I. INTRODUCTION
1.
Insufficient attention to the safety of nuclear
power plants is one of the legacies of the former Soviet Union. The 1986 tragedy of Chernobyl demonstrated
the disastrous consequences of a nuclear accident and attracted worldwide
attention to the high-risk Soviet-designed nuclear power plants (NPP) still
operating in a few countries of Central and Eastern Europe. In 1998-1999, after a visit to the
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in Vienna, this Committee again
focused its attention on this very serious problem. The NATO Parliamentary Assembly approved Resolution 285 at its
Annual Session in Edinburgh putting into words the alarm of its members at the
news that at least 15 NPPs in Central and Eastern Europe were operating whilst
unsafe. A letter based on this
Resolution was then addressed to all NATO heads of government. The results of this initiative, and further
findings of the Committee, were outlined in a 1999 Special Report by Sir Peter
Emery of the United Kingdom, Chairman of the Sub-Committee on the Proliferation
of Military Technology [AS 288 STC (99) 10].
2.
According to the conclusions of the 1999 report,
considerable progress on nuclear safety has been made in Central and Eastern Europe
since 1990, thanks also to a number of international initiatives and
programmes. Design safety improvement
programmes are in place in all countries concerned, which have come a long way
in producing the legislative and regulatory framework for their national
nuclear regulation. However, as
confirmed during a visit to IAEA in March 2000, significant additional efforts
are required, especially to maintain and enhance an effective safety culture
and to improve the technical abilities of the national regulatory
authorities. It is the G-8 and the
European Union’s view that 24 Soviet-designed NPPs in Armenia, Bulgaria,
Lithuania, Russia, and Slovakia are still operating with considerable risk. These reactors are of either the RBMK (all
generations), or the WWER 440/230 type.
RBMK reactors are:
Ignalina
1, 2 (Lithuania)
Kursk
unit 1-6 (Russia)
Leningrad
unit 1-4 (Russia)
WWER
440/230 reactors are:
Bohunice
unit 1, 2 (Slovakia)
Kola unit 1, 2 (Russia)
Kozloduy
unit 1-4 (Bulgaria)
Medzamor
unit 1, 2 (Armenia)
Novovoronezh
unit 3, 4 (Russia)
3.
As indicated in the 1999 report, it is the opinion
of this Committee that close attention to the safety of these specific NPPs in
Central and Eastern should continue to be paid. Also, the Committee decided to continue its investigations into
the operations of the various international bodies “…to try to ensure that
there is proper co-ordinating of the work being carried out." Your Rapporteur would like to update the information
provided earlier by this Committee and summarise the most recent developments
in this area with regard to both the implementation of the various programmes
aimed at improving the safety of Soviet-designed NPPs and the specific
activities taking place at plant sites in various countries. In conclusion, a
few recommendations concerning the future will be provided.
II. Differences between Soviet-designed and Western NUCLEAR
POWER PLANTs
4.
To understand the safety concerns related to
Soviet-designed NPPs it is useful to briefly outline their major differences
from Western NPPs with regard to safety features. Soviet-designed reactors are essentially variations on two basic
designs: the RBMK - graphite moderated, channel reactor - and the WWER or
pressurised light water type. Western
NPPs adopted the design principle of “safety in depth”, relying on a series of
physical barriers, including a massive reinforced steel and concrete structure
called “containment”, to prevent the release of radioactive material to the
environment. While Soviet-designed NPPs
employ the design principle of “safety in depth” they do not have, with the
exception of the WWER 1000 design, a containment structure.
5.
Three generations of RBMK reactors were produced
and all of them lacked a containment structure. The RBMK’s original version of containment, called accident
localisation system, proved ineffective at Chernobyl in 1986 as it could not
withstand the force of the accident. In
addition, RBMK’s reactor control systems are unforgiving to many potential
system upsets, with a consequent potential difficulty of successful
recovery. Other weaknesses of these
reactors as they were produced included inadequate fire-protection systems,
limited capability for steam suppression in the graphite stack, flawed
separation and redundancy of electrical and safety systems.
6.
Of the three generations of WWER reactors, the
first one, the WWER 440/230, presents the most serious deficiencies. Despite improvements, the accident
localisation system, which serves as a reactor confinement, remains well below
Western standards. In addition, this
confinement has very small volume, poor leak-tightness and hydrogen
mitigation. WWER 440/230 reactors have
no emergency core-cooling systems or auxiliary feedwater systems as Western
NPPs do. Further, plant instrumentation
and controls, safety systems, protection for control-room operators, as well as
the quality of materials, construction and operating procedures of these NPPs
are below Western standards.
7.
According to the US Department of Energy (DOE), the
second generation of WWER reactors (440/213), despite significant improvements
over the first generation, still have some deficiencies. Some of these reactors still operate at
plant sites in five countries: the Czech Republic, Hungary, Russia, Slovakia,
and Ukraine. Significant variations and
different safety improvements have been adopted by these countries with regard
to WWER 440/213 reactors. Some of these
reactors, such as those operated by the Czech Republic in Dukovany, by Hungary
in Paks, and by Slovakia in Bohunice and Mochovce, have now reached safety
levels comparable to those of Western reactors of the same age.
8.
Before moving to analyse international nuclear
safety programmes, we should stress that the costs involved in upgrading, retrofitting,
and decommissioning these reactors are immense. Both national governments and the international community have
only limited resources available compared to the huge scale of the problem.
III.
INTERNATIONAL
NUCLEAR SAFETY PROGRAMMES IN CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE
9.
In 1990, responding to requests for assistance from
countries operating WWER 440/230 NPPs, the IAEA launched a major international
programme to evaluate these reactors and to provide safety assistance to
operators and regulators. The programme,
which as of 1992 was extended to include other WWER and RBMK reactors, was
financed primarily by voluntary contributions from various IAEA member
countries as an Extrabudgetary Programme (EBP), and also through the Agency’s
regular budget and other national and regional technical co-operation
projects. The EBP specific objectives
were as follows:
·
to identify safety shortcomings in the design and
operation of WWER and RBMK NPPs;
·
to establish international consensus on priorities
for safety improvements;
·
to provide assistance in the review of the
completeness and adequacy of safety improvement programmes; and
·
to undertake specific studies of unresolved topical
safety issues.
10.
The EBP concluded successfully in 1998, but the
IAEA continues to provide nuclear safety assistance to its member states within
the framework of its regular nuclear safety programmes. Further, a specific project on WWER and RBMK
safety has been included in the IAEA programme for 1999-2000, and three ongoing
regional technical co-operation projects are being extended. In March 1998, an extrabudgetary project was
also established concentrating on RBMK accident analysis and related training.
11.
At the Munich Summit in July 1992, the G-7
governments offered the countries of Central and Eastern Europe a multilateral
programme of action to improve the safety of their NPPs. This was to include immediate measures in
operational safety improvements, near-term technical safety improvements to
plants, and enhancement of regulatory regimes.
The G-7 also encouraged the creation of a multilateral mechanism to
address urgent nuclear safety measures in Central and Eastern Europe and in
1993 proposed that the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD)
set up a Nuclear Safety Account (NSA) to this purpose. Since March 1993, the NSA has provided grant
funded assistance for short-term safety upgrades at WWER and RBMK reactors
following specific agreements with the countries concerned. These upgrades have the primary objective of
improving safety levels of NPPs for a limited period until the definitive
shutdown of the high-risk reactors. An
Assembly of Contributors (the European Union and 14 countries: Belgium, Canada,
Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Norway,
Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom and the United States) approves the
projects prepared by EBRD. As of 31
December 2000, members of the NSA Assembly had contributed €260.6 million.
12.
Following the G-7 Denver Summit in 1997, the
European Union and Ukraine set up a supplementary multilateral funding
mechanism, the Shelter Implementation Plan (SIP), to help Ukraine transform the
existing Chernobyl “sarcophagus” into a stable and environmentally safe
system. Developed under the joint
sponsorship of the EU Tacis programme and the US DOE, the SIP will take about
eight to nine years to complete, at an estimated cost of $ 768 million. By July 2000, approximately 97% of this
cost estimate had been covered by the international donor community.
13.
With the exception of Chernobyl, until recently
little progress had been made on the closure of the other high-risk
reactors. However, the EU accession
process has led the governments of Bulgaria, Lithuania, and Slovakia to decide
upon the closure of their RBMK and WWER 440-230 reactors. The European Commission agreed to support
the decommissioning of these reactors over a period of eight to ten years, and
invited the EBRD to administer three International Decommissioning Support
Funds (IDSFs). The funds will not only support the first phase of
decommissioning, but will also finance measures for facilitating the
restructuring, upgrading and modernisation of the energy production,
transmission and distribution sectors and improvements in energy efficiency
which are consequential to closure decisions.
This is a very interesting development, since, as the 1999 report
pointed out, countries operating Soviet-designed NPPs stress their dependency
on these plants as sources of energy until new plants can be built.
14.
The European Union has taken a prominent role in
international efforts to ensure nuclear safety in Central and Eastern
Europe. Its policy is based on the G-7
(now G-8) strategy adopted in Munich in 1992 and reflects the IAEA’s
classification of design and operation risks regarding nuclear reactors. The
EU contribution to the above international efforts has been provided mainly
through the Phare (for Central and Eastern Europe) and Tacis (for Newly
Independent States) aid programmes.
Both programmes have focused their specific nuclear safety activities
on:
·
on-site assistance and operational safety;
·
design safety;
·
regulatory authorities and their technical support
organisations;
·
waste management;
·
off-site emergency preparedness.
15.
For the past decade, also the OECD Nuclear Energy
Agency (NEA) has been carrying out a programme of co-operation and assistance
with Central and Eastern European countries on nuclear safety. The aim of the programme is to assist these
countries in the planning, development and execution of safety programmes with
a view to building up capabilities in safety technology and analysis, in
particular concerning WWER reactors.
The programme has also been able to benefit from NEA’s co‑operative
research projects such as RASPLAV (severe accidents, in‑vessel
retention), Halden (experimental reactor), and PLASMA (plant safety parameters
monitoring).
16.
Apart from the enormous technical challenges in
addressing the safety of Soviet-designed NPPs, a number of problems have been
encountered by all the above international efforts. In certain cases, beneficiary countries have proved reluctant to
co‑operate with the international community’s nuclear strategy. For example in Russia, as it will be
described in the next section, the early closure of the oldest generation
reactors is not foreseen; indeed their operating life may be further
extended. In addition, the nuclear
safety programmes have only been relatively slowly implemented. As a
consequence, a considerable backlog of contracts has built up. This difficulty has arisen in part because
the financial and assistance regulations have not proved to be well suited to
the particularities of this highly complex and specialised sector. Another source of delay in contracting and
payment has been the time taken to define projects, in particular because
commitments were made when insufficient information, for example on a
particular plant or regulatory authority, was available. Moreover, especially in Russia, the time taken
by project beneficiaries to agree to terms of reference of projects has led to
major delays in the implementation of projects.
17.
Another concern, already mentioned in the previous
NATO PA report, is that of the co-ordination of all international efforts. In 1992, after the G-7 endorsed its
multilateral programme of action, the G-24 Nuclear Safety Co-ordination (NUSAC)
Group was created to harmonize domestic and international programmes in this
field. The NUSAC focused on policy
issues rather than technical matters and aimed to move from technical
assistance programmes to co-operative ventures. At the Group meeting of 23-24 March 2000, however, NUSAC
participants generally agreed to disband this co‑operation
mechanism. In a communiqué posted on
the EU website, members stated that “the situation regarding international
nuclear safety assistance and cooperation has normalised and that residual
co-ordination could be addressed satisfactorily through normal channels and
structures now in place”. Although
other mechanisms, such as the NSA Assembly of Contributors, or organisations
(IAEA or the European Union) could take the lead and provide some form of
co-ordination of international efforts, at the moment no alternatives to NUSAC
have been formally established.
IV. Specific
activities at RBMK and WWER REACTORS
18.
In this section we will primarily describe the
activities related to the operating RBMK and WWER 440/230 reactors listed
above. However, some information about
the second generation WWER reactors (440/213) that still operate in these countries
will also be given.
A. RUSSIA
19.
The Russian Federation is the only state of the
former Soviet Union involved in all aspects of nuclear power, from uranium
mining to plant design, power generation and spent fuel reprocessing. In Russia, about 12% of electricity is
generated by nuclear power and the civil nuclear industry directly employs some
300,000 people. Although there has been
substantial co‑operation between Western and Russian experts, it often
appeared that there were basic differences of approach to nuclear safety.
20.
While the short-term safety upgrades at Kola,
Novovoronezh and Leningrad NPPs have been completed, the current situation in
the Russian nuclear sector presents some concerns. In the autumn of 2000, the Russian government resumed operation
of Kursk unit 1 for fully commercial purposes and not for testing, as
previously declared, in clear breach of the EBRD NSA agreement. According to EBRD, the current regulatory
regimes for Kursk 1 and Leningrad 1-3 also violate the provisions of the NSA
agreement. Further, the delay in the
In-Depth-Safety Assessment programmes ‑ designed to determine the safety
level of Russian plants using Western standards ‑ makes it unlikely that
a full review and implementation of corrective measures can be completed within
the design life of the old reactors.
21.
In May 2000, the Russian government endorsed a
“Strategy for Nuclear Power Development in Russia in the First Half of the 21st
Century”, which, among other things, extends the service time for first
generation WWER reactors beyond the original design life of 30 years. By 2005, six of the ten Russian high risk
reactors (Leningrad 1-2, Kola 1-2 and Novovoronezh 3-4) will have reached the
end of their original design life.
However, Russian officials argue that these reactors are needed to
support the local economy. The strategy
also indicates that “it is reasonable to suggest that with the safety
philosophy prevailing today nuclear power is approaching a state of marginal
economic efficiency: further build-up of safety systems may only mean sacrifice
of competitiveness”. In addition, no
investments are under way in the Russian energy sector which would facilitate
early permanent closure of the old, high risk RBMK and WWER reactors.
22.
According to EBRD reports, the IAEA plans to launch
a technical co-operation project for 2001-2002, with the objective of achieving
the safe operation of Russian NPPs whose life had been extended beyond their
original service life, and to develop for that purpose, on a regulatory basis,
a renewal/extension of operating licences.
B. UKRAINE
23.
On 15 December 2000 the government of Ukraine
permanently shut down unit 3 of the Chernobyl NNP, the site’s only remaining
operational nuclear reactor. This was
undoubtedly a significant event for nuclear safety in Central and Eastern
Europe. Also, the first phase of the
Chernobyl Shelter Implementation Plan (SIP) was completed in the year 2000 and
the plan is entering its second phase.
This will be characterised by the installation of monitoring systems and
major construction activities for the stabilisation of the Shelter and its
confinement, an engineered barrier to the environment designed to last
approximately 100 years. Some programmatic
decisions are still to be taken with regard to the removal of nuclear waste and
the concept of the new confinement. If
everything goes as scheduled by EBRD, then the SIP may be completed by 2007.
24.
According to The Economist Intelligence
Unit, the total cost of the Chernobyl closure is approximately $1.48 billion,
of which $585 million will come from a Euratom loan to the Ukrainian national
nuclear power company, Energoatom (approved in December 2000 by the European
Commission), $348 from export credit agencies, $215 million from EBRD, $124 million
from Russia, and $209 million from Ukraine.
25.
Several challenges still lie ahead for Ukraine in
the technical, organisational and institutional areas related to nuclear power
production. According to EBRD, a
significant improvement in the country’s regulatory framework is indeed one of
the prerequisites for the success of the SIP.
The ongoing conversion of the nuclear regulator into the State Nuclear
Regulatory Committee of Ukraine, established in December 2000 by the President,
is of extreme importance for an efficient regulatory process.
26.
Regarding the other NPPs, Ukraine has 13 operating
pressurised light-water reactors (11 WWER 1000 and two WWER 440-213). The Euratom loan to Energoatom will also
help finance the completion, modernisation and commissioning of the WWER 1000
reactors at the Khmelnitsky (unit 2) and Rivne (unit 4) NPPs, which will
provide replacement power for that lost by the closure of Chernobyl. The decision by the EU was welcomed by
Foratom, the European nuclear industry’s trade association, which noted that
the nuclear option was rightly preferred to other options including new
fossil-fuelled plants. However,
Ukrainian and international environmental groups criticised the decision
because of its implications for the future of nuclear power in Europe, and also
because it did not encourage the use of renewable energy sources such as solar,
wind and biomass power generation.
C. ARMENIA
27.
The Armenian government has repeatedly stated its
commitment to close the Medzamor NPP by 2004, provided that a secure energy
alternative supply is available. A
working group of experts from the Armenian government and the European
Commission has been set up to develop a plan for this purpose. Meanwhile, on-site assistance at Medzamor
for short-term nuclear safety will continue to be provided through the EU Tacis
programme. This assistance concentrates
on the level of design safety, operating and surveillance conditions, the
organisation of operational safety and the provision of equipment.
D. BULGARIA
28.
Bulgaria operates the six-unit Kozloduy NPP, of
which units 1-4 are WWER 440/230 reactors, and units 5 and 6 WWER 1000. On 29 November 1999, Bulgaria and the
European Commission signed an understanding in which the Bulgarian government
committed itself to the early closure of units 1-4. More specifically, Sofia committed to definitely closing down
units 1 and 2 before the year 2003, and units 3 and 4 before the previously
envisaged closure dates of 2008 and 2010.
A decision on the exact closure date of units 3 and 4 will only be taken
in 2002 as part of the updating of the Bulgarian energy strategy.
29.
In support of this decision, as indicated in par.
13, the European Commission offered a multi-annual assistance package for
Bulgaria’s energy sector and established through the EBRD a new International
Decommissioning Support Fund (IDSF) to assist the country with grant funding in
support of:
·
An early phase of decommissioning of Kozloduy units
1-4;
·
energy and energy efficiency measures and
modernisation of the power sector;
·
mitigation of the social consequences of the early
closure of Kozloduy NPP;
·
environmental protection measures relating to the
use of conventional energy sources.
30.
Meanwhile, all short-term safety upgrade projects
at Kozloduy were completed by the end of 2000.
Despite the significant safety
improvements already achieved considering the present safety status of the
plant, there are still some major safety issues which are closely linked to the
original basic design of the VVER-440/230 reactors and which are difficult to
remove, such as the limited confinement function and capability and the
vulnerability against common cause failures.
Moreover, according to the Western European Nuclear
Regulators Association (WENRA), it
seems that financial provisions for continued safety improvements are
inadequate.
31.
The Bulgarian authorities are currently working on
a Strategy for the implementation of the understanding signed with the European
Commission. The country’s National
Programme for the Adoption of the Acquis (NPAA), which was adopted in
April 2000, states that nuclear safety is a “main priority” of the Bulgarian
energy policy.
E. LITHUANIA
32.
Lithuania operates the Ignalina NPP with two RBMK
reactors with a nominal capacity of 1,500 MW each. Following discussions with the European Commission, Lithuania
committed itself to closing and decommissioning this NPP in the National Energy
Strategy adopted by the Seimas (Parliament) in October 1999. Ignalina unit 1 will be closed before 2005,
while a decision on the closure of unit
2 will be taken in 2004 and the Commission understands that the closure will
take place in 2009 at the latest.
33.
The original design of
Ignalina NPP has been considerably improved through different safety
improvement programmes. Most of the
generic safety concerns with RBMK reactors have been satisfactorily
addressed. However, according to WENRA, weaknesses remain with respect to the last barrier
for the protection of the environment, especially in case of a severe accident. Therefore special attention needs to be
given to the prevention of accidents during the remaining operating time,
including the need to ensure a high level of operational safety.
34.
As is the case for Bulgaria and Slovakia, a special
fund administered by EBRD will finance selective projects to support the first
phase of decommissioning of the Ignalina reactors, but also measures for
facilitating the necessary restructuring, upgrading and modernisation of the
energy production, transmission and distribution sectors and improvements in
energy efficiency which are consequential to closure of the Ignalina NPP. An international pledging conference for the
Ignalina IDSF was held in Vilnius in June 2000. Pledges totalling €191
million were secured from the European Commission, eight EU countries, Norway
and Poland.
35.
All NSA-financed project activities at Ignalina NPP
have been successfully completed.
According to WENRA, although the Ignalina NPP “cannot realistically reach
a safety level comparable to that of Western European reactors of the same
vintage”, the legal and regulatory system in Lithuania “has been substantially
improved over the past years”. Further,
a licensing system has been put in place and the Lithuanian regulatory body
VATESI has developed its approach to safety assessment and inspections.
F. SLOVAKIA
36.
At Bohunice NPP there are four pressurised heavy
water reactors in operation: two WWER 440/230 (twin units 1 and 2) and two WWER
440/213 (twin units 3 and 4). In
September 1999, the Slovak government decided to shut down the two high-risk
first generation reactors, in 2006 and 2008 respectively. An IDSF for Slovakia (similar to the ones
for Bulgaria and Lithuania) is also being set up by the European Commission
through the EBRD, which is currently identifying and preparing projects for
it. Dialogue with the Slovak government
is in progress and the First Assembly of Contributors should be scheduled in
2001.
37.
With regard to the
short-term safety of Bohunice V1 (units 1-2), the utility has made significant
progress towards establishing a new design base and implementing the relevant
safety measures. Since 1990,
significant improvements have been implemented also at Bohunice V2 (units
3-4). However, in order to achieve
adequate reliability of safety systems in all operating situations, an
extensive modernisation programme is planned for implementation before 2006,
with the major upgrades relating to safety due to be completed by 2002.
38.
Slovakia also operates
two WWER 440/213 reactors at Mochovce NPP.
Compared to other reactors of the same generation, units 1 and 2 of
Mochovce included several modifications during the design phase. The most important of these are the use of
higher quality equipment and the improvement of systems used in accident
situations. However, some design weaknesses remained, and a dedicated nuclear
safety improvement programme was developed for the Mochovce NPP in 1995 and is
now almost complete. Although some
residual work is still needed to confirm all parts of safety analysis, the
safety level of Mochovce units is comparable to that of the nuclear power
plants being operated in Western Europe.
V. CONCLUSION
39.
Since this Committee
last examined the problems relating to nuclear safety in Central and Eastern
Europe, the situation has substantially improved. The closure of unit 3 of the Chernobyl NPP in December 2000
represents the best example of the successful co-operation between the international
community and the countries still operating Soviet-designed reactors. As the above analysis illustrates, many of
these countries have taken on the nuclear safety burden themselves, especially
in establishing legal frameworks and regulatory regimes and bodies dealing with
nuclear safety activities. Recipient
countries and donor organisations (and countries) have also come a long way in
creating a “safety culture” and developing safety-oriented management
principles and quality assurance programmes.
Adequate personnel training is also contributing to the establishment of
this safety culture, thanks to the extensive development of training programmes
at all concerned NPPs.
40.
The decisions taken by
the governments of Bulgaria, Lithuania and Slovakia to decommission those
reactors which could not be brought to internationally accepted safety
standards should certainly be praised.
However, we should underline the role played by the European Commission
in bringing about these decisions by stressing the importance of nuclear safety
in the context of the EU accession process.
The Commission has developed an impressive range of activities and
instruments and is using pre-accession funds to pursue its nuclear safety
policy objectives. Brussels has also
been instrumental in establishing the Nuclear Safety Account and the
International Decommissioning Support Funds, administered by the EBRD.
41.
Of course, much remains
to be done in most Central and Eastern European countries to
facilitate the necessary restructuring, upgrading and modernisation of the energy
production, transmission and distribution.
The energy requirements of these countries need to be satisfied by
alternative energy sources and a more efficient use of the available energy. For these reasons, the international
community should maintain its commitment to resolve all nuclear safety issues
in Central and Eastern Europe in the next decade. It is essential that more funds are allocated by the G-8 and EU
countries to this purpose and that the various programmes and initiatives are
properly co‑ordinated.
42.
Finally, as indicated
above, there are serious concerns about the implementation of nuclear safety
agreements between donor organisations and countries and the Russian
government. In general, Russia’s
transition to internationally acceptable nuclear safety practices is far from
being complete although, through international assistance programmes,
considerable progress has been made. In
particular, ten RBMK and 4 WWER 440/230 reactors still operating in Russia
continue to pose a serious threat to the global environment, the local
population and neighbouring countries.
Your Rapporteur is particularly concerned about the violation by Russia
of the agreements signed with the Assembly of Contributors of the EBRD Nuclear
Safety Account which “address fundamental nuclear safety objectives and put
these very adequately in the context of economic and energy market reforms,
energy efficiency and the least cost principles for investments in the
replacement power generation capacity”.
Despite this, high-risk nuclear reactors continue to be viewed in Russia
as a comparatively cheap source of electricity and local employment while
safety remains an issue of secondary importance. For these reasons, continued and concerted efforts by the
international community appear to your Rapporteur to be indispensable to a
sustainable improvement of nuclear safety in Russia. A wider strategic agenda appealing to Russia seems to be the only
viable option to deal with the underlying problems relating to the country’s economic
and socio-political environment and to achieve some progress towards all
nuclear safety objectives.
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