help
Russia is giving Iran in completing a nuclear power plant in Bushehr is in fact
supporting Tehran’s nuclear weapons programme.
Russia denies the accusation, but a proposed shipment to Iran of a laser
isotope separator (useful in uranium enrichment) was recently stopped by
Washington. Moreover, many in the
United States are disturbed by Russia’s continuing sale of conventional weapons
to Iran, India, and other countries.
56.
Additional concerns with regard to Russia’s
policies may have a more direct impact on co-operation with the United States
in the area of non-proliferation.
President Putin has revived several Russian security agencies, which
have put pressure on the ministries dealing with US officials in the context of
security co-operation activities.
Although Mr Putin has spoken out in favour of downsizing the Russian
nuclear arsenal, he also stressed the need for Moscow to retain a strong
nuclear capability. This was reinforced
by the approval, in April 2000, of a new military doctrine which allows the use
of nuclear weapons in response to any other weapons of mass destruction, and
against any country or coalition if the situation is critical to Russian national
security, even if the adversary does not possess nuclear weapons.
57.
It is now up to the new US administration to manage
this complex and delicate agenda.
During the presidential campaign, George W. Bush made several positive
statements about continuing to co-operate with Russia in the area of nuclear
security. He also affirmed that, as
president, he would ask the Congress to increase US assistance to Russia to
allow for the rapid dismantling of its nuclear arsenal.
58.
European NATO allies and Western countries in
general can do much to support US policies and offer a more substantial
financial contribution to some of the activities in the security co-operation
agenda. This will also send a strong
political signal to Moscow, which tends to see these activities only in the
context of its bilateral strategic relations with the United States. In this sense, the Non-proliferation and
Disarmament Co-operation Initiative (NDCI) an information exchange platform
recently launched by the European Union to support the US 1999 ETRI programme,
is a welcome step in the right direction.
59.
The Rapporteur shares the general assessment of the
Task Force that drafted the 2001 Report Card: “current non-proliferation programs in the Department of Energy,
the Department of Defense, and related agencies have achieved impressive
results thus far, but their limited mandate and funding fall short of what is
required to address adequately the threat”.
In line with what the Task Force also indicated, we can affirm that, to
face this urgent security challenge, an “enhanced response” should be devised
by the new US President, in consultation with Congress and in co-operation with
Russia and all the allied countries equally concerned by the threat. Based on these premises, the Rapporteur
would like to offer a few policy recommendations as to how to shape this
“enhanced response”.
60.
A necessary precondition for a more effective
programme is an agreement between the US and Russian governments on the degree
of transparency and access needed to assure that all co‑operative
activities have measurable impacts on programme objectives. Also, on both sides a more centralised
command and co‑ordination of the financial and human resources is
essential to conduct the programme successfully.
61.
In the area of strategic weapons dismantling and
weapons protection, control, and accounting, projects that have been quite
successful, specific improvements may include:
·
Assisting the Russians as they identify, tag, and
seal all their warheads as part of a reliable accounting system;
·
Rapidly agreeing on WPC&A upgrades to the 123
nuclear weapon storage sites selected by the Russian government, eventually
establishing priorities;
·
Commissioning an expert evaluation of missile
solid-fuel disposition options, given the significant technological
uncertainties;
·
Defusing proliferation risks from the sale of
potentially useful components from dismantled missiles by accounting for or
destroying them in a verifiable manner;
·
Strengthening the existing Russian programmes to
improve personnel reliability and limit the insider threat.
62.
More profound improvements and additional
initiatives are needed in the area of nuclear submarine dismantlement and
naval fuel consolidation. In this
area, the United States should encourage financial and technical contributions
from allies. The most urgent actions
should include:
·
Accelerating the dismantling of SSNs;
·
Increasing spent fuel storage sites and improving
their physical protection measures;
·
Encouraging Minatom and the Russian Navy to develop
a complete “cradle-to-grave” submarine dismantling cycle, including plans for
long-term storage of separated reactor compartments;
·
Launching an international (United States and
allies) programme to encourage defence conversion at Russian shipyards by
providing incentives for Western firms operating in Russia;
·
Prohibiting any Russian sale of nuclear submarines
and related technologies to foreign countries.
63.
In the area of fissile material, successes
and shortcomings of the ongoing programmes suggest a series of recommendations:
·
Consolidate fissile material at fewer sites and
considering consolidating material from other NIS to Russia;
·
Help Russia and NIS to provide their nuclear
personnel with adequate organisation, motivation, training, equipment, and
resources to perform the mission of safeguarding nuclear material;
·
Demilitarise all remaining excess Russian HEU
through a programme of US investment in expanded capacity for down-blending in
Russia;
·
Accelerate the purchase of the approximately 400
tons of HEU remaining to be down-blended under the HEU Agreement;
·
Halt plutonium production in the three
still-operating reactors in Siberia by convincing Russia to implement a 1994
shut-down agreement;
·
Accelerate the construction of the nuclear storage
facility at Mayak, in order to store up to 50 tons of excess plutonium,
and eventually build additional wings to store more material;
·
Eliminate up to 100 tons of plutonium by blending
fuel as MOX or immobilising it through vitrification.
64.
Other more general recommendations to reduce the
Russian nuclear complex and implement existing programmes could include:
·
Facilitate Russian efforts to shut down weapons
assembly, component fabrication, and materials production facilities;
·
Help Russia to ensure nuclear weapon scientists and
workers are provided financial incentives for early retirement;
·
Increase international lending practices to new
businesses in the nuclear cities, finding ways to eventually extend credit at
competitive rates to businesses employing former scientists or technicians;
·
Enhance the relationship between the municipalities
and the weapon facilities of the nuclear cities, in order to increase
efficiency in the expenditure of resources.
65.
Finally, considerable advantages might derive from
the adoption of international non-proliferation initiatives, such as an
agreement on a Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT), a ban on the production
of material for nuclear weapons, and the introduction of the strengthened
international safeguards system supported by the 2000 Nuclear Non-Proliferation
Treaty (NPT) Review Conference.
Unfortunately, negotiations on the FMCT, although on the agenda of the
Conference on Disarmament in Geneva, are kept on hold by the obstruction of
Russia and China. These two countries
have insisted that FMCT negotiations can only start in parallel with
negotiations on nuclear disarmament and prevention of an arms race in outer
space. The United States opposes this
linkage.
