1.
As NATO has worked to transform itself
during the past decade, the Alliance has asked its members’ militaries to carry
out a host of new missions. Gone is the
traditional need for territorial defence while new hotbeds of instability
outside the NATO area today threaten European security. Therefore, NATO forces
have had to become more mobile, able to rapidly perform out-of-area
missions. Some member countries have
moved more quickly than others to develop the new capabilities needed. This has
increased existing imbalances within the Alliance. While these imbalances already existed prior to 1999, the recent
Kosovo air operation has made them all the more apparent. In order to improve NATO’s combined
capabilities and gradually close the
technology gap, the Defence Capabilities Initiative (DCI) was launched at the
1999 Washington Summit. This initiative
is a tool or checklist against which the Alliance can improve its capabilities and better prepare NATO to meet its broadened set of security
obligations, as outlined in the Strategic Concept.
2.
The Sub-Committee’s report last year focused on factors leading to the
creation of the DCI, including analysis of the technology gap, the Revolution
in Military Affairs, and the long-standing debate on the burden-sharing among
member states. Given the justified ambition of the European allies to play a
more significant role, while taking up more responsibility for their own
defence and security, the DCI is proving an effective tool to gradually reduce
the technology gap and have a fairer burden-sharing. Europeans will have to develop their capabilities to the greatest
extent so as to reduce their reliance on the United States, in particular in
key areas such as strategic lift and surveillance. The DCI will thus contribute
to strengthen the European pillar within the Alliance, while giving momentum to
the development of the European Union’s European Security and Defence Policy
(ESDP).
3.
Moreover, last year’s paper described how the DCI will be implemented,
including the Alliance’s force planning process. Therefore, these subjects will be referred to only briefly in
this year’s report. It should be borne
in mind that the DCI is an outgrowth of NATO’s 1999 Strategic Concept, which
broadened the range of operations that might involve the Alliance. Among these, the most likely are non-Article
5 operations that address new challenges to security, such as peacekeeping and
humanitarian intervention in crisis areas.
This means that the Alliance must adjust its military capabilities if it
wants to avoid the risk of being unable to meet future emergencies.
4.
Against this backdrop, Chapter two of
this year's report will give an overview and update of the progress of the DCI
almost two years after its launch, according to the information and evidence
provided by the NATO officials working on the DCI itself. Chapter three focuses on the defence reforms
underway in many of NATO member countries as well as their budget implications.
Chapter four considers ways in which allies are promoting defence co-operation,
both at the political and industrial level, in order to procure their
equipment. Chapter five links the DCI
with the issue of parliamentary scrutiny. This is an important aspect given
that many of the documents concerning the DCI are classified - depending on
national legislation - and even MPs
have no access to them. This limits their capability to scrutinise their
militaries' and governments' action.
5.
Officials at many national missions to NATO who were interviewed for
this paper agree that the DCI has made a promising start and is generally on
track, but given the timeframe for the completion of many individual DCI items,
in particular equipment-development items, it is simply too soon to evaluate
its real success or failure. This
chapter focuses on the progress made in the implementation of the individual
items under the five headline categories, with specific reference to the last
six months. Promising progress has also
been made on a more general level, in particular in relation to the work of the
High-Level Steering Group (HLSG). The
Sub-Committee was to visit NATO Headquarters in May 2001 to learn more about
the DCI and how it affects the NATO force planning process; the findings from
those meetings will be incorporated into the final report this Autumn.
6.
In brief, it should be recalled that the DCI is a compendium of 58
items, divided into five headline categories, each of which constitutes a key
capability area needing improvement. These are: Deployability and Mobility
(moving forces to crisis areas, using for example air and sea lift
capabilities); Sustainability and Logistics (keeping troops supplied with
adequate logistic support, such as food, shelter and equipment); Effective
Engagement (the development of adequate firepower needed for successfully
defeating the enemy); Survivability of Forces and Infrastructure (improvement
of forces’ ability to defend against weapons of mass destruction, i.e. against
chemical, biological and nuclear attacks); and Command and Control (C2)
Information Systems (improving allied communications systems, such as secure
radios).
7.
Enhanced Deployability and Mobility
is probably the aspect of DCI that has received the greatest attention. This is
not surprising for an Alliance increasingly concerned with security challenges
outside its own borders. Most of the
items included under this headline are relatively low-technology assets, which
are expensive but mostly exist already.
Thus, the main problem is of a financial nature. Nevertheless, nations appear willing to make
large transport air and sealift purchase, as shown, for example, by the
decision of seven nations (Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Spain, Turkey, and
the United Kingdom) to acquire the A400M large aircraft and the UK decision to
purchase new roll-on roll-off logistics ships.
An aspect in need of further development under this headline is the definition
of regulations to gain access to civilian assets (freighters, for example) in
times of crisis. While many nations have already established such regulations
for Article 5 operations, fewer have been created for non-Article 5 operations.
8.
In the field of Command and
Control Information Systems, work is progressing well, particularly in the
development of interoperability and definitions of allied standards. Member
countries are acquiring some of the types of equipment outlined in this
eight-item section of the DCI; for example, combat identification and
deployable command and control capabilities. NATO also plans to develop a C3
architecture to assist allies in their future choice of interoperable
systems. One advantage in this field is
that several ad hoc committees have been in existence for some time to develop
C2 systems thus laying a basis for further work. The challenges for
this headline are equally divided between resources and technology. Designing a product that suits all and is
fully interoperable is often not simple; however, the challenges are not
insurmountable.
9.
Effective
Engagement is the largest of the headline categories with 22 items, including
procurement of high-cost assets such as Suppression of Enemy Air Defence
(SEAD), Alliance Ground Surveillance (AGS) and all-weather precision-guided
munitions. Nations are making good
general progress in this area, such as upgrading combat aircraft and stand-off
munitions. However, individual large-purchase items such as SEAD and AGS are
proving to be more problematic. AGS
acquisition by NATO, for example, has been deadlocked for the past two years in
a transatlantic argument over a European stake in the radar. Effective
engagement items are usually high cost because they require a major effort in
the research and development of new systems and technologies. As indicated
above, this is not the case with deployability and mobility assets which,
though expensive, do not rely on the development of new technologies.
10.
Developments under the 14-item headline of Sustainability and Logistics are also progressing satisfactorily.
At the Washington Summit, the decision was taken to implement the concept of
Multinational Joint Logistics Centre (MJLC). This marked a move from a national
to a multinational approach to logistic problems. The MJLC is a management cell
responsible for the implementation of the directives given by the theatre
commander. The objective is to facilitate co-operation between the nations
participating in any given operation, minimise competition to acquire locally
available resources and reduce overall costs. Basically the structure and the
size of the Centre depend on the specific mission, operational environment and
units it is intended to support. In short, the MJLC is based on a flexible and
modular approach. The result is a widely co-operative logistic support
capability that allows each country to achieve considerable savings of
financial and human resources. For example, the United Kingdom introduced an
initiative to consider co-operative purchase of bulk logistics, such as
fuel. However, after careful
investigation, the HLSG concluded that the NATO Maintenance and Supply Agency
(NAMSA) was the best forum through which to progress this project, because of
its tried and tested contracting channels and mechanisms. This highlights the
importance of the work of the HLSG in breaking down the barriers between the
various agencies and committees of NATO and finding the right forum for
implementing DCI decisions.
11.
Survivability
of Forces and Infrastructure has shown less sign of progress. Nine items fall under this category, and
include assets such as defence against attacks from weapons of mass
destruction; that is, nuclear, biological and chemical (NBC) weapons. The lack
of progress is attributed in part to nations not identifying an imminent danger
from NBC attack, and to inadequate budgeting for this type of equipment, most
of which has already been developed; in particular, chemical protection gears
which few nations are buying. Some feel that the technology for defences
against biological weapons is not mature enough, and in many cases the decision
not to purchase this equipment is the somehow unavoidable result of national
spending prioritisation. Certainly, most commercial off-the-shelf equipment
needed to meet the DCI criteria could be purchased by 2005. In that regard, with adequate national
funding and the necessary political will, these DCI items could be completed
relatively soon.
12.
In sum, the NATO and national representatives interviewed for this paper
report that many of the easy items in the DCI already have been completed or
are well on the way to completion.
Realistically, they conclude that it is the difficult items that remain
to be tackled. Following nearly two
years of heavy activity, it can be expected that in the near future a period of
slow progress will be almost unavoidable, until technological and funding
issues and industrial policy are resolved.
These obstacles are not specific to the DCI, but also indicative of
NATO’s longstanding armaments procurement problems and closely linked to the
traditional debate on burden sharing and European defence spending.
13.
The DCI itself is a large-scale undertaking that nations cannot expect
to complete rapidly, certainly not before the end of the HLSG's mandate, which
runs out in 2002. During this year's February Assembly meetings held at NATO
Headquarters, parliamentarians pointed out that 58 items are too many for most
nations to consider at once and complete swiftly. To this end, they felt that
guidance is needed to assist member countries in their national prioritisation.
The Assistant Secretary General for Defence Planning and Operations, Edgar
Buckley, replied that NATO's International Staff was aware of this problem. It was
not by chance that Secretary General Robertson had circulated letters to
nations in January 2001, indicating where they should focus their budgets and
procurement activities.
14.
Aside from progress on the above-mentioned items, much general progress
has been accomplished in relation to the DCI. The role of the HLSG has been
particularly important in this regard, helping to overcome, for example, the
kind of political hesitancy and indifference that has traditionally plagued
successive NATO defence initiatives. The difficulties lie with the force
planning process (a full description of which was included in last year's
report), and its lack of legally binding enforcement procedures. This means
that NATO cannot compel nations to fulfil the force goals established in the
force planning process. As most of the objectives of the DCI items will be
implemented through the PfP Planning and Review Process (PARP), there is no
guarantee of a full implementation by member states.
15.
NATO's reliance upon the political goodwill of member states to pursue
Alliance objectives has often been perceived as something of a hurdle. However, there appears to be no good reason
to put to question the political and legal basis of the Alliance operating
mechanisms. Arguably, even if the force planning process became more binding,
it is very unlikely that the Alliance's capability gap would have been
identified and resolved much sooner. It
ought to be stressed once again that in this regard the HLSG, the forum through
which defence ministry officials from the 19 capitals consider the DCI and
how the Alliance might best address its implementation, has played a crucial
role.
16.
The HLSG, originally created in 1999, recently had its mandate extended
from April 2001, to the Prague Summit, expected to take place in November
2002. However, some officials at
national missions to NATO have suggested that the HLSG be transformed into a
permanent body, chaired by the Deputy Secretary General, that would undertake
defence reviews on a regular basis and serve as a qualified forum for
consultation on defence capabilities. A permanent HLSG could be the vehicle
through which the original energy of the DCI can be kept going. This is an interesting proposal, as most of
the DCI items will not be implemented by 2002 but much later; the DCI is a
long-term planning and implementation effort which includes, for example, the
fielding of equipment that is still in its design phase, such as Unmanned
Aerial Vehicles (UAVs).
17.
The role of the HLSG is important for a second reason: the harmonisation of the work of the various
NATO planning disciplines. These include nuclear planning; command, control and
communication (C3) planning; civil emergency planning; logistics
planning; and search and rescue planning. The disciplines have developed
separately and therefore they lack some coordination. Importantly, the HLSG
provides a single forum where views can be continuously exchanged among the
nations and among the various planning disciplines. For the time being, a solution has not been found to harmonising
the planning disciplines, but it is hoped that progress can be made by the
Prague Summit next year.
18.
Finally, when reviewing DCI progress, without doubt the hurdle most
frequently cited by NATO experts is defence spending. Even those countries
fully committed to fulfilling the DCI decisions face this problem and have
found progress slow because of significant financial restrictions. Chapter
three looks at this in more detail. However, it is worth highlighting that
research and development (R&D) is the budget item more often indicated as
inadequately funded. As already seen, several of the DCI items call for the
development of assets that do not yet exist and it is clear that without
sufficient R&D the realisation of DCI objectives will be seriously
delayed. As the European allies
combined spend one-fourth of what the United States spends on R&D, and
spend it in a more fragmented manner, it is generally recognised that this
ratio has to improve for the DCI to succeed in progressively reducing the
technology gap.
19.
An innovative proposal made by the Netherlands during the January 2001
NATO Planning Symposium is a modular approach to equipment procurement.
Designed to overcome present funding constraints, the approach would have
nations buy complementary but different assets, instead of co-operating in the
same projects and then purchasing the same equipment. The Netherlands has
already acted on this proposal by recently offering to spend €45 million ($41 million)
upgrading four German large aircraft with air-to-air refuelling sets. In
return, the Germans will provide the Dutch with air transport, a capability
they would not be able to finance alone. In this way, DCI items can be met more
promptly.
20.
When assessing the net progress the
DCI has made in terms of equipment procurement, it is certainly difficult to
know how far to attribute the appearance of new assets to the DCI. Many countries had already taken steps to
increase their forces’ mobility,
deployability and interoperability capabilities. The British Strategic Defence Review (SDR), discussed in last
year’s report, is a case in point. One clear strength of this particular NATO
defence review, which has enabled more progress to be achieved than usual, is
that the DCI has provided a political road map against which NATO priorities
can be checked and direction given to
all allies as they plan their defence programmes. The DCI decisions are a place to start, but are principally a
document for long-range planning or a building block to a more comprehensive
Alliance-wide approach.
21.
This chapter provides a brief overview of defence reforms and budgets
among the key NATO allies, building on the work in last year’s report that
focused on defence reforms in the United Kingdom and France. In the Autumn report, this section will
incorporate information gained during the Sub-Committee visits to Belgium, the
Netherlands and Germany.
22.
The Strategic Defence Review (SDR), published in 1998, was driven by
British foreign policy objectives and assessed the United Kingdom’s essential
security interests and defence needs in light of changes in the international
strategic environment. In February
2001, the Ministry of Defence published two new documents that look at British
defence in a European context and take a long-term look at British
security. The first, "Defence
Policy 2001," is a concise statement of Britain's defence policy and
includes a clear and full statement of the United Kingdom's approach to
European defence. The second, "The
Future Strategic Context for Defence" looks further ahead to the
challenges for British defence planning over the next 30 years. In particular, this paper represents an
update of the SDR policy framework, placing particular emphasis on the
implications of recent events or emerging trends.
23.
While the SDR emphasises the support capabilities needed for out-of-area
deployment and joint operations across services, the Future Strategic Context
goes one step further by examining the role of coalition forces, which may not
always precisely reflect existing alliances, to achieve military
objectives. Accordingly, joint and
coalition thinking will be the foundation of the United Kingdom’s defence
doctrine.
24.
Although operational commitments in Kosovo resulted in some delays, the
Ministry of Defence claims that it is on course to meet its targets on force
structure changes. For example, the
formation of the new 12 Mechanised Brigade continued, with the brigade headquarters, one armoured regiment, and two
mechanised infantry battalions in place, and
the implementation plan was on schedule as of December 2000. The Royal Air Force has also reorganised the
group structure in its Strike Command Headquarters, to take account of the
establishment of the Joint Rapid Reaction Forces, other force structure
changes, and to benefit from new working practices.
25.
To finance its ambitious procurement and modernisation plan, the UK set
its defence budget allocation at £22.8 billion ($31.9 billion; €36.1 billion)
in fiscal year 2000-2001 and £23 billion ($32.2 billion; €36.4 billion) in
2001-2002. Yet, although a "smart
procurement" process was introduced in the SDR, the National Audit Office Annual
Report on Defence Spending last year said the United Kingdom’s 25 major defence
projects are running £2.7 billion ($3.86 billion; €4.3 billion) over
budget and roughly four years late.
26.
Since 1996, France has been implementing an ambitious six-year programme
to reconfigure its military away from territorial defence toward a force that
can be deployed rapidly and sustained over the life of the mission. With an increased power projection, the
French military is to be able to maintain a range of component units that can
easily be combined to deploy an effective force that is tailored for a specific
mission. France is developing heavy
forces that would be combat ready, termed "coercion forces", and
lighter forces that could reach a crisis area quickly, called
"violence-management forces."
The idea is that French forces would have the capability to react to the
complete spectrum of security threats in Europe.
27.
France's 2001 defence budget, adopted last November, calls for total
defence spending of €28.8 billion ($30 billion). Under the reforms, defence budgets have declined by about 15%
since 1996. Most of the savings,
however, are coming from personnel reductions resulting from the elimination of
conscripts, enabling a modest increase in procurement spending while keeping
the operations and maintenance budget constant.
28.
Even though Paris does not participate in the NATO force-planning
process, France rigorously supports the DCI objectives. The French government (along with Spain and
Italy) in 2003 will launch the first European military observation satellite,
Helios IA. In accordance with the
principle of joint financing and Franco-German industrial cooperation, the
operational needs of both countries for the necessary satellite constellation
will be completed by 2006. France also plans cooperate with Germany and Italy in
the field of optical radar and space imagery.
29.
The last decade has seen major changes in German thinking regarding the
role of the armed forces. Recently, a
consensus has emerged suggesting that the role of the Bundeswehr should be
broadened to enable operations beyond the nation's borders. Previously, however, most German politicians
considered this not only unthinkable but also unconstitutional. Participation in the Kosovo conflict and
government defence reforms demonstrated very clearly the extent of this
philosophical shift. However, decades of planning to defend its territory
against a Soviet-led invasion left Germany with forces that were not well-suited
for NATO’s new out-of-area missions. This
understandable and unavoidable legacy has affected Germany’s ability to play a
leading role in out-of-area crisis management.
30.
In order to improve the situation, Defence
Minister Rudolf Scharping in June 2000 put forth his proposal for reforming
German defence. Mr Scharping suggested
the overall reduction in the armed forces, the expansion of crisis-reaction
forces, reduction in the numbers of conscripts called up and redirection of
finance from manpower toward investment.
The reform plan emphasises the renewal, re-orientation and optimisation
of the German armed forces.
Accordingly, Germany should be able to deploy beyond its borders 50,000
troops for up to one year, or sustain two medium-size operations with 10,000
troops each for several years under EU or NATO command.
31.
Proposals call for a reduction from 338,000 to a standing force of
255,000, within which the rapid reaction force would grow substantially to
150,000. When fully augmented with
reservists, the wartime strength of the Bundeswehr would be 500,000. Civilian Bundeswehr posts will be cut by
around a fifth, and there will be a number of base closures. There will also be a reduction in the number
of conscripts actually serving from 130,000 to 77,000, and from 2002 the length
of conscription will be reduced to nine months. Military service will be made both more flexible and attractive
and, as of January 2001, women are now able to play a full role as professional
soldiers in all branches of the Bundeswehr.
32.
The government reform proposal has generally enjoyed wide support from
all parts of the political spectrum, except for the post-communist Party of
Democratic Socialism. The proposed
changes in conscription and the proposed budgets have generated the most
debate. The Sub‑Committee will
learn more about these proposals during its visit to Germany in June.
34.
This limited funding makes it
difficult to finance new weapons programmes while converting the Bundeswehr
into a largely professional, well-paid force.
Nonetheless, Germany remains committed to buying 73 Airbus A400M transport-aircraft. While the draft budget has no cost estimate
for this programme, early estimates are about €83 million ($75 million) per
aircraft. Other projects have been
cancelled because of budgetary restrictions, such as the PARS 3MR anti-tank
missile and five of the 15 new corvettes for the navy.
35.
The Italian military is undergoing a major reorganisation, coupled with
extensive modernisation programmes. In
particular, the Italian parliament this past autumn approved the gradual
transition to a completely professional army by 2006; earlier in 2000 the first
group of women entered the Italian military.
Once the professionalisation process is completed, the Italian armed
forces will total 190,000 professional soldiers.
36.
As part of the professionalisation effort, the
army is reorganising its force structure in one corps-sized headquarters and
two divisional headquarters and reshaping its major units at a brigade level to
guarantee rapid deployment. There are nine Manoeuvre Brigades and one Air Brigade.
These are supplemented by seven brigades for tactical and logistic support.
These forces are receiving new tanks, infantry-fighting vehicles, armoured
combat vehicles, and artillery.
37.
As for the navy, several new warships are being built. The navy has ordered two Orizzonte (Horizon)
anti-air frigates and plans to acquire a second carrier. As was briefed to the
Sub‑Committee during its 1999 visit to Italy, Italian shipbuilding contractors have been
active in international R&D and procurement efforts, such as the Flexible
Automation in Ship Prefabrication (FASP) programme; the Euroship programme for
common shipping procurement among Spain, Italy, France and Germany; the
Euroyard programme for common research; and a joint programme with France to
produce frigates. Italy is also working
with Germany on the 212-Class joint
submarine programme, in which the German and Italian navies are sharing a
common submarine design. Parliament has
approved the purchase of two submarines, which are to be launched in 2002 and
commissioned in 2005, and the Italian navy has an option to purchase two
additional vessels.
38.
Italy continues to lease roll-on roll-off vessels for sealift, while
relying on its own transport aircraft fleet. This will be made up of 22
C-130J/C-130J-30 (i.e. the standard and extended version) and 12 C-27Js. Italy is also participating in the A400M
programme and has planned to buy 16 aircraft.
These three transport aircraft programmes, together with four dual-role
Transport-Tanker aircraft based on the Boeing 767, will provide adequate
airlift capabilities. Reports indicate
that Italy supports the idea of a joint NATO and/or EU sealift capability and,
in the long run, a multinational force of wide-bodied transport aircraft.
39.
In addition, the new Eurofighters will soon enter service in the Italian
air force, which still flies the F-104S version of the Starfighter. The air
force is leasing US F-16A/Bs as a
"gap filler", while it awaits delivery of its Eurofighters. In 2001, Italy will be spending nearly 2% of
its GDP on defence.
40.
George W. Bush, the new US president,
has pledged a complete review of American defence strategy, missions, forces
and weapons. The new administration
faces what many analysts see as a mismatch between defence strategy, the
requirements to fulfil that strategy, and the resources available to the
military. The US Congressional Budget
Office (CBO) estimated that it would cost $340 billion a year to maintain
American armed forces at their current levels; that is, to purchase new
equipment at the rate that it needs to be replaced while maintaining current
personnel levels. By contrast, the US
defence budget for 2001 is $296 billion, and Mr Bush has proposed to Congress a
2002 defence budget of $310 billion.
41.
The CBO notes that the new
administration’s defence review will have to answer three questions about US
defence policy: 1. Is the current strategy an appropriate
response to threats to US national security?
The current strategy requires the military to be able to fight and win
two major theatre wars that occur almost simultaneously. 2. Will the Pentagon’s plans enable the
military to carry out the national security strategy? 3. Does the defence
budget adequately fund the national military strategy?
42.
Some analysts, like Carl Conetta of
the Project on Defence Alternatives and Cindy Williams of the Massachusetts
Institute of Technology, have suggested that the two-war strategy is
over-ambitious and ignores changes in the world over the past decade. Rather than prepare to fight two wars on the
order of the Persian Gulf War, the United States should take into account the
diminished strength of potential adversaries like Iraq and North Korea, as well
as the likely contributions of allies like the United Kingdom in the Persian
Gulf region and South Korea on the Korean peninsula. Experts like Michael O’Hanlon, of the Brookings Institute,
suggest that given the small chance that conflicts would break out in two
different regions at nearly the same time, the United States should seek the
ability to fight one “Desert Storm” size war, carry out one “Desert Shield”
deterrence operation, and maintain a major peacekeeping presence, such as the
1996 Implementation Force (IFOR) in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Writing in the Spring 2001 issue of Survival, Mr O’Hanlon suggests that such
a revision of US strategy could allow the Pentagon to save $10 billion a year.
43.
Press reports cite "senior
government officials" who say that Defence Secretary Donald Rumsfeld
intends “to pursue dramatic reforms in the way the nation’s armed forces are
organised,” suggesting that the Bush administration review will be considerably
more radical than similar exercises in 1991, 1993 and 1997. One report quotes an official saying the
review "basically does away" with the two-war strategy. Some thinkers have advocated a full embrace
of the "revolution in military affairs", or RMA, as discussed at
length in last year’s report. Mr Bush
himself promised to "skip a generation" of weapons, emphasising research
and development in the near future, when the United States faces no peer
military competitor, so that technologically advanced systems could be ready in
the long term, when a peer may arise.
As for NATO, some reports cite senior officials as indicating that Mr
Rumsfeld will reorient US defence policy and force deployments away from Europe
to Asia in order to address possible threats from China, which is developing a
more powerful military.
44.
In order to encourage the process of transforming American forces,
President Clinton redesignated the Atlantic Command in Norfolk, Virginia, as
the Joint Forces Command in 1999. Joint
Forces Command is charged with developing new concepts and experimentation. Members of the Committee indicated their
interest in visiting Norfolk during next year’s Committee meeting in the United
States to learn more about this.
45.
Defence transformation is taking place
across all services, but only consumes about 2% of the services’ budgets. The navy is developing the ability to work
in littoral waters and integrate its communications with the other services to
work cooperatively. The Marine Corps is
experimenting with urban operations and how to leverage electronic and
communications technology. The air
force is creating expeditionary forces that will be able to deploy to theatres
and sustain operations, as well as further developing precision, stand-off
weaponry. Future uses of space are also
part of air force experimentation.
46.
The army is moving rapidly to transform itself to a lighter, more mobile
force able to get to the theatre of operations quickly. It is developing a medium-weight
"interim combat brigade team" armed with wheeled, light-armoured
vehicles and able to move on C-130 tactical transport planes. The brigade would be more powerful and
survivable than a light brigade, but require less support and cost while being
more mobile than a heavy brigade. It
would contain all of the support units needed, allowing it to deploy rapidly without
waiting for additional units. While the
light armoured vehicle is not capable of taking on an adversary with heavy
tanks, it can move quickly and possesses enough firepower to destroy
bunkers. The army wants to purchase
almost 3,000 of these vehicles to equip six to eight brigades.
47.
The Netherlands’ Strategic
Discussion on the Future of Defence (STD) can be characterised by four
recurring elements: an increase in the combat-ready strength, the improvement
of sustainability, the need to review operational tempo in light of the
frequency of deployment, and making a more efficient use of reserve
personnel. Plans call for the
combat-ready personnel of rapidly deployable units to increase by 2,100,
including 1,000 mechanised infantry personnel and 300 marines. The white paper formulates a number of
measures aimed at reducing operational tempo.
In support of such measures, an additional €22.7 million
($20.5 million) was allocated to the defence budget, marking a turning
point in the political climate after years of structural cut-backs and
increases confidence where the available budget for the coming years is
concerned. More specifically, €431
million ($389 million) will be allocated to shaping and implementing the new
defence personnel policy over the next 10 years.
48.
In May 2000, the Belgian
government approved its Strategic Plan for Modernising the Belgian Military
from 2000-2015, emphasising a multinational and multi-institutional approach as
"indispensable" to overcome new challenges and international
engagements. The 15-year plan provides
for the progressive evolution of the armed forces so that they can become more
mobile, deploy more rapidly and sustain out-of-area missions. The document states that the Belgian armed
forces will rely on inter-service and multinational forces with a strong
emphasis on civil-military cooperation, where “joint is the rule and non-joint
is the exception". Active-duty
military comprised almost 40,000 last year, and plans call for a reduction in
defence personnel of 5,000, but lump together cuts in civilian and military
personnel. The plan calls for defence
budgets to remain at €2.5 billion ($2.25 billion) for the next 15 years, with
adjustments only for inflation.
49.
Following the footsteps of other European countries, Greece is conducting a Strategic
Defence Review despite the fact that it recently completed its major five-year
modernisation programme (1996-2000) and plans to make use of new technology in
its own Revolution in Military Affairs.
The Greek army has completed its transformation to a brigade structure
and is developing a more mobile force that could defend the mainland and the
islands and come to the assistance of Cyprus.
The navy, with limited amphibious capabilities, is enhancing its ability
to defend Greek territorial waters and sovereignty, as well as to keep open sea
lines of communication. Greece is
upgrading its air force's capacity to defend Greek airspace and support the
army and navy. With the third largest
defence budget as a percentage of GDP in NATO, Greece will spend approximately
€14.9 billion ($13.5 billion) on its modernisation plan for 2001-2005.
50.
Norway announced a
radical armed forces restructuring plan in February calling for base closures
and a dramatic cut in personnel.
Similar to other European countries, the Norwegian Defence Ministry is
shifting the role of its armed forces away from the defence of national
territory to one capable of participating in out-of-area operations as part of
international coalition forces. If the
$3 billion (€3.34 billion) defence proposal is approved, Norway's armed forces
will be cut by almost 50% between 2002 and 2005 and a new command structure
created.
51.
Recognising that it must modernise its forces, the Czech Republic has undertaken a major strategic review after years
of directionless military developments.
The Czech Republic, which spends around 2.2% of its GDP on defence, has
been using aged, Soviet-built aircraft as the mainstay of its air defences,
leading to high costs for operations and maintenance. Regarding procurement programmes, Prague faces the soaring cost
of purchasing 72 L-159 light attack aircraft from Aero Vodochody, a project
that will consume about 70% of capital spending (roughly $235 million or
€260 million) on defence next year and a similar proportion the year
after. Additionally, the Czech Republic
has faced a "political battleground" regarding a project tender for
between 24 and 36 supersonic fighter aircraft set to replace its elderly fleet
of Soviet-supplied MiG-21s; if approved, it will cost the country $2.5 billion
(€2.8 billion).
52.
In Poland, the government in March 2001 submitted to the Defence
Committee of the Sejm its defence plan for the six years 2001-2006, which is
the first practical step to ensure multi-year planning of defence budgets in
Poland. The draft bill stipulates that
the defence budget each year shall be at least 1.95% of GDP, and it calls for
steady increases in modernisation spending, which is to reach 19% of overall
defence expenditures in 2003 and 23% in 2006.
Earlier, the parliament had approved a 2001 defence budget of $3.81
billion (€4.23 billion), which is 1.98% of GDP. That figure is $19 million (€21 million) lower than the
government’s request.
53.
In order to achieve the objectives of
DCI, it is generally acknowledged that some NATO countries must spend more on
defence, and all must spend more efficiently. In the absence of increased
defence budgets, many allies are pursuing co-operative military equipment
projects, at both the European and transatlantic level, to ensure greater
efficiency. With the European Union’s
ambitions for an autonomous European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP),
procurement and standards may move from being national responsibilities to
European. More specifically, closer integration of allied supplier bases will
facilitate more interoperable coalition forces, access to the most advanced
technologies, and a more efficient industrial structure.
54.
In European defence markets, where equipment
is already in production, various examples of duplication provide a compelling
argument for countries to co-operate and reap greater efficiencies. At present,
European countries manufacture several variants of most pieces of principal
military equipment, some with very similar roles and capabilities; for example,
the Dassault Rafale multi-role combat aircraft and the Eurofighter. This
results in smaller (national) production runs and higher unit costs. The need
to create forums for European defence procurement co-operation has become
pressing over the past decade as the shrinking of defence budgets, coupled with
the changed (but not reduced) requirements for defence equipment, make for a
difficult equation for national governments to solve alone.
55.
In order to achieve greater efficiencies, efforts have been made to
promote cross-national procurement co-operation. This has been done; firstly,
at an industrial level through defence industrial mergers and acquisitions; and
secondly, at a political level through the building of political and legal
institutions to oversee defence industrial co-operation and harmonise European
defence industrial policies. While efforts in this area are not new, the events
of the past decade and subsequent changes in the geo-strategic environment,
have certainly given renewed impetus to co-operative ventures, as well as
succeeded in breaking down legal barriers. Until now, these laws have served to
protect national defence markets from outside competition.
56.
At the European industrial level, recent defence procurement
co-operation has been dynamic, culminating in the mergers of several large
national defence manufacturers into two giants. The first, BAe Systems, was the
product of British Aerospace's acquisition of Marconi Electronic Systems. The
second, the European Aeronautic, Defence and Space Company (EADS), was created
through the merger of Aerospatiale-Matra (France), DASA (Germany) and CASA
(Spain). The market share for these giants is impressive: EADS has a turnover
of €21 billion ($19 billion) per annum and BAe Systems a turnover of €17.4
billion ($15.7 billion). Within EADS, over 70% of the company's business has
already been organised into common, joint ventures.
57.
The industrial dimension can only be exploited so far, however, before
political will is required to take defence procurement co-operation further.
Given the large role governments have traditionally played in armaments
manufacturing and arms policy, it has been essential for governments to
"change their mode of co-operation throughout the procurement process and
redefine their role of customer, sponsor and regulator," according to a
Western European Union study. At the
political level there are several forums through which governments have
traditionally met to discuss the co-operation of arms policy, including NATO's
Conference of National Armaments Directors (CNAD), the Western European
Armaments Group (WEAG) and Western European Armaments Organisation (WEAO). More
recently, however, two enterprises have promised a greater level of
co-operation, albeit among smaller groups of countries. The Letter of Intent
(LoI) process and the Organisation for Joint Armament Co-operation, known by
its French acronym, OCCAR, are two forums with legal status, which have the potential
to dominate co-operative ventures in arms procurement for the near future.
58.
Created in 1996, OCCAR provides improved management of collaborative
defence equipment programmes involving European partners, avoiding the need to
develop individual procedures each time a new collaborative venture commences.
OCCAR builds a centre of expertise using principles of best procurement
practice and encourages the development and procurement of joint weapons
systems in a more cost-effective and technologically competitive way. The A400M
strategic transport aircraft programme has been earmarked for OCCAR management,
making it a truly joint project that falls directly in line with the
requirements of the DCI. Its membership is small but dynamic: France, Germany,
Italy and the United Kingdom. Belgium has applied for membership to OCCAR and
the Netherlands will soon join. Dutch participation in the German-UK
Gepanzertes-Transport Kraftfahrzeug (Multi-Role Armoured Vehicle) programme
this year was significant as the Netherlands did so in the hope it would be its
"entry ticket" to OCCAR.
59.
The LoI process was initiated by six
major European armaments-producing countries (France, Germany, Italy, Spain,
Sweden and the United Kingdom) which, through the signing of a letter of intent
in 1998, outlined their intention to harmonise existing national regulations
related to armaments. Six working groups were established to handle the various
aspects of armaments regulation harmonisation. The working groups consider
security of supply, export procedures, security of information, research of
information, research and technology, harmonisation of military requirements
and treatment of technical information.
In Europe, for political and historical reasons, armaments regulations
lack homogeneity and make the operation of multinational companies very
complicated. This is exactly what the LoI process intends to resolve.
60.
Despite a great deal of activity, no organisation or forum yet performs
the role of a European armaments agency, which would provide a common approach
to integrated armaments policy. Some of the challenges include different
security priorities that drive equipment prioritisation, non-aligned national
procurement cycles, and varying defence-budget allocation. The challenge is to
align procurement policies, or find common policies, but this is difficult when
countries fundamentally disagree on security and defence policy. Proponents of
arms-policy harmonisation as a vehicle for increasing European arms production
cite the necessity of first developing a truly common ESDP. It seems likely
that without such a policy, national preferences will continue to steer the
traditionally fragmented approach to European arms procurement.
61.
At the transatlantic level, defence
industrial co-operation has been less dynamic. Some governments, such as the
United States and United Kingdom, have warned against the establishment of two
arms-producing blocks forming at each side of the Atlantic: a "Fortress
Europe" or a "Fortress America", as they are called in a paper
by the WEU Institute for Security Studies.
It certainly appears there is a trend in Europe to buy European
equipment rather than rely on the United States. The UK decision to
cooperatively develop the Meteor air-to-air missile with its traditional
European partners and the European decision to acquire the A400M, rather than
purchase the American C-17, are examples of this trend. There is also a belief
by some Europeans that the DCI is an attempt by the United States to persuade
Europeans to buy American. While the DCI should not be considered simply a tool
to purchase American products, meeting the DCI targets rapidly would entail the
purchase of some American equipment.
Alternatively, European contractors could develop some of the necessary
equipment, but this would entail a longer timeframe.
62.
On the one hand, the improvement of European defence capabilities would
facilitate joint military operations between Europe and the United States
because equipment interoperability would be enhanced. However, US government export-control policies have both promoted
and constrained transatlantic defence industrial consolidation. This is because
the US government fears a loss of national control over technologies, the dispersion
of the resultant capabilities to potential adversaries outside of NATO and the
reduction of economic benefits in particular regions. On the other hand, these
contradictory pressures clearly affect the degree to which the American market
remains a fortress and the European market becomes one. This undesirable
alternative could result in the separate evolution of US and European military
technology, which could undermine interoperability and lead to the selection of
sole-source European firms selected as suppliers for political purposes. The
best way to avoid such a scenario and to maintain genuine competition is to
encourage the formation of transatlantic defence industrial alliances.
63.
Export controls and
technology-transfer rules have been the central target of European criticism of
the American fortress and of the emerging struggle within the American
government to redefine the transatlantic defence industrial relationship. One
of the ways in which the United States intends to meet its commitment to
implement DCI is through the reform of export procedures. Although Washington urges its allies to
increase their capabilities, the US export‑control process has often
impeded acquisition of US systems or key components. Therefore, the Departments
of Defence and State have developed a mechanism through which NATO allies can
expect faster processing of export requests, which support capabilities
emphasised by the DCI.
64.
In May 2000, President Clinton
approved the Defence Trade Security Initiative (DTSI). This initiative came as
an effort to improve the efficiency and the competition in defence markets,
while at the same time maintaining the necessary export controls to safeguard
mutual security. The 17 arms export reforms that make up DTSI provide the
tools to enhance and to expedite defence co-operation in an increasingly
commercial, consolidated, global and technological environment. At the same time, the initiatives, or
"up-to-date tools", strike a balance between supporting national
security and foreign policy goals and enhancing technological co-operation
between industries. This aims to
facilitate greater technology sharing between US and European companies that
could, in turn, close the transatlantic military and technology gap.
65.
Pentagon initiatives may also increase opportunities for some US
companies to compete in European and other overseas defence markets, according to the Pentagon’s annual
Industrial Capabilities Report to Congress in January 2001. However, like the
United States, European countries tend to purchase major defence equipment from
their domestic companies when such options exist. Nonetheless, several US
firms, such as Boeing, General Dynamics, and Lockheed Martin, are
increasing their presence in Europe, mostly with subsidiaries in the
United Kingdom. At the same time, European companies, particularly UK
firms, are entering the US defence market by acquiring US firms. For example,
BAe Systems North America now employs 18,000 people and had estimated revenues
of $2.4 billion in 2000. The United Kingdom's Smith Industries is also active
in the United States, with approximately 50% of its revenues coming from its US
operations, according to the Pentagon report.
66.
These recent initiatives may
facilitate greater technology sharing between US and European companies, which
may help close the transatlantic military and technology gap and perhaps
encourage the formation of "global" industrial defence alliances.
Companies such as EADS, for example, should increase their influence in the
United States by building alliances along the lines of its wide-ranging
partnership agreement with Northrop Grumman. On the other hand, BAe Systems’
recent acquisition of Lockheed Martin’s Aerospace Electronics Systems could
very well open doors for European defence companies in the United States. In
addition, extending the exemption of the International Traffic and Arms
Regulations (ITAR) to qualified firms in countries that adopt stringent export
control and technology security systems creates a strong incentive for other
countries to improve their own systems.
EADS has also made known its intention to acquire a transatlantic
dimension, possibly with Northrop Grumman. From the US perspective, it is
likely that the American defence manufacturers will look for routes into the
newly created European market following the European mergers of the last two
years.
67.
Legislative oversight of defence is a major component of effective
democratic civilian control of the military. Yet, in the sensitive area of
national, regional and international security, governments, for obvious
reasons, cannot make all information public knowledge. While the need to classify information is
understandable, this creates some problems of accountability. Members of the Defence and Security
Committee raised this point last year during the annual session in Berlin. Given that many of the large-purchase DCI
items, such as Suppression of Enemy Air Defence (SEAD) and Alliance Ground
Surveillance (AGS), will run into billions of dollars of taxpayers' money, it
is important that parliaments are given the opportunity to adequately
scrutinise this initiative.
68.
In the case of the DCI, all 58 items are classified, as are the force
goals through which the items are translated into specific targets. While a
great deal of open-source information exists relating to the DCI, the details,
particularly those which parliamentarians might find most useful, such as cost
estimates and production schedules, are often considered too sensitive to
publish openly and are subsequently kept classified. Following discussions with
NATO member parliamentarians, it has become apparent that among the 19 NATO
member states, different security practices have been established among different
nations. This means that not all NATO parliamentarians have equal access to
classified information.
69.
Information collected from NATO member country parliaments found that
most parliamentarians see and use very little classified information, even though
some information they might find particularly useful is classified. In addition, each national government takes
a slightly different approach to granting clearances to its members of
parliament, particularly in relation to oversight of defence and security
matters.
70.
In the United Kingdom, for example, there is a strong formal working
relationship between the Ministry of Defence, the Foreign and Commonwealth
Office and Members of Parliament. Should an MP wish to have access to NATO
classified information on any given defence and security-related subject, the
MoD will provide such information; Members are rarely, if ever, refused
information. Only access to certain documents such as "advice to
ministers" is flatly refused. Nevertheless, government officials can
re-write highly classified information to a lower classification, prior to
submission to a parliamentary committee. Indeed, MPs will rarely receive
original documents.
71.
In the United States, Members of Congress are considered to have
security clearances by virtue of their election. While access is restricted to some classified material, such as
intelligence sources and methods, this is generally not the case for
defence-planning data. In addition,
staff members who work on defence issues are routinely vetted and granted
appropriate clearances.
72.
In Norway, the case is similar. Parliamentarians can request to see a
specific classified document should they so wish. However, little classified information is sent to them as a
matter of course. Furthermore, very little has been forwarded that is specific
to the DCI, a point that has been reiterated by several nations. Thus, an MP
would have to know that the document first existed, before requesting to view
it. In order to inform MPs of important issues, the Norwegian government meets
with Members through the special committee for defence and security affairs.
However, this forum is principally designed as a "sounding-board" for
the government to ascertain public opinion before introducing what could be a
politically contentious policy. In these cases the government, not parliament,
controls the agenda.
73.
Other NATO countries grant members of parliament differing levels of
access to national and NATO classified information. In the case of Italy no MP, as such, has access to any classified information. In Spain, the law was changed only recently
to allow a very limited number of MPs to have access to NATO classified
information. Many other countries –
including Germany, Denmark, Hungary, Iceland and Portugal – grant security
clearances (usually at the NATO Secret level) to those MPs who work on the
foreign and defence committees.
74.
Legislative oversight is a critical component of civilian democratic
control of the armed forces. By
necessity, some information about defence and security policy must be kept
secret, both at the national level and at NATO. But it is essential that those members of parliament who need to
know about national and NATO defence policy be able to receive the information
that is necessary for informed, effective oversight. Today there is no
legitimate reason to deny elected representatives access to such information
they need in order to perform their duties.
75.
The solution to this problem is two-fold. First, some examination must be given to why certain information
is classified. Your Rapporteur cannot
understand why the list of the 58 items in the DCI is classified, but he
recognises there is a Catch-22 situation at work: he cannot have access to the
list, so he cannot make an informed judgment about whether public disclosure
would be harmful. Likewise, information
about NATO Force Goals is classified, so your Rapporteur and many of his
colleagues cannot evaluate whether their countries’ defence plans fulfil their
NATO Force Goals. Declassifying these
processes would facilitate public scrutiny and enable parliaments and publics
to pressure their governments to fulfil their commitments to NATO.
76.
Second, at a minimum, members of parliament must be cleared to review
classified information about their countries’ defence plans and how they fit
with NATO force planning. It would be
most desirable for all NATO countries to adopt the American model, where
Members are automatically granted clearances, and their staffs are routinely
vetted and cleared. At a minimum,
members of defence and foreign affairs committees should receive clearances to
review the national and NATO defence information they need to exercise
effective oversight. In addition,
delegates to the NATO Parliamentary Assembly should be granted NATO clearances
so they can fulfil their role of legislative oversight of the Alliance’s
activities.
77.
Although the DCI is on track and has made significant progress in
important areas, it is still a long way from completion. The challenges are
clear. Governments and parliaments must
continue to facilitate the provision of adequate funding for DCI-related
matters, in particular support for research and development of military
equipment. Political consensus must be built within NATO and a more
co-operative approach be taken to equipment procurement generally, away from
traditional national lines. Innovation
and dynamic momentum must be sustained to overcome any tendency to let the DCI
become another of the Alliance’s semi-completed defence reviews.
78.
NATO currently faces several
challenges to transatlantic unity. The
efforts by the EU to develop ESDP and by the United States to deploy a missile
defence system have led some on both sides of the Atlantic to question whether
Alliance security was being decoupled.
The debates about fair burden sharing, which have featured in Alliance
discussions since NATO was founded, continue.
NATO’s ability to meet these challenges is closely linked with its
ability to develop the right tools for the job and, in doing so, build
credibility. Thus, in many ways, the DCI is the centrepiece of other important
endeavours. The DCI cannot afford to fail and risk damaging other NATO
initiatives, and with them the cohesion of the Alliance. If DCI succeeds, it will increase Alliance
unity, mute criticisms about burden sharing, and help the EU develop the
capabilities it needs for an effective ESDP.
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