1. At the Berlin session, the Sub-Committee renamed itself “Sub-Committee on Democratic Governance”, reflecting the conviction of the members that democracy is much more than a formal process of elections and legal changes. Democracy encompasses the need for in-depth evolution in a country’s political culture, the engagement of its citizens, the functioning of its institutions, and the re-balancing of rights and responsibilities at all levels and in all fields of human action. Many of the “new democracies” have begun that mutation and some of them are well underway. However, it has to be restated at this point that democracy is a never-ending process. The so-called “advanced democracies” themselves must remain aware of the risks threatening the “democratic acquis”; they must also constantly adapt their ways to become more attuned to changes in citizens’ political culture and way of life, as well as to mutations in the international environment.

2. There are, however, a number of countries and provinces in Europe where, 10 years after the adoption of the “Charter of Paris for a New Europe”, democracy still has difficulty taking hold. Your Co-Rapporteurs believe that it would be useful, at this juncture, to examine some of those particular cases. Congruent with the Sub-Committee’s agenda and current developments, their analysis this spring bears on the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) and Belarus, two very different situations in the sense that developments in the former can be characterised as globally positive, whereas the latter is marked by lack of progress and perhaps deterioration - but two situations that present particular difficulties for Western policies. The present report also includes a third case study, on Kaliningrad, a region which requires delicate treatment for other reasons, i.e. its situation as a Russian enclave in soon‑to-be European Union territory.

3. Members will be asked for their views on the policy positions taken by the Rapporteurs - a normal procedure – but also on the relevance of these case studies; whether they should be updated for the autumn session; and which specific countries or regions should be investigated in future by the Rapporteurs, in conjunction with the general programme of the Sub-Committee.

I. FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF YUGOSLAVIA / SERBIA

A. SERBIA’S DOMESTIC CHANGES AND FOREIGN RELATIONS: THE STATE OF PLAY

4. The following development aims to provide an overview of domestic political developments in the FRY and the main trends of its foreign policy as of mid-April 2001. The Co-Rapporteurs hope to update their analysis on the basis of a visit to Belgrade in June or early July.

1. Domestic political change in the FRY and Serbia

5. The victory of the Democratic Opposition of Serbia (DOS), a coalition of 18 parties, in the Yugoslav federal elections of 24 September 2000 signalled the beginning of a radical transformation of the dynamics of power and politics in the FRY and in Serbia itself. Also on 24 September, the DOS candidate, Vojislav Kostunica, won against Slobodan Milosevic in the presidential elections. However, he was not able to assume office until 6 October, after mass street demonstrations had forced Milosevic to surrender in still disputed conditions.

6. This change of political dynamics was locked in by the resounding victory of DOS in the 23 December Serbian parliamentary elections (176 seats out of 250). A new government, headed by Zoran Djindjic, a long time opposition leader and one of the main architects of the electoral victory of Vojislav Kostunica, was formed in Serbia in the course of January 2001. With little delay the government set out to pass a number of important reforms to gradually eliminate the remnants of the old regime, democratise the country, and transform its economy so as to gradually integrate it into European and Western co-operation networks. Among the most significant early steps were the relatively rapid dismissal of many Milosevic “cronies” in the administration, police, and security services, including, in February, the former chief of the secret police, Rado Markovic; the abolition also in February, of the restrictive media law, and a major sweep in the judiciary so as to clear the way for the prosecution of Milosevic and his earlier entourage. Milosevic himself was arrested and jailed on 30 March.

7. One of the major uncertainties marking the domestic political scene, however, which could significantly hamper the management of the reforms, is the untidiness of the division of responsibilities between the Federal and Serbian levels of government. This lack of clarity is largely a heritage of the successive constitutional reforms engineered by Mr Milosevic since 1992 in order to perpetuate his hold on power. One of the consequences has been the gradual estrangement of Montenegro (see below). Between the Serbian and Federal levels of governments the former is certainly the strongest, and many believe that Serbian Prime Minister Djindjic would not mind the disappearance of the Federation, which would rid him of his popular rival in public opinion, Federal President Kostunica.

2. Yugoslavia’s new, co-operative foreign policy vis-à-vis neighbours and Euro‑Atlantic organisations

8. Immediately upon his assumption of power President Kostunica signalled his intention to break from the confrontational policies of his predecessor, which had led to the country’s isolation. This was manifested in early overtures to the European Union – the support of which was direly needed – contrasting with the distance maintained vis-à-vis the United States, which Belgrade kept blaming for the damage done to the country by NATO’s military operation of March 1999. It was also illustrated by Yugoslavia’s desire to reintegrate international institutions. Thus, the FRY was admitted to the Stability Pact on 26 October 2000, the United Nations on 1 November, the OSCE on 10 November, and the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development in December. In a variety of meetings with various leaders of the region, including Albania, Croatia, and Bosnia and Herzegovina, President Kostunica also signalled his intention to establish a new quality of bilateral relations with his neighbours. A remaining factor of ambiguity relates to his position vis-à-vis Bosnia. The conclusion of an “agreement on special parallel relations between Yugoslavia and Republika Srpska” in early March this year was perhaps not the right political signal to send at this time, although the EU has characterised it as “being in line with the 1995 Dayton/Paris” agreement.

9. Perhaps most striking in the attitude of the new Yugoslav Government, is its willingness to cooperate with NATO, a clear break from the past. This was manifested by the visit of Foreign Minister Svilanovic to NATO Headquarters in January, at the initiative of the Yugoslav Government, and more recently by the efforts to find a solution in co-operation with NATO to the problems of the Presevo Valley (see below). The FRY is also participating in the NATO-supported effort by the countries of the region to develop a common view of security risks and priorities in the form of a “South East Europe Common Assessment Paper” (SEECAP), and its Defence Minister has expressed the hope that the country could soon join Partnership for Peace.

10. One area in which the policy of the Yugoslav Government is disputed regards its attitude toward the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) in The Hague. Western governments have nominally made the delivery of Serb war criminals – and in priority former President Milosevic himself – the litmus test of Yugoslavia’s capacity to join Europe and the West. However, practical policies differ. European governments, separately and in the EU, have shown greater understanding for the Yugoslav position that it would be dangerous to do so at an early date, before democratic forces have sufficiently consolidated their hold on power. Some commentators also believe that a judgment of Serb war criminals in Serbia could have a positive cathartic effect on the collective mentality of the population. The debate became more heated in early April, following the arrest of Mr Milosevic, whom the ICTY claimed should be delivered to international justice before any proceedings be undertaken in Yugoslavia. Although the Government – partly under external pressure (see below) – has stepped up its practical and legal co-operation with the ICTY, President Kostunica has maintained his position that Mr Milosevic should first account for his crimes in the FRY (accusations pertain to corruption and abuse of power), before he can be delivered to The Hague. Going beyond the legal aspect, it is obvious that, like other countries that have had to deal with collective responsibility for war crimes or crimes against humanity, Yugoslavia will need time to confront its past.

3. Western policies

11. Generally speaking, the “divine surprise” of the change of regime in Yugoslavia has been welcome by NATO Allies, although echoing Belgrade’s attitude alluded to above, Europeans have been more forthcoming than Washington. As early as October 2000 the European Council decided to lift the sanctions imposed on the FRY since 1998, with the exception of those affecting Milosevic and his close associates; it issued an invitation to Belgrade to begin negotiations leading to a “Stabilisation and Association Agreement”; and declared the country eligible for a series of economic and technical assistance programmes from which it had been excluded. Newly-elected President Kostunica was invited to the EU Summit in Biarritz on 13‑14 October, at which the EU pledged to release 200 million Euros in emergency aid to help the FRY/Serbia through the winter. The FRY’s re-admission into regional fora was sealed by President Kostunica’s presence at the 24 November Summit of the Stability Pact in Zagreb. The FRY was included in the EU’s recently liberalised trade regime for the region in December.

12. Also in December, the United States began lifting the trade and financial sanctions imposed against Serbia in 1998 (again excluding those sanctions against members of the former regime), and it pledged some US$160 million in rapid energy, humanitarian and technical assistance for the winter. Much more clearly than the Europeans, however, the US has conditioned its continued assistance to demonstrable progress in the democratisation of the FRY/Serbia and its abidance by the Dayton Agreement and Security Council Resolution 1244 on Kosovo, placing special emphasis on the arrest of President Milosevic, the early transfer of some 15 indicted war criminals to The Hague and broader co-operation with the Tribunal. The arrest of Mr Milosevic on 30 March enabled the Administration to bypass a congressionally-mandated limitation to financial assistance to the FRY, making possible the full release of a promised US$ 100 million assistance package. However, support for the ICTY’s bid for an early judgment of Mr Milosevic in The Hague remains stronger in the US than in Europe.

13. Beyond these differences in appreciation, there is transatlantic agreement on the fact that it befalls upon the EU to steer the reintegration of the FRY/Serbia into the fold of European democracies and market economies, as is the case for the rest of South-Eastern Europe.

B. PENDING PROBLEMS

14. In this section your Co-Rapporteurs would like to review a number of problems making Serbia’s move to democracy and European institutions difficult politically. The challenges of economic reform are analysed by the Economics and Security Committee [Harry Cohen's Draft Interim Report The Serbian Economy: Reconstruction and Transition Challenges for post-Milosevic Serbia AU 104 EC/EW (01)].

1. Kosovo

15. Since the end of the NATO operation in June 1999, Kosovo has become an international protectorate, guarded by some 45.000 allied and partner troops, and administratively run by the United Nations – now under the stewardship of former Danish Minister of Defence and former NATO PA member Hans Haekkerup - and kept alive economically by external aid (the bulk of which is coming from the EU). Municipal elections on 28 October 2000 have to some extent clarified the picture as regards the balance of political forces in the Albanian community, giving a clear majority (58%) to moderate forces, but they have in no way resolved the problem of coexistence between the Albanian and Serb communities, no more than they have led to an end of the violence against Serbs and other minorities, or to a clarification of the future status of Kosovo. Legislative elections prepared by the UN and the OSCE (and perhaps to take place in the autumn) are expected to bring the province closer to the situation of self-administration foreseen in UN Security Council Resolution 1244. However, they will not resolve the basic question of Kosovo’s relations with Serbia.

2. The Presevo Valley and Macedonian Border

16. The winter 2000-2001 witnessed a significant escalation of the confrontation which had been developing since December 1999 in Southern Serbia, between the Albanian militias of the Liberation Army of Presevo, Medvedja and Bujanovac (UCPMB) and Serb/Yugoslav Governments. UCPMB militias took advantage of the 5 km (3 miles) wide Ground Safety Zone (GSZ), created along 400 km of the Kosovo-Serbian border by the June 1999 Military-Technical Agreement (MTA) between NATO and the Yugoslav Government, to consolidate their forces and launch increasingly violent attacks on Serb forces, police, and civilians. The UCPMB is vying for the secession of the region, where some 100,000 Albanians live, from Serbia, and for its integration within Kosovo.

17. The Yugoslav and Serb Governments have vowed to solve the problem diplomatically rather than by force, a welcome change from Milosevic’s policies. They have engaged in close co-operation with NATO and put forward a plan for the short and long term stabilisation of the area. The “Covic plan” (from the name of the Serbian Prime Minister), presented in early February, rules out annexation by Kosovo or autonomy for the areas where Albanians are in the majority, but seeks to address Albanian grievances by offering them large representation in government, police and judiciary structures at a local level and representation in the Serbian Government. It outlines a phased demilitarisation of the region, with security being ensured in the future by joint Serb‑Albanian police patrols. Further, it includes a plan for the economic development of the backward area, backed by international assistance.

18. Barring a more cooperative attitude by the Albanians, the Serb and Yugoslav Governments have argued that if NATO was unwilling to police the border region more effectively, the Yugoslav Army (VJ) and Serbian Military Police (MUP) should be allowed back into the GSZ (from which they had been banned by the MTA, except for a handful of lightly armed police), at least in the most sensitive areas. While initially reluctant to accede to that demand, NATO eventually relented in early March, accepting the redeployment of the Yugoslav and Serb forces in the southernmost part of the GSZ, next to the border between Kosovo and the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. Outbursts of violence on the border, and within the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia itself in February had made the search for a solution more urgent, an urgency that was confirmed by the wider outbreak of hostilities in the North of the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia in March [The situation in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia is analysed by Markus Meckel in an appendix to the Draft General Report of the Political Committee Key Issues of the Future of Transatlantic Relations and European Security AU 110 PC (01) 2)]. The Serb redeployment, however, was to occur in a strictly defined area, under NATO’s close monitoring, and to exclude those units which had been involved in the past in the worst acts of repression against the Albanians. In addition, it was to be accompanied by the beginning of negotiations between Belgrade and the region’s Albanians for a long term political settlement. The negotiations, made possible after NATO had brokered a ceasefire on 12 March, are to be based on the Covic plan.

19. Even though they apply to a fairly small swath of territory, it is particularly important for Presevo Valley negotiations to succeed, for a failure would: (i) worsen the risk of destabilisation in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia; (ii) further entertain the climate of inter-communal tensions in Kosovo; (iii) continue to be an unwelcome “distraction” for the Serb and Yugoslav Governments, at a time when they need to focus on urgent matters of domestic institutional and economic reform. Somewhat ironically, a positive fallout of the Presevo Valley developments is that they have provided a stepping stone for the appeasement of relations between NATO and the FRY/Serbia, on the basis of practical co-operation.

3. Montenegro

20. Following the disintegration of old Yugoslavia, Serbia and Montenegro re-established a federal type of arrangement in 1992, in which institutional and functional links were loose, but political bonds strong. Those political relations, however, gradually deteriorated as a result of the desire of a part of the Montenegrin leadership to end the international isolation to which the country was confined by Milosevic’s policies. This led, in July 1997, to a split in the ruling Party of Democratic Socialists (PDS), followed in October by the election of Milo Djukanovic to the Republic’s presidency. From then on, the Montenegrin Government set about detaching the tiny province (650,000 inhabitants) from the federal institutions, gradually endowing it with the attributes of a state. The estrangement grew during the Kosovo crisis, as a result of Montenegro’s decision to stay out of the fray. Serbia reacted with a trade blockade (partial in summer 1999, total after March 2000), leading Montenegro to turn to the outside world for assistance, and to step up its independence drive. This included the establishment of a Montenegrin Customs Administration, the introduction of the Deutschmark as the national currency (November 1999), the creation of a central bank, the build-up of a 12,000 to 15,000 strong militarised police force, as well as a diplomatic offensive to gain Western countries’ and neighbours’ support for the independence cause. De facto, that cause was helped by the change in the federal constitution imposed by Milosevic in July 2000, aiming, among others, at diminishing the power of Montenegro in federal institutions. The Montenegrin presidency’s decision to boycott those institutions entirely, led to the government coalition’s abstention in the Yugoslav elections of 23 September 2000. Thus, Montenegro is only represented by a handful of opposition Socialist People’s Party (SNP) members in the Federal Parliament. The increasing estrangement between Montenegro and Serbia was epitomised by the fact that the once pro-Milosevic SNP eventually allied with the democratic forces in Belgrade to provide a government majority to President Kostunica in October.

21. While President Milosevic still ruled the FRY, Montenegro’s bid for independence was subdued, for fear of violent repression. The coming to power of a moderate government in Belgrade, however, emboldened the Montenegrin President to step up his campaign for the sovereignty of his province. President Djukanovic´s call for early elections on 22 April 2001 – with large support from the Parliament - was an attempt to up the ante for a referendum on independence. The election outcome, however, provided him with less than a clear mandate. With roughly 55% of the votes going to pro-independence forces and 45% against, the President now has to reconsider his strategy, possibly exploring a compromise formula with Belgrade. Whether he can secure a mandate to that end from political allies in Podgorica remains to be seen.

22. The election outcome brought some relief among foreign governments. External reactions to Montenegro’s drive for independence had been less than enthusiastic on both sides of the Atlantic, as well as in Russia. Weary of the outbreaks of hostilities which have accompanied the successive stages of dismembering of the former Yugoslavia, and fearing its consequences on Kosovo and Bosnia, the European and American Governments had expressed in no uncertain terms their lack of support. The 22 April results now make more likely the outcome advocated for some time by experts from respected institutions such at the International Crisis Group and the European Security Initiative, i.e. a pragmatic process of negotiation focussing on the substance of the relations that Serbia and Montenegro would want to entertain in the future in trade, communications, currency, foreign affairs, defence, citizenship, etc., without prejudging the outcome. Actually, there is a fair amount of overlap between the positions of the parties, as outlined since late 2000, and agreement should therefore be possible in a number of areas. Alliance countries may want to encourage this process through gentle diplomatic nudging without getting directly involved.

23. The risk that the independence of Montenegro would have a “domino effect” on the many other irredentist groups in the region can, in the view of your Co-Rapporteurs, be warded off through appropriate Western policies. Each conflict area in the Balkans needs to be addressed on its own merits. While the sovereignty of Bosnia and the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia cannot be questioned, and Kosovo’s future must be dealt with in full respect of Resolution 1244, the independence of Montenegro need not have damaging effects. A resolution of the “Montenegro question” is urgent, in any event, in order to clarify the roles and responsibilities between Serbia and the Federation, so that political leaders can focus their attention on the huge challenges of political and economic reform ahead. Should a negotiation result in Montenegro´s independence, it would demonstrate that also in the Balkans, political arrangements can be redefined through negotiation rather than by force.

II. BELARUS

24. At the Annual Session in Berlin (November 2000), the Committee on the Civil Dimension of Security had a long discussion on Belarus. The background of the debate was the question of what kind of relations the Assembly should entertain, if any, with the National Assembly (Parliament) of Belarus. Belarus’s Associate status was suspended in 1997, following a constitutional referendum (1996) that enabled recently elected President Lukashenko to “change the rules of the game”, putting an end to the term of the existing Parliament (13^th Supreme Soviet) and hand-picking an acquiescent National Assembly. New regulations for parliamentary elections were eventually passed on the basis of the 1996 Constitution, allowing for the choice of a new National Assembly in October 2000. However, the electoral legislation and, more importantly, the conditions in which the consultation took place were deemed “short of meeting the minimum commitments for free, fair, equal, accountable, and transparent elections” by the OSCE. As a result, the Standing Committee of the NATO PA felt that it would be premature to lift Belarus’s suspension (the OSCE and Council of Europe Parliamentary Assemblies have adopted a similar approach). However, they encouraged the initiative of the Committee to organise a fact-finding visit to Belarus, so as to gain a better understanding of developments in the country.

25. The visit took place on 25-27 March, in the form of a joint delegation of the Standing Committee and Sub-Committee on Democratic Governance, headed by Markus Meckel, Vice‑President of the NATO PA, and Alice Mahon, Chairperson of the Sub-Committee. Over two days the delegation held extensive discussions with the diplomatic community, representatives of the government and National Assembly, opposition forces, and representatives of the civil society. The present report summarises those findings that are most relevant to the NATO PA. Further details can be found in the report submitted to the Standing Committee in Rome [AU 28 SC (01) 8] and the press release spelling out the Standing Committee decision [4 PR – CC/DG (01), in file].

A. GENERAL POLITICAL AND SOCIOLOGICAL TRENDS

26. From the discussions held by the delegation and the results of recent opinion polls, it is obvious that a wide spectrum of the Belorussian population would like to see a loosening of government control in favour of a wider distribution of political and economic power, and greater reliance on the market and private enterprise. Further, “actors of change” are engaged in all wakes of life – the media, politics, the environment, women’s rights, think tanks, trade unions, etc. However, they remain a minority, and apathy is still prevailing in large swaths of the population. In the words of the U.K ambassador to Minsk, there exists in Belarus “a foundation for change in the future”. The question is how long it will take for the small, involved groups and individuals to build up the “critical mass” necessary to impel a transformation of the system. The greatest potential for change, in the eyes of several members of the delegation, lies in the trade unions, which, unlike other groups, have a wide membership (Belarus has four million unionised workers, out of a population of about ten million), and are beginning to express deep discontent at the government’s social and economic policies. Timewise, a key moment of recognition of Belarus’s potential for change will be the presidential election due later this year (see below).

27. Despite the slow pace of domestic change and the repressive nature of the regime, the delegation was sensitive to the argument made by Western diplomats that it would be a mistake to isolate Belarus, leaving her no other option but “to throw herself in the arms of Russia”. Differences arose, however, both within the delegation and in the diplomatic community, as to whether current Western policies had that effect or not. The recommendations formulated by the delegation at the end of the visit aimed at communicating to the Belorussians a clear message that Europe is interested in them and that they have a due place in Europe. They were endorsed, with one important modification regarding the Parliament (see below), by the Standing Committee meeting in Rome on 30 March.

B. THE DEMOCRATIC PROCESS AND ELECTIONS

28. Successive international delegations that have visited Belarus recently (EU Troika on 8‑9 February; European Parliament, OSCE and Council of Europe Parliamentary Assemblies Troika on 5-7 March), have pointed to the country’s shortcomings on the democratic front. Basic freedoms such as freedom of speech, association, demonstration, freedom of the press, the right to due process of law, workers’ rights, etc., are frequently violated. The judiciary remains largely submissive to the executive power; the regime has failed to seriously investigate the disappearance of leading opposition figures; and the harassment of political opponents remains common. When rights are not denied directly, obstacles arise such as the rationing of printing material for the print media; loss of jobs for active trade unionists; denial of study places for politically engaged students, etc. These sanctions are not applied systematically but their arbitrary use contributes to entertain an atmosphere of fear, and to dissuade political and social commitment as one never knows whether and how harsh one will have to pay for criticism of the executive.

29. Elections have focused the international community’s attention on the many freedoms that may be infringed upon on that occasion, leading to a severe assessment of last October’s parliamentary elections, as pointed out earlier. Problems affected the registration of voters and candidates, media access, obstruction of independent observation, and the wide scope for fraud created by the encouragement of early voting (up to 5 days in advance). Among the conditions for free elections that have been identified by international observers, two in particular were brought to the attention of the delegation as deserving special care in the context of the forthcoming presidential elections: the possibility for opposition candidates to have fair access to the State media; and the freedom for domestic independent groups to observe the proceedings.

30. The media issue, actually, transcends the question of elections. Independent media are very weak, whether in the printing or the broadcasting world, for several reasons. One is the unavailability of financing, due to the underdevelopment of Belarus’s private economy; another is the lack of know-how; yet another is related to the various forms of harassment to which private media are subject, from lawsuits to the seizure of newspapers, to restrictions on printing paper availability and the imposition of fines so unbearable that they leave news outlets and printing establishments no other choice but to close. Ambassador Wieck, the Head of the OSCE’s Advisory and Monitoring Group in Minsk (AMG), estimates the circulation of independent print media conveying a political message at some 200,000 weekly, against 500,000 daily for State newspapers. Besides, independent media are hardly available in the provinces because of distribution problems.

31. The situation in the broadcast media is even worse, with very few free radio channels and no private Belorussian television channels. Actually, the main sources of independent news are the two Russian television channels, NTV and TV6, which cover between them close to 90% of Belarus’s territory, and in the West of the country, Polish television channels. There is much speculation in Minsk about the role of Russian television outlets in the forthcoming presidential elections, in parallel with the discussions about the potential influence of the Russian Government itself (see below). NTV’s message has been strongly critical of President Lukashenko in the past, but this could change with the Russian authorities' gaining control of the channel. TV6 has also been unsympathetic, in a milder fashion. Whether either or both could serve as campaign vehicles for the opposition remains to be seen. It has to be noticed that television will play a key role in the campaign, given the limited availability of the printed press. Also taking into account the limited access of opposition members to the State media – despite the sustained efforts of the OSCE to enforce this legally-recognised right – the message communicated by the Russian channels will have a crucial influence on the outcome.

32. Election observation is one of the key conditions for fraud and irregularities to be exposed to a large public, as demonstrated in the autumn 2000 parliamentary consultation - and even more patently at the same moment by the Yugoslav experience. It is also a legally-enshrined right, just like opposition access to state media. Last October, a cohesive network of domestic observers had been set up by the OSCE’s AMG, with the technical and financial assistance of Western public and private organisations. However, plans to reinforce that network and train new observers could now be put in jeopardy by Decree #8, issued by the President on 12 March and in force since 1 April, which subjects to minute government control the type of international aid that has helped NGOs and civic organisations to organise just such observation, and supported free media outlets. Whether and how Decree #8 is actually implemented – some diplomats believe that it only ratifies an already existing situation – it is clearly aimed at undermining the efforts spearheaded by the OSCE’s AMG to organise and train domestic observers for the forthcoming presidential elections. It is also widely interpreted in the country as a sign of the insecurity of President Lukashenko. Being prone to believe in conspiracies, the President sees the creation of an integrated system of observation, together with the ongoing process of unification of the opposition (see below), as the emergence of an obscure force directed against him. Further crackdowns on NGO and opposition activities in the context of the elections therefore cannot be ruled out.

C. THE POWERS OF PARLIAMENT

33. The question of the powers of the Belorussian Parliament is important to the NATO PA in the sense that the Assembly cannot consider having as an Associate member a body which is nothing but the mouthpiece of an autocrat. It is, however, not an easy one to answer, and it was one of the bones of contention among opposition forces in the autumn legislative elections. In the end, only a small part of the opponents to President Lukashenko participated, while the majority boycotted the consultation, both on account of the lack of freedom and fairness of the election process, and because they feared cooptation by the powers-that-be.

34. This being said, all political forces met by the delegation, whether in or outside Parliament, consider that the National Assembly must reinforce its powers vis-à-vis the President. This desire is expressed, however, in different degrees. While the President’s supporters explain that they have proposals in the work to that end, opposition members in Parliament give concrete examples on how they are using the powers they possess to call the government to account. The extra-parliamentary opposition, for its part, continues to claim that the Parliament is only a legitimising instrument of Lukashenko; therefore there is no reason to risk being compromised by participating.

35. It was, of course, difficult for the delegation on the basis of a two-day visit to assess the validity of the arguments of the opposition in and outside Parliament, each side obviously trying to justify its choice in the last elections. Members were, however, impressed by the determination by the small opposition in the National Assembly (3-4 deputies) to assert their rights. They were also pleased to learn that the opposition seems to have a potential for support among other MPs, as indicated by the fact that each of its members received 10-12 votes in the nomination for leadership positions in Parliament last fall (out of 97 members). They were also sensitive to the argument made by Ms Abramova, one of the leading opposition figures in Parliament, that her holding an elected position had made it much easier for her to work with her constituents without fearing harassment by the authorities.

36. The delegation recommended to the Standing Committee that Ms Abramova be invited as a special guest to the Vilnius session, as a sign of encouragement to the budding opposition, short of any kind of recognition of the National Assembly. It was not followed on this point by the Standing Committee.

37. The question of the powers of Parliament, in the end, may be as much a political as a legal one. Should President Lukashenko be toppled in the autumn elections, many analysts and political actors seem to suggest that the dynamics of power between Parliament and the executive branch could change, leading key opposition figures to alter their position even before the letter of the law has been amended.

D. THE FORTHCOMING PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS

38. The presidential elections to be held later this year will be a test of Belarus’s democratic capacity in many ways, including through the possibility of alternance in power at the top. Several opposition leaders have indicated their intention to compete against President Lukashenko. They include Mikhail Chigir, Prime Minister between 1994-96, who resigned in protest against the 1996 constitutional referendum, tried to run in the presidential elections of 1999, but was prevented to do so by temporary imprisonment under dubious allegations; Vladimir Goncharik, Head of the (official) Belorussian Federation of Trade Unions and a former member of the 13^th Supreme Soviet; Pavel Kozlovsky, former Minister of Defence, who was dismissed along with the whole government following Lukashenko’s victory in the 1994 presidential elections; and Semion Domash, former member of the 13^th Supreme Soviet, former Head of the Regional Executive Committee of Grodno, the only regional leader to have openly defied the President at the time of the 1996 referendum.

39. Key issues are the opposition’s appeal in the electorate and its capacity to unite. According to outside observers and analysts, extra-parliamentary opposition forces represent no more than 10-15% (at most 20%) of the electorate, and none of the leading candidates was credited with more than 5% of the votes (as against some 40% for President Lukashenko) at the time of the visit. In order for one of the opposition leaders to win in the next elections, he/she would have to gather the support of large groups in society that are dissatisfied with the current leadership but have so far refrained from entering into action. This includes a large number of industrial and agricultural workers who can be mobilised through the trade unions, and some parts of the “nomenklatura” who are keen to see the system evolve.

40. This potential for change would more likely be realised if the opposition succeeded in uniting its forces. The disastrous consequences of failing to do so in the past seem to be starting to “hit home”. At the beginning of the year, Messrs Chigir, Goncharik and Kozlovksly basically agreed to support, among the three of them, the one who was best positioned in the race. In late March, it seemed that Mr Domash was inclined to join that agreement.

41. Asked about the wisdom of maintaining four candidates (or more) in the race at this time, the opposition leaders told the delegation that this was a tactical choice aimed at protecting themselves against the regime. A single candidate would be easy to target, politically or legally (for example by being denied registration). It was therefore safer to “keep several horses in the race” at least until after registration and perhaps until after the first round. Western diplomats stressed that the combination of the four current leaders was probably the best coalition to gather broad-based support in the population, with Mr Chigir appealing to the disgruntled elements in the bureaucracy, Mr Goncharik to rebelling trade union members (whether State-run or independent), General Kozlovsky to parts of the army, and Mr Domash providing a regional base to the opposition movement.

42. Much speculation is taking place among Belorussian intellectual elites about the role that the Russian Government could play in the presidential elections – in parallel with discussions of the role of the Russian press. President Lukashenko has clearly lost his appeal in Moscow, as President Putin is reluctant to back a leader with such a poor image in the West whilst he is trying to improve relations with Europe, and because Belorussian economic reforms are lagging at a time when the two countries have made a commitment to integrate their economies and currencies. Russia has reportedly been looking for an alternative candidate to President Lukashenko. However, it does not seem to have been successful at this stage, and time is running short as the presidential elections have to take place at the latest in October. NATO diplomats tend to believe that, unable to find a satisfactory option, Moscow will adopt a “wait and see” attitude, and refrain from favouring one candidate or the other. Unless a Kostunica-like figure suddenly appeared on the political scene – not a very likely perspective – the chances of President Lukashenko being granted another four-year term are fairly high.

E. BELARUS’S RELATIONS WITH NATO

43. Belarus is a member of Partnership for Peace and its government is keen to remind the Allies that it resumed its co-operation with NATO before Russia, following the Kosovo crisis. Belarus, already a NATO neighbour since Poland joined the Alliance, is obviously concerned by the perspective of further NATO enlargement, and would like to deepen consultations with NATO on the matter. The Allies, however, are demonstrating little eagerness to increase their co‑operation with Belarus at this time, hoping that this will send a clear message to President Lukashenko that he has to mend his ways domestically before he can expect a more co‑operative Western attitude.

III. KALININGRAD

44. Since the autumn 2000 Kaliningrad has been the subject of much media attention, and much rumour in its wake. For a brief stint this winter, Western concerns focussed on allegations that Russia may be using the region for the forward positioning of tactical nuclear weapons. No conclusive evidence was brought to settle the matter. Most of the debate about Kaliningrad, however, revolved around the consequences of European Union enlargement for the region itself, as well as for its neighbours, primarily Poland and Lithuania. With Polish and Lithuanian membership of the EU approaching, Kaliningrad, already an “island” in Western lands 600 km away from motherland Russia, would soon become an enclave in EU territory. Kaliningrad citizens, backed by Russia, fear that they will be isolated from the motherland politically, economically and in human terms. Allegations have also appeared in the local press that EU membership could be a cover for a “re-germanisation” of the former Koenigsberg. Kaliningrad residents, however, hope to be able to benefit from the new opportunities created by EU extension. Russia, on the other hand, is worried that the growing singularity of the province might encourage autonomous aspirations there – undermining the administrative re-centralisation which President Putin has made a hallmark of his policies. The Russian concerns, of course, would be magnified by the prospect of Lithuania entering NATO, a possible outcome of the Alliance’s revision of its enlargement strategy in 2002.

45. Lithuania and Poland, for their part, would like to see the problems of Kaliningrad, in particular those related to border control, resolved soon, least this might negatively impact on their EU membership. As one of Kaliningrad’s main trading partners and its main transit route to the Russian mainland, Lithuania is also keen that solutions be found for the enclave’s economic development and its communication with the outside in a way that fosters economic and political stability in the area.

46. The European Union has been trying to address these concerns, making it clear in its June 2000 Feira conclusions about the Northern Dimension that Kaliningrad would be a priority issue, and following up with a Commission communication on “The EU and Kaliningrad” in January this year. The communication has received the approval of the Council of Ministers. Your Co‑Rapporteurs propose to analyse the main points raised in this document, also taking into account Russia’s remarks from 6 March and its official response to the Commission on 19 March. Prior to this analysis, however, they have deemed it useful to provide some background information about the enclave.

A. BACKGROUND

47. The region of Kaliningrad is a Russian enclave bordered by Poland, Lithuania and the Baltic Sea (see map). It has a surface of 15,100 km2 and a population of about 950,000 inhabitants, almost half of whom are concentrated in the capital. In Russian administrative terms, it belongs to the North-Western Federal District (Russia has seven such districts), whose capital is St. Petersburg.

48. With the loss of the Baltic States, Kaliningrad is important strategically for Russia as this is the only Russian port on the Baltic that does not freeze in winter. The Russian military presence, however, has diminished significantly over the past ten years, with the current number of military personnel in the region variously assessed at between 18,000 and 25,000 (from a total of 200,000 during the Cold War), plus some 5000 Border Guard troops and some 1000 Internal Forces.

49. Accordingly, the direct economic importance of the military has greatly diminished. However, it remains of some weight in the sense that many retired military personnel have opted to stay in the region and are engaged - as are some active military - in the “shadow economy”. The latter is estimated to account for more than 50% of GDP. Today, the main industries are oil and amber extraction (the province holds some 90% of world reserves of amber); oil is extracted offshore and refined in Lithuania, while virtually all of the amber is smuggled abroad. The fishing industry, once prosperous, has largely collapsed. The designation of the whole of the Kaliningrad area as a Special Economic Zone in 1996, then touted as the first step in its transformation into the “Hong Kong of the Baltics”, has not had the desired driver’s effect.

50. Kaliningrad’s social indicators are bad. The standard of living is lower than the already poor Russian average, with 30% of the population estimated to live below subsistence level. Communicable diseases such as AIDS, tuberculosis, syphilis, diphteria, measles, and paratyphoid have spread at an alarming rate over the past few years due to the prevalence of drug abuse and prostitution. Sanitary conditions are deteriorating, and the region is only second to St. Petersburg as a major source of Baltic Sea pollution, generating more than 400,000 tons of domestic and industrial waste every year. Feeding on weak institutions and the dire economic situation, criminality is thriving. Official statistics put the crime rate at 20% above the Russian average, with the region playing an important role as a hub of organised crime.

51. As summarized by Swedish Prime Minister Goeran Persson, “Almost every problem imaginable can be found in Kaliningrad”, well justifying that the EU should grant the province particular attention. Sweden, as a Baltic Sea neighbour, has made Kaliningrad a priority of its presidency (1 January – 30 June 2001).

B. TACKLING THE PROBLEMS: EU’S PROPOSALS AND THE RUSSIAN RESPONSE

52. In good logic, the Commission’s communication divides the consequences of enlargement for Kaliningrad into two sets: 1) those that are specific to the province; they relate mainly to the movement of goods, people, and the supply of energy; 2) those that relate to broader areas in which the EU would like to step up its co-operation with Russia, e.g. economic development, the environment, the fight against crime, and health care. Your Co-Rapporteurs will take these two categories in turn.

1. EU ENLARGEMENT ISSUES SPECIFICALLY RELATED TO KALININGRAD

a. The movement of goods

53. The Commission makes a fairly convincing argument that the adoption by Poland and Lithuania of the EU’s acquis will benefit Russian goods, since the common external tariff will be lower than the ones previously applied by the two countries. Russia does not seem to have an argument with this. It does, however, express pointed concerns on the transit aspect of trade, defending the view that there should be “untrammelled transit” between Kaliningrad and the rest of Russia. In addition, Russia makes it clear that military transit “is beyond the EU acquis and thus may be regulated with Lithuania on a bilateral basis”. In this regard, the Russians have recently voiced the desire to review the existing agreement.

54. Russia sees positively European proposals for major improvements in border crossing facilities and procedures, and in infrastructures such as port facilities, road, rail, and air links, as well as the development of multi-modal transport strategies for the region. These projects would be supported by the PHARE and TACIS programmes. This would also be welcome by Lithuania, which, as said above, would like to avoid disruptions in trade links resulting from enlargement. Poland is also interested, but to a lesser extent, although improvements in border crossings and customs procedures would greatly benefit its neighbouring Warmia-Mazury region, one of the country’s poorest.

b. The movement of people

55. This is perhaps the most sensitive issue in the definition of an EU-compatible regime for Kaliningrad. The Commission document makes it clear that the current visa-free transit arrangements with Poland and Lithuania will have to be discontinued, as the new member states will have to apply the common visa policy of the Schengen area. The most the EU seems ready to concede is a willingness to consider the suitability of Community rules on small border traffic and transit for the specific situation of Kaliningrad. Otherwise, the solutions it proposes are mainly of a technical nature, as pointed out by the Russian response. Moscow would have liked a more “political” approach. Like for trade transit, the Commission stresses the necessity to improve the efficiency of border crossings through the upgrading of facilities and procedures, and states the EU’s readiness to assist in the field. Other practical solutions suggested include a reduction of Russian passport costs (currently, Kaliningrad residents can travel back and forth to Russia without a passport); a reduction of visa costs, to be granted by EU member states; and the opening of new consulates in the province by the EU countries. This leaves Russia less that satisfied. Moscow would like to ensure that Kaliningrad residents are granted free one-year term visas for crossing Lithuania, Poland and Latvia. It also requests that non-Kaliningrad Russian citizens be able to travel visa-free between the province and the mainland, provided they use pre‑determined routes.

c. Energy

56. Kaliningrad produces only 20% of its own energy needs and is almost totally dependent on imported energy, which comes from Russia via a common grid with Lithuania. As Lithuania envisages a link to the Central Europe electricity grid, Kaliningrad will have to re-think its energy supply, either switching also to the Central Europe grid, or adapting its infrastructure to remain connected to Russian supply sources, or increasing its own production. Russia would prefer a combination of the latter two. The building of a new power plant, however, is sure to be resisted by the Union. At this point the Commission is careful, suggesting that a TACIS study be undertaken to analyse possible scenarios, also taking into account projects underway for new gas pipelines in the Baltic region.

d. Fisheries

57. Here Russia’s concern is that after enlargement, the Baltic Sea will almost become an exclusive EU fisheries zone. The Commission proposes to take this into account in the context of a yet-to-be negotiated new Russia-EU fisheries agreement. Russia, however, expresses doubts that this will happen soon enough to offset the effect of enlargement on Kaliningrad (and St. Petersburg as well).

2. OTHER ISSUES OF CONCERN REGARDING KALININGRAD

a. Economic development

58. Despite Kaliningrad’s momentous economic problems, the Commission suggests that these be tackled in the context of existing EU programmes, in particular TACIS and regional policies, also taking into account the heavy involvement of regional organisations such as the Nordic Council, the Council of the Baltic Sea States, and the Nordic Council and its financial institutions (Nordic Investment Bank, Nordic Environmental Financing Corporation). To those should be added EBRD and World Bank projects, as well as the active technical and financial assistance of several member states, primarily Denmark, Sweden, Germany, and Finland. Kaliningrad has received some 30 million euros in TACIS assistance since 1991.

59. A contentious issue might be to what extent Kaliningrad’s problems could be addressed through the EU’s regional policies, since regionalisation might mean loss of control from the centre. Russia’s medium term strategy for the development of its relations with the EU, published in 1999, makes it clear that the authority of Moscow over the enclave should be preserved, conceding that Kaliningrad could, at best, fulfil the role of a pilot region in the relations between Russia and the EU. On the other hand, one cannot rule out the possibility that the election of Admiral Yegorov, a close ally of President Putin, as Kaliningrad’s governor in 2000, would paradoxically give the province greater breathing space. However, the Admiral is a firm believer in control from the centre.

b. Governance, democracy and the rule of law

60. One of the foci of TACIS is to help with the improvement of public administration and judicial reform, a major task in Kaliningrad as well as in the rest of Russia. The EU particularly stresses the need for action to combat illegal activities, pointing that the improvement of border facilities and procedures, needed to facilitate travel and transit, will also play an important role in the fight against crime. It also praises Russia for its active role in the Task Force on Organised Crime in the Baltic region, which has successfully been conducting joint, multi-disciplinary law enforcement operations since 1996. Efforts to combat crime in Kaliningrad have to be placed in the context of the broader programmes, which the EU is trying to promote with Russia as part of its Action Plan for the Northern Dimension, initiated in June 2000, and its Common Strategy on Russia, launched a year earlier.

c. The Environment

60. As alluded to above, Kaliningrad’s environmental situation is calamitous, justifying that environmental clean-up and pollution reduction have been a focal point of EU assistance. In the immediate future the largest efforts will go to reducing water pollution in the Baltic Sea, as this affects all riparian states, and to improving water quality and sewage treatment in the District. The EU does not rule out that problems of disposal of nuclear waste might also have to be tackled in the future, and points out that stockpiles of chemical weapons dating back from World War II will have to be dismantled.

d. Communicable diseases

61. The high incidence of communicable diseases in Kaliningrad, in particular AIDS, is a major concern for neighbouring countries. EU member countries in the region, in particular Denmark and Finland, have taken the lead in co-operative efforts to address the problem. Initiatives are co-ordinated by a Task Force for Communicable Disease Control, created under the auspices of the Council of the Baltic Sea States in April 2000.

3. THE POLITICS OF NEGOTIATING OVER KALININGRAD

62. As pointed out in a recent Polish study, Moscow’s policy over Kaliningrad has remained unclear and suffered frequent U-turns since the beginning of the 1990s (Overcoming alienation; Kaliningrad as a Russian enclave inside the EU, Steffan Batory Foundation, Warsaw, January 2001). The main concern of the central government at present, as alluded to above, seems to be that the changes in the “EU’s rules of the game” in the region could lead to estrange the province from the mainland. These concerns should be alleviated by the EU’s position that issues related to Kaliningrad should be discussed within the framework of the EU/Russia Partnership and Co-operation Agreement (PCA), the main forum for the management of EU-Russia relations. Moscow, at the same time, is unhappy with the EU’s plans to have the negotiations broken down into the 15 PCA committees, as this will make it more difficult to have a comprehensive view of the progress being achieved and limit the scope for bargaining. The EU, for its part, is reluctant to agree to the creation of a single committee devoted to Kaliningrad within the PCA, as this could lead to Russian pressure for a special agreement enshrining Russian interests. In a February speech in Kaliningrad, however, Finnish Foreign Minister Erkki Tuomioja suggested that such a joint body could be formed, but he linked it specifically to the interest of bringing into the negotiation the area’s regional authorities. It is far from clear that the proposal would suit Moscow. One therefore cannot rule out that tensions could arise between the desire of local elites eager to take advantage of the benefits that Kaliningrad’s geographic encirclement by the EU could bring, and a centre determined to keep it on a short leash for a combination of political, ideological and strategic reasons. The EU must brace itself to face an uncomfortable negotiating position.

63. An easier question, paradoxically, may be the involvement of the neighbours in the process. The EU and Russia seem to agree that meetings should be organised on a multilateral basis with Poland and Lithuania when relevant. But perhaps, here again, the devil is in the details.

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