1.
European defence today stands at a
crossroads. As NATO continues to
redefine its roles and missions in the post-Cold War era, it has become clear
that the Alliance is most likely to become involved in operations outside the
territory of its member states, operations that do not arise from the Article 5
guarantee of collective defence. As a
result, the NATO allies as early as 1994 created arrangements for operations
that do not involve all of the allies to use Alliance capabilities. At the same time, the European Union since
late 1998 has proceeded to create its own European Security and Defence Policy
(ESDP), which would give the EU the ability to take military action when NATO
as a whole is not engaged. In the past
two years, ESDP has taken on a momentum of its own and relegated to the back
burner NATO’s European Security and Defence Identity (ESDI), in which the 17
European allies were developing the ability to act without the participation of
the North American allies.
2.
But the steps taken by the EU have not been
without controversy. Some strong
proponents of greater EU integration have characterised ESDP as a process that
will free Europe from its dependence on the United States for its security or
as a step that will help bring about a closer union among the 15 EU member
states, four of which are not members of NATO.
Some friends of NATO, in turn, have reacted to ESDP as a threat to
Alliance unity, a Trojan horse that will undermine the transatlantic link that
has helped protect the European democracies for a half-century and facilitated
the reconciliation that permitted development of the EU. While both North Americans and Europeans
welcome any effort by the Europeans to shoulder a greater share of their
defence burden, there is some concern that most of the effort in ESDP has been
put into building new institutions to rival NATO, while few resources have been
put toward developing the capabilities that would enable the Europeans to
undertake missions on their own.
3.
The EU’s Helsinki Summit in December 1999
marked an important step forward for ESDP.
The EU agreed to a Headline Goal to create by 2003 a corps-strength
rapid reaction force deployable within 60 days and sustainable for at least one
year, with appropriate air and naval elements.
For the EU governments, this would enable them to implement the
ambitions of the 1997 Amsterdam Treaty and the May 1999 Cologne Summit by
providing the EU with the capabilities for a common EU policy on security and
defence.
4.
The May 2000 EU Summit in Feira set out the permanent institutional
structures that are to govern ESDP, which are discussed as part of Chapter VI:
·
Ultimate responsibility will rest with the EU General Affairs Council,
which normally consists of the foreign ministers of the 15 EU countries. This is similar to the North Atlantic
Council (NAC) when it consists of foreign ministers during its semi-annual
ministerial-level meetings. This
structure means that ESDP is an intergovernmental process; that is, it will
operate based on a consensus of the 15 member governments, rather than the
communitarian method of interplay between the Council, European Commission and
European Parliament.
·
The Political and Security Committee (known by its French acronym,
COPS), will have specific responsibility for ESDP. It consists of permanent representatives holding ambassadorial
rank, similar to the permanent representatives to the NAC but of lower
seniority, and it is chaired by the ambassador representing the country that
holds the EU’s rotating presidency.
·
An EU Military Committee, comprised of flag officers, advises the EU on
military matters. It is similar to the
Military Committee at NATO, and most countries have designated their
representative to the NATO Military Committee to sit on its EU equivalent.
·
An EU Military Staff informs and prepares the deliberations of the
Military Committee and the COPS on defence issues, similar to the role played
by the International Military Staff (IMS) at NATO.
·
The High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy
(CFSP), Javier Solana, will play an essential part of the future EU defence
organisation and could serve as chairman of the COPS, especially during a
crisis. Already, Mr. Solana has
organised a Policy Unit, consisting of civilian experts who report to him and
advise him on defence issues, and a Situation Centre, which reports both to Mr.
Solana and the Military Staff.
5.
At a November 2000 Capabilities Commitment
Conference, EU members pledged the forces needed to fulfil the Headline Goal,
but some shortcomings still exist and are discussed in greater detail in
Chapter III. At the December 2000 Nice
Summit, France, which held the EU presidency, issued a report setting out the
goals and decision-making procedures for the ESDP. The French proposal gives the EU autonomy in taking decisions on
possible future security missions, which are expected to be limited to the
Petersberg tasks, which include humanitarian and rescue tasks, peace-keeping tasks,
and tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peace enforcement.
6.
The Nice Summit conclusions reveal that the
EU’s Rapid Reaction Force would depend on NATO for its planning capabilities,
which are discussed further in Chapter V, respectively. The EU military staff would have no operational
capabilities of its own, and NATO would be the preferred option to engage in a
mission. Although this outcome
addresses many fears that ESDP would develop apart from NATO, there are still
unresolved issues regarding the role of non-EU European allies like Turkey in
the process, which are discussed at greater length in Chapter IV.
7.
Additionally, there are several other
questions surrounding ESDP that will be addressed in this report. While much talk has centred around the
mechanisms of ESDP, not enough thought has gone into describing what ESDP is
supposed to do, and Chapter II will examine the basic question of “what
for?” At the same time, while there has
been much work done on the intergovernmental side of ESDP, there has been
little talk of mechanisms for exercising legislative oversight of the
process. Chapter VII will review some
of the proposals for parliamentary oversight.
8.
Before examining the institutions and mechanisms being established by
the EU, it is important to first explore the rationale behind ESDP, to ask
“what for?” Is defence simply the next
step for the integration of a union that already has developed a common market,
a common customs union, and a common currency?
Is ESDP ultimately to become a way for European countries to assume
complete responsibility for their common defence and end their reliance on the
transatlantic link? Is ESDP merely a
glorified international police force that will undertake operations that are
too minor for Washington to bother with, such as the WEU missions in the former
Yugoslavia? Is ESDP an insurance policy
for European countries against the day when the United States declines to get
involved in an operation that is important to the security of the Europeans?
9.
In part, the impetus for ESDP has arisen out of an increased desire for
Europe to make itself heard in world affairs, sometimes referred to as “one
voice for Europe.” That being said, a
political will has materialised among Europe’s leaders, illustrated in
particular with the St. Malo initiative in 1998, where Tony Blair, the UK prime
minister, ended Britain’s reluctance to give the EU a meaningful role in
Europe’s security. The need for some
military capabilities to lend credibility to European policies has been widely
recognised.
10.
ESDP is also a pragmatic response to the crises in the Balkans. In particular, it was given impetus when
European countries were unable to quickly assemble enough troops to man the
NATO peace-keeping force, which entered Kosovo in June 1999. Also, Europe’s subsidiary role to the United
States in the bombing campaign against Serbia proved that although the EU
members spend an amount equal to 60% of the US defence budget, they were only
getting a fraction of the capability that such spending should yield. The reason, according to some members of the
European Parliament, is that in Europe many structures are redundant, equipment
is not standard, the rate of modernisation is not the same, and there is little
joint procurement.
11.
ESDP can fill a real need in European defence, but it should not become
a rival to NATO. That means that the EU
should not aim to become a collective defence organisation. NATO has ably filled that role for 50 years,
and NATO serves an irreplaceable role in linking the democracies of Europe and
North America to defend their systems and values against any future
threat. ESDP should seek to give the
European democracies the capability to take military action when a threat
arises to the stability of Europe and when NATO as a whole is not engaged. The EU should have the ability to make
decisions about intervention and have recourse to the assets needed to
undertake a crisis management operation along the lines of those envisaged in
the Petersberg tasks, which include humanitarian and
rescue tasks, peace-keeping tasks, and tasks of combat forces in crisis
management, including peacemaking.
12.
The decision of whether the EU should intervene in a crisis must
ultimately rest with the 15 member states. However, according to decisions taken in Nice, as soon as a
crisis emerges, the EU must intensify regular dialogue and consultation with
NATO and with other European nations, especially the non-EU European allies.
Inevitably, military capabilitiesare at the heart of the ESDP and are the test of EU credibility in this
domain. The ultimate success or failure
of ESDP will depend on whether member states develop the military capabilities
needed, beginning with those needed for the Headline Goal.
13.
While ESDP will inevitably help deepen the process of European
integration, it is essential that ESDP remain an intergovernmental
process. Only democratically elected
governments and parliaments have the legitimacy to undertake a military
operation and thereby put their citizens at risk. In democratic systems this power cannot be delegated to a
supranational bureaucracy. There is no
European army, no power for the European Commission, and no transfer of
sovereignty from the 15 member states.
Every EU member retains its right to participate (or not) in an EU operation
or to an EU exercise and its right to contribute (or not) to the Headline
Goal. The ESDP is a common
policy not a single policy, with the aim of creating a common ground
that will rely on strong national policies.
The issue, at least from a French point of view, is not a
“communitarisation” but a “mutualisation” of means and capabilities.
14.
ESDP is not designed to create a military superpower. ESDP is part of a comprehensive strategy
driven by the EU to deal with potential crises by using a wide spectrum of
political, economic and social tools.
This strategy pertains to crisis management and not to collective
defence, which will remain the sole prerogative of NATO.
15.
What remains to be defined are the limits of ESDP and the Petersberg
tasks. At least one EU official,
speaking to the Assembly’s International Secretariat, averred that a possible
ground invasion of Serbia during the 1999 Kosovo campaign would have
constituted a task of combat forces in crisis management and therefore been a
legitimate mission for the EU. For the
time-being, the lack of European military capability makes this a theoretical
argument, but the EU countries and the NATO allies may confront such a question
in the future. It is important that the
links between the EU and NATO be open and wide-ranging to ensure that such
future decisions are taken in a way that ensures the security of all of the
NATO allies and guards against asking the EU to undertake an operation it is
not prepared for.
16.
In addition, it will be necessary to indicate more clearly the
geographical areas where the EU force may intervene. Otherwise, it would be impossible to plan accurately for the
transport, logistics and communication needed for the operation. Such clarification is also necessary in the
relationship with NATO, which seems unlikely to act in Africa and Asia, but
became actively engaged in the Balkans.
17.
In December 1999, during their Helsinki Summit, the 15 members of the
EU endorsed a Headline Goal, which, for the first time, formally outlined the
Union's military objectives. The Headline Goal states that by 2003, the EU will
be able to deploy a rapid reaction force to its full strength of up to 60,000
troops within 60 days and be capable of sustaining it for a period of one year
for the purposes of the Petersburg tasks, with appropriate naval and air
elements. The Headline Goal specifically outlines the need for
self-sustainability, with access to necessary command, control and intelligence
capabilities, logistics, and other combat support facilities across all
services.
18.
Regarding roles and missions, the Headline
Goal essentially provides a framework for the EU to establish a limited
military crisis management tool, which would fill a gap that has arisen in
European security between civilian crisis management and higher-end
peace-keeping tasks. Until now, the more demanding of these Petersburg tasks
has been undertaken by NATO. The WEU and EU have limited themselves to
lower-end military tasks. The EU rapid reaction force will not conduct
operations in relation to common defence, though most of the national units
that comprise the EU force would be also be available to carry out a NATO
Article 5 operation. Instead, the force is intended for operations where NATO
as a whole would not become involved. Initially, the rapid reaction force might
conduct operations that remain below NATO's threshold, such as disaster relief,
evacuation of EU citizens from unstable countries, humanitarian aid, and
traditional peace-keeping, but not engage in peace enforcement.
19.
The 50,000 to 60,000 service men and women
that will form the Rapid Reaction Force, will not be newly recruited, but will
be drawn from existing national forces. They will constitute neither a
“European Army,” nor a standing force, although on EU missions they may wear an
EU insignia. The size of the force, around 15 brigades or 50,000 to 60,000
troops is not a random figure but is based upon recent expeditionary
operations, such as KFOR (50,000) and IFOR (60,000). The Chief of Staff of the
interim EU Military Staff, Maj. Gen. Graham Messervy-Whiting, indicated that
this figure is not static. As the EU's
military dimension expands, the size of the force may grow accordingly. While some observers, noting the need to
rotate troops deployed abroad, state that the EU force will have to comprise
120,000 or 180,000 troops, it is important to remember that troop rotation will
be done in accordance with national practice, as discussed in the following
section. The Headline Goal simply calls
for a force of 50,000 to 60,000 to be deployed at any one time.
20.
Any decision taken by the EU to deploy the
Rapid Reaction Force will not bind all 15 members to participate, nor will
operations be exclusive to the 15 members alone. The EU will incorporate
mechanisms to enable other non-EU countries to participate, which is discussed
in further detail in Chapter IV. The Headline Goal does not explicitly define
the geographical parameters for deployment of the Rapid Reaction Force. Unlike
NATO, the EU Rapid Reaction Force is not limited to deployment in a specified
region and, according to the EU, could be sent outside of Europe under mandate
of, for example, the UN or OSCE. The benefits of using the force have been
described in terms of Europeans being able to demonstrate a unified and
stronger commitment to international crises, such as that of East Timor or
Sierra Leone.
21.
In order to be capable of undertaking the full range
of Petersburg missions, the EU has compiled a "capability catalogue".
This catalogue, in accordance with agreements made at the May 2000 Feira
Summit, was compiled with the assistance of NATO, and lists the military
capabilities, assets and forces that the EU would require in order to fulfil
the Petersburg missions and meet the objectives of the Headline Goal. The
above-mentioned 50,000 to 60,000 troops are included in the catalogue, as well
as some 400 combat aircraft and 100 naval vessels. The capability document is a
classified document, and the exact requirements for the force have not been
published.
22.
In November 2000, the EU held its Capabilities
Pledging Conference in Brussels. During this meeting, the 15 member states
pledged to make available various military assets and capabilities in
accordance with the capability catalogue. Essentially this conference
established how close the EU was to achieving the objectives of the Headline
Goal and what capability shortfalls remain. During the conference, leadership
of the nascent EU Military Staff was also announced. German Lt. Gen. Klaus
Schuwirth was named the head of the interim Military Staff and
Major General Messervy-Whiting became his chief of staff.
23.
All commitments pledged during the
conference were set out in a "force catalogue". The 15 EU
members adequately met troop goals, pledging some 67,500. The Germans pledged
the largest number of troops at 13,500, followed by the United Kingdom with a
pledge of 12,500, and the French with 12,000. Italy and Spain each pledged
6,000, the Netherlands committed 5,000 troops and Greece pledged 3,500.
Austria and Finland pledged 2,000 respectively and Sweden 1,500. Belgium,
Ireland and Portugal each promised 1,000. Finally, Luxembourg made a pledge of
500 troops. Only Denmark did not pledge troops on the understanding that it
would be likely to provide part of a "Nordic Contingency"; this was
in keeping with Denmark’s decision to “opt out” of EU defence matters.
24.
The above number of troops (67,500) is not a
figure that includes force mix or force rotation, requirements that have led
some observers to offer higher numbers for the Headline Goal commitment. Recognising that different missions might
require troops with different abilities, member countries have offered the EU
access to a total pool of 100,000 troops. It is important to have this larger
number of troops available as it enables commanders to select the right mix
from a larger pool of forces for a specific operation of up to 60,000
troops. For example, heavy artillery
units might not be called upon for low-end policing missions, but might make up
part of the overall pool. In relation to this, the UK stated it would be ready
to provide 12,500 troops at any one time, but this number would be drawn from a
wider pool of 18,000.
25.
The figure of 50,000 to 60,000 does not
include troops for force rotation, which is done to allow units to work, train
and rest adequately over a sustained period of time. Readers may have seen
figures as large as 180,000 for the estimated size of the rapid reaction force.
This figure includes force rotation and is based on a 3:1 rotation. That is to
say, one unit would be deployed while the second unit trains and the third unit
rests. This figure is unhelpful, however, as not all nations rotate their
forces in this manner. British troops, for example, spend two years at home
after every six-month deployment. The French work in 16-month cycles, built
upon four months of deployment, eight months of preparation and four months on
alert. Britain and France are among the
European countries furthest along in restructuring their militaries; as a
result, they plan to have a large proportion of their troops available for
deployment. For example, Britain plans
to have all of its 77,000 army troops available in a pool for overseas
missions, while France plans to have a pool of 100,000 of its 138,000 soldiers
available for deployment at some point.
26.
In terms of military equipment, wide ranges
of assets were made available. The British pledged attack helicopters, air
defence assets, 72 combat aircraft, Royal Navy aircraft, 18 ships (including
one aircraft-carrier, two nuclear-powered submarines and up to four destroyers
and frigates), as well as an amphibious task group with a helicopter landing
ship and an amphibious brigade. France is contributing armoured forces,
engineering units, reconnaissance unmanned aerial vehicles, two AWACS and 12
ships, including its new aircraft-carrier. France has also ordered two
amphibious assault ships capable of carrying 20 transport helicopters for use
by the Rapid Reaction Force. The Belgians have promised a squadron of F-16
combat aircraft and a number of naval vessels.
More details will be provided in the final report this fall.
27.
Non-EU countries, including NATO allies and
EU candidate countries, were invited to pledge contributions to the capability
catalogue. These included Turkey, which pledged a mechanised infantry brigade,
two F-16 squadrons and two C-130 transport aircraft. The EU noted that on first
impression the capabilities and assets pledged by this group of non-EU
countries constituted an important first step, in particular in building a
working relationship between the EU and this group of countries. However, the
EU did not feel that the pledges would significantly rectify the shortfalls
described below. For most EU countries, the real problem in relation to meeting
the requirements of the capability catalogue will be in providing military
assets and modern technologies that are either in their developmental stage or
simply do not yet exist.
28.
During the force pledging conference, the 15
EU members surpassed their goal for the number of ground troops. This is not surprising, as the 15 countries
field more than 2 million active-duty servicemen and women. While the armies of many EU countries
contain large numbers of conscripts, there are still hundreds of thousands of
professional troops. The United Kingdom
and France alone field more 170,000 soldiers that would be available for
overseas rotations. However, the conference did reinforce a stark, but enduring
reality. While Europe possesses a vast number of troops, it lacks many
necessary key military capabilities and assets, which would ensure easy
deployment, full mobility, secure and inter-operable communications and
sustainability in field via access to adequate supplies. These capabilities are
necessary to ensure the EU rapid reaction force can project decisive force
beyond its borders. Many members of the EU indicated large shortfalls in
relation to attaining the level set out in the capability catalogue.
29.
These shortfalls did not come as a surprise.
European capability deficits were catalogued through the WEU Audit of Assets
and Capabilities and NATO's Defence Capabilities Initiative in 1999. Indeed,
NATO had identified shortfalls years prior to this date. Not surprisingly, the
capabilities conference acknowledged a very similar set of shortfalls as the
WEU Audit and the DCI. Six of the seven capabilities necessary to ensure the
EU's effective engagement in crisis management are the same as the capabilities
and assets identified by the DCI as being key areas for improvement within the
Alliance. Furthermore, one of the four NATO-EU ad hoc working groups
established at Feira specifically handles capabilities and provides a forum
through which both organisations can consider a combined approach.
30.
Key strategic capability gaps highlighted by
the commitment conference include strategic shortfalls in air and transport,
intelligence collection assets and command and control assets. Tactical
shortfalls include suppression of enemy air defence, combat search and rescue,
precision guided munitions, cruise missiles and medical capabilities. The
report of Giovanni Lorenzo Forcieri for the Sub-Committee on Future Security and
Defence Capabilities Report considers many of these capability shortfalls.
However, one shortage specific to the EU is that of satellites. The EU will
need to develop an intelligence policy and capability autonomous of the United
States. Although it is unlikely that the EU would develop an equivalent to the
US Central Intelligence Agency, it would aim to reduce its reliance on the
United States, especially in the field of satellite imagery. According to the
EU's objectives for its ESDP, plans have been made to develop the WEU Satellite
Centre in Torrejon, Spain, as well as to draw on other national assets
possessed by France and the United Kingdom to provide an EU capability. This Sub-Committee was to visit the WEU
Satellite Centre in April 2001 to learn more about this, and its findings will
be included in the final version of this report in the fall.
31.
In order to meet some of its capability
shortfalls in other areas, European countries are searching for purely European
solutions. The joint development and purchase of the A400M large aircraft by
seven European countries is a case in point. However, if the EU is to be
capable of acting autonomously from the United States in the very near future,
larger assets, such as transport aircraft must be acquired quickly. Arguably,
to meet all of the major strategic capability shortfalls by Headline Goal's
target date of 2003, the EU would not be able to find a European solution to
all shortfalls and would have to purchase or lease at least some equipment from
the United States. For example, the A400M will not come into service until
2007, four years after the proposed completion of the Headline Goal. Similar
large aircraft, such as the US C-17, are already in production. The British
government has overcome this problem by leasing C-17 aircraft from the US,
while committing the eventual development and purchase of the A400M.
32.
A second capabilities conference was to take
place in Gothenburg in May 2001. At this conference, countries were to consider
how to quickly acquire the capabilities and assets they do not already possess
in order to fulfil the requirements of the Headline Goal. Certainly, in order
to overcome many of the shortfalls in the long-term, Europeans will have to
rationalise their limited defence budgets, as discussed in last year’s report
by Paul Helminger for the Economic Committee.
They will also have to participate in an increased number of joint and
co-operative military equipment programmes, as discussed in Mr. Forcieri’s
report. A central issue of debate is
how far the EU itself should develop its one distinct capability shortfall,
which is military planning. This will be considered in Chapter V.
33.
One of the most controversial aspects of ESDP since the December 1999
Helsinki summit has been how the European NATO allies outside of the EU will be
included in ESDP. The “European pillar”
of defence had originally been perceived as ESDI, meaning the European members
of NATO; the rapid development of an EU defence policy led to the spectre of
discrimination against NATO allies while granting a full place at the table to
four neutral members of the EU. As was
discussed in last year’s Sub-Committee report, the Western European Union (WEU)
had provided an innovative set of arrangements to enable broad participation in
European defence matters. The 10-member
WEU, nearly all of whose activities have been subsumed into the EU, established
mechanisms for including non-EU European members of NATO (associate members),
neutral EU members (observers, a group that included Denmark because it
declined WEU membership), and EU candidates (associate partners). The non-EU European members of NATO were
given the right to ”fully participate” in its activities. The role of these six countries in the
emerging security and defence policy of the EU, has emerged as a contentious
issue in the current debate.
34.
All EU members agree that non-EU members cannot have the same rights as
EU members, particularly when it comes to making a decision about whether the
EU will undertake an operation. There
is a dispute, though, that centres on whether the non-EU allies should be
regarded as a distinct category of states that would benefit from standing
institutional relations with the EU and what those relations should cover.
Since NATO's support is critical to ESDP, and the six are in a position within
NATO to withhold that support, it would be wrong to exclude them from the EU
debate.
35.
France suggests that the relevant group of countries to be associated
with it should be a larger group of 15, including all recognised candidates for
the European Union. The French
underline that the day-to-day work of the Political and Security Committee
(COPS) and other relevant EU structures will have much more to do with the elaboration
of joint EU foreign-policy positions, than with the sort of crisis-management
decisions that would call for formal consultation with NATO and its European
members.
36.
That being said, the EU has offered the
following arrangements for including the six non-EU European allies in ESDP:
·
NATO members would have the right to
participate in any EU operation using Alliance assets – and almost all EU
actions are expected to use NATO assets such as planning processes, operational
headquarters or surveillance – and could be invited to join operations that do
not use Alliance assets;
·
All non-EU countries participating in an
operation with “significant” military forces would join a political/military
committee of contributors with the same rights as participating EU members,
though the EU alone would make the initial decision to undertake an operation;
·
Non-EU NATO members would have a say on
potential operations in their own regions;
·
There is provision for military liaison with
the EU.
37.
The EU members agreed on the new institutional arrangements linking the
EU to NATO at the Feira Summit, respecting EU decision-making autonomy and its
single institutional framework.
Accordingly, it was decided that there would be a single inclusive
structure in which all the countries concerned – European allies and EU
applicants – can enjoy the necessary dialogue, consultation and co-operation
with the EU. Within this structure,
there will be exchanges with the non-EU European NATO members where required,
as in the case of management of EU-led operations that use NATO assets and
capabilities.
38.
These principles have led to some difficulties because non-EU countries
have only consultative rights until an operation is launched. Turkey, a long-standing NATO member, fears
that it will suddenly be excluded from decisions affecting European
security. Ankara regards itself as a
pillar of European security in NATO and wants a say in all ESDP decisions. Consequently, Ankara is opposed to the EU
having automatic access to NATO assets and capabilities -- such as
reconnaissance systems and transport planes -- in times of crisis if the matter
of its involvement in ESDP is not settled to its own satisfaction. The other five non-EU European allies have not
voiced objections over the proposed inclusion arrangements.
39.
During this Sub-Committee’s visit to Turkey in December 2000, Turkish
Defence Minister Sabahattin Cakmakoglu set out four points that he said must be
taken into account by the EU as it establishes ESDP:
·
Because the Washington Summit Declaration on NATO’s European Security
and Defence Identity (ESDI) referred to “building upon” the relationship
between NATO and the WEU, it is important to preserve the WEU, and with it,
Turkey’s place within the WEU as an associate member, or else to create an
equivalent relationship with the EU.
·
NATO countries must maintain control of NATO assets, so any EU use of
NATO assets must be approved on a case-by-case basis, and all EU candidate
countries must have a say in any EU operation.
·
If Turkey participates in an EU operation, Turkey must participate in
the EU decision-making mechanism.
·
If NATO assets and capabilities are used for EU operations, Turkey must
have full and equal rights of participation in all such operations.
40.
Faruk Logoglu, Turkey’s Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs, told the
Sub-Committee, “We have not been satisfied by the degree of participation
offered by the EU… Nice is insufficient.
In peacetime, it is not participation, only consultation, and that is
not enough… We want to say ‘yes’ to ESDP, but it must be good enough for
Turkey.” While Mr Logoglu conceded that
the 15 EU members ultimately must make the final decision on whether the EU
would act in a crisis, he said that Turkey must be involved in all aspects of
the “decision-shaping and decision-making process” leading up to that decision.
41.
Turkish officials also noted that non-Article 5 missions - those in
which the EU might become involved because they do not entail collective
defence - can escalate into Article 5 missions if a NATO member is
attacked. For example, if the EU were
to undertake an operation without the approval of all NATO members, and the
adversary attacked a NATO member that participated, the non-EU allies might be
compelled to come to their ally’s defence without having approved the original
mission. Foreign ministry officials stated that assured access by the EU to
NATO planning capabilities is contingent upon assured access of all NATO allies
to the planning and preparation of operations in which those NATO capabilities
are used. The planning of an operation
is important because it defines the rules of engagement and how soldiers
protect themselves, “which is highly political.” They said that all allies must
have a role in matters affecting their vital security interests, and it is not
politically acceptable for the EU to use NATO assets without asking Turkish
views on the matter at hand.
42.
Representatives from the Turkish Mission to NATO stress that the
Turkish position on ESDP is not an attempt to take a shortcut to EU
membership. Instead, they say Turkey’s
involvement in ESDP underlines Turkey’s support for strengthening the European
pillar of NATO, emphasising indivisibility and fair burden sharing,
complementary crisis management and the building of European capabilities.
43.
While the Turkish concerns are understandable, Ankara’s continuing
intransigence has become counter-productive.
The arrangements of Helsinki, Feira and Nice provide Turkey with nearly
all that it is looking for. These
arrangements ensure that Turkey will be consulted on all EU decisions on
defence and security; that Turkey will have the right to participate in any
operation that uses NATO assets; and that Turkey will have full and equal
decision-making rights in any operation in which it participates. While the WEU provided an excellent
mechanism for inclusion, it is unrealistic to insist on maintaining its
arrangements when the WEU member states have shifted most of its
responsibilities into the EU, leaving the WEU only a shell of its former self.
44.
If Turkey continues to refuse to allow the EU to have assured access to
NATO capabilities, it will strengthen the hand of those who would have the EU
develop such capabilities independent of NATO by demonstrating that NATO cannot
be relied upon. This, in turn, would
reduce the input of Turkey and other non-EU allies into ESDP. While they would have the automatic right of
participation in any operation that involves NATO assets, and the automatic
right to a full decision-making role if they participate, they would not enjoy
such rights in an operation that does not use NATO assets. The current Turkish position could lead
Turkey to enjoy a lesser role in ESDP, which would be a regrettable position
for a country that has been a loyal ally for almost 50 years. Moreover, NATO planning for EU operations
would also be in Turkish interests, as it will take into consideration the
views and capabilities of all allies and provide maximum transparency.
45.
National governments and their armed
services engage in many types of military planning. For the purposes of this
paper three will be considered: operational planning, defence planning, and
force planning.
46.
Operational planning, according to the armed
services, is defined as all planning relating to an operation and takes place
at three main levels: strategic, operational and tactical. It can be further
divided into advance planning (long-term) and crisis response
planning (short-term). Advance planning is conducted by the armed services
around potential security risks and based around various scenarios and
eventualities, involving, for example, both real and fictitious adversaries.
Crisis response planning is conducted once an actual threat or crisis
has been identified. For example, following the March 2000 decision to strike
Serbia during the Kosovo crisis, NATO and SHAPE conducted crisis response
planning for the air campaign over Kosovo. All operational planning can be
conducted at a national level or through NATO and SHAPE.
47.
A second type of military planning is that
of defence planning. Within defence planning, there are many disciplines. These
disciplines include, for example, infrastructure planning, armaments planning,
nuclear planning, and communications planning. Defence planning is conducted at
both a national level and an intergovernmental level via NATO. Under the
auspices of NATO's Defence Capabilities Initiative (DCI), allies have sought to
find methods of co-ordinating the work of the disciplines, which tend to
develop and progress separately from one another. Today, NATO is working to
establish methods to find inter-operability and commonality within the defence
planning disciplines.
48.
NATO force planning focuses on co-ordinating
the member armed forces to ensure that they have the correct capabilities and
assets to carry out the Alliance's Strategic Concept. A full description of
NATO's force planning process was provided in last year’s report of the
Subcommittee on Future Security and Defence Capabilities. Essentially, the
process is a biennial advisory mechanism based upon Ministerial Guidance from
NATO member country defence ministers. This guidance lays out broad priorities
and areas of concern for NATO, which is then translated into national Force Goals.
Each nation agrees to its Force Goals which enable it to meet its national
objectives while assisting the Alliance in its overall objectives.
49.
One of the most contentious issues facing
the establishment of a military dimension within the EU is that of EU access to
NATO's military planning capabilities and assets, mainly in operational
planning, but also force planning. The central problem focuses around
interpretation by both institutions of the concepts of "autonomy" and
"assured access". While the EU wishes to establish its own autonomous
military capability, it has limited operational planning capabilities of its
own and no force planning mechanisms. Furthermore, the establishment of the
ESDP, and with it an autonomous decision-making capability, was endorsed by
NATO on the understanding that the EU would use NATO planning mechanisms,
specifically operational planning at SHAPE and the NATO force planning process,
to prevent duplication and take advantage of NATO's considerable expertise.
50.
NATO and the EU are now deadlocked in
discussions over options for EU access to NATO's operational military planning
capabilities. The EU has stated it requires "guaranteed permanent access
(legally binding automatic access) to the Alliance's military planning
capabilities, specifically its military headquarters (SHAPE) when conducting
EU-led operations.” This is because, in practical terms, the EU Military Staff
is small, (about half the size of NATO's International Military Staff), and will
possess no structure like SHAPE (which has about 2,500 staff) upon which to
draw its expertise. This is a large capability that should not be
duplicated. However, as discussed
above, Turkey in particular would prefer that access to NATO capabilities and
assets be agreed on a case-by-case
basis.
51.
Should a decision regarding EU access to
NATO planning facilities be delayed further, there is a risk that this will
create the incentive for the EU to find its own solution, and start to create
truly autonomous planning facilities, specifically its own operational
headquarters. If EU access to NATO planning were based upon the NAC's
case-by-case approval, an option preferred by Turkey, the EU's political
objectives (ESDP) would not be truly autonomous. At the December 2000 NAC
meeting, no agreement could be reached on modalities for EU access. As yet, no
decision has been reached. Until this central problem can be resolved, NATO and
the EU have decided to proceed in other areas (building capabilities, for example),
working on the basis that nothing is agreed until everything is agreed.
52.
The type of planning that the EUMS envisages
it will conduct is limited to the strategic level and is known as advanced,
strategic level planning. This very
limited EUMS planning capability is intended only to enable the military staff
to advise the Council in its selection of an operation commander. The operation
commander, for example the Deputy SACEUR or Deputy SACLANT, would then chose
the operational headquarters, which would begin operational and tactical level
planning. These two levels of planning could be conducted at SHAPE or national
joint headquarters, like the British Permanent Joint Headquarters at Northwood
or its French counterpart at Creil. This type of operational planning would not
be undertaken by the EU.
53.
It is important not to confuse the interim
EUMS "operating" capability with an "operational"
capability. The EUMS talks of an operating capability only in terms of its
transition from an interim to a permanent body. Its principal task is to
provide in-house military expertise to the Council. At present, the interim
EUMS represents a small advisory body of about 40 personnel (military and
civilian), which will eventually assist the EU Council bodies, discussed above,
in exercising political control and strategic direction of Petersberg
operations. The interim EUMS has a staff of approximately 40 and will have a
maximum size of fewer than 100 officers when it becomes permanent, with 20 to
30 reinforcement posts to be filled on a case-by-case basis for demanding
crisis operations. This is still approximately half the size of NATO
international military staff and can in no way be compared to SHAPE.
54.
With regard to force planning, the EU has
been discussing the possibility of using NATO force planning capabilities for
over a year, and both the EU and NATO have stated the need to make use of
structures which already exist. While the EU is attempting to match its
capabilities to the requirements of its potential roles and missions, as
outlined in the Petersburg tasks, this process does not constitute a detailed
force planning process like that at NATO.
55.
An important question for ESDP is who
will exercise the ultimate authority over its operations. The EU is a unique amalgam of an
international organisation and a confederation, and a mixture of communitarian
and intergovernmental decision-making procedures. Currently, the Council is the ultimate authority over ESDP, meaning
that it is a common policy of 15 countries, with little or no role for the
Commission and the European Parliament.
56.
ESDP is an outgrowth of the EU’s
efforts to develop a Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), and gives a
defence dimension to what has been a rather toothless endeavour. The appointment of Javier Solana as head of
the General Secretariat of the Council and High Representative for CFSP, as
well as Secretary General of the WEU, gave greater visibility to this
effort. His task is to assist the
member governments by contributing to the formulation, development and
implementation of political decisions and to represent the governments in
discussions with third countries.
57.
To ensure a more coherent approach towards regions that are of vital
interest to the EU, there is also Christopher Patten, European Commissioner for
External Relations. Essentially, he is
the Commission’s interface with the EU’s General Affairs Council and the
Commission’s interlocutor with Solana.
The treaties that govern the EU stipulate that the Commission should be
fully associated with the work carried out in the CFSP field, but they do not
address ESDP. The Commission’s foreign
policy role, first and foremost, deals with the delivery
of external assistance, but also using its resources and civilian expertise to
assist EU crisis management operations.
58.
ESDP is run by the General Affairs Council,
made up of foreign ministers from the 15 member countries. The Political and Security Committee
monitors the international situation, contributes to the formulation of
policies by giving the Council opinions (either at the latter’s request or on
its own initiative) and also oversees the implementation of the policies that
are agreed. In accordance with the
Presidency each term, the EU member governments also hold informal defence
ministerial meetings twice a year, as with the North Atlantic Council, so as to
achieve objectives for a quickly operational and fulfilment of the Headline
Goal. The EU defence ministers held an
informal meeting in April 2001 to discuss shortcomings on capabilities as well
as an assessment mechanism for those capabilities that do exist. A joint meeting between EU defence ministers
and those of the six non-EU European members of NATO was set for May 2001.
59.
The European Council has already developed
the civilian aspects of crisis management with a view to establishing a better
balance among the various instruments available to the Union. It thus decided to set up, by 2003, a force
of 5,000 police officers to carry out crisis management operations, 1,000 of
which must be deployable within 30 days.
Moreover, the European Council laid down a work programme embracing
conflict prevention, the consolidation of peace and the internal stability of
states, areas, or regions in crisis or threatened by crisis. This has been institutionalised with a
committee for civilian aspects of crisis management and a mechanism to provide
co-ordination between the EU’s interim Situation Center/Crisis Cell.
60.
One aspect of ESDP that has attracted little
attention is the oversight role that will be played by democratically elected
representatives of the people of the EU.
Popular support is necessary to give legitimacy to decisions such as how
much of a society’s resources should be spent on defence or whether to send its
citizens into harm’s way. Legislators
elected directly by the people can reflect the popular will and serve as a
check on policies that do not reflect the wishes of society.
61.
Despite this, the problem of the
parliamentary dimension was not mentioned in the declarations from the 1999
Cologne and Helsinki summits, which gave impetus to ESDP. According to the treaties that govern the
EU, the European Parliament (EP) has no power to initiate legislation. Its role is confined to expressing its
opinion to the country holding the rotating EU Presidency and being regularly
informed by the Presidency and the Commission about developments in the Common
Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), which originally did not have a defence
dimension. Last year, the EP made a
failed attempt to include ESDP in Article 21 of the Treaty on European Union,
which requires the EP to hold an annual debate on the CFSP.
62.
The EP has proposed that a parliamentary
body for security and defence should be set up to correspond to the broader
framework of European security. This
body would act as a link between the EP and national parliaments, whose
delegations would include the chairmen of the committees on foreign affairs and
defence. In recent interviews with Members
of the European Parliament, it was suggested that this forum would represent 16
parliaments (15 members states plus the EP) and include approximately 150
representatives.
63.
It is essential that the European Parliament
make administrative arrangements that enable it to monitor the development of
ESDP closely and continuously, but the prime responsibility for the ESDP
resides with national parliaments. The
EP can also play a constructive role overseeing the humanitarian aid aspects of
CFSP, which are currently the responsibility of the Commission. The EP’s Committee on Foreign Affairs should
develop some competence in defence matters, to ensure coherence between the
intergovernmental ESDP and the Commission’s work on the EU’s common foreign
policy, but it is unlikely to provide parliamentary oversight of ESDP.
64.
Some steps have already been taken toward
integrating national parliamentary defence committees and the EP. Since 1995, a Conference of Chairmen of the
Foreign Affairs Committees of the Parliaments of the European Union and the
European Parliament has been meeting twice a year. Consequently, the first Conference of Chairmen of the Defence
Committees of the Parliaments of the Member States of the European Union took
place in July 2000 in Paris. In February
2001, the European Parliament (EP) was invited to attend this defence
chairmen’s conference for the first time.
The importance of the role of the national parliaments in relation to
the European Parliament for the scrutiny of the development of ESDP was
discussed, as well as their role in funding ESDP.
65.
During that February 2001 meeting of defence
committee chairmen, a proposal to establish a second parliamentary chamber for
the EU, consisting of members of national parliaments, drew criticism from
those opposed to additional EU institutions.
In the end, the chairmen decided to create an ad hoc working group to
prepare a third conference, to be held in Belgium in July 2001. The European Parliament will be included to
deal with parliamentary scrutiny of the ESDP and funding of common structures
and missions. The working group will be
composed of the defence committee chairmen from the immediate past, present,
and future holders of the EU presidency:
France, Sweden, and Belgium.
66.
In addition, it is essential that those
European states outside the EU that share an interest in European security be
offered a parliamentary forum. The EP
has suggested a desire to involve the parliaments of the applicant countries and
those of the non-EU NATO allies. Nonetheless,
the EP believes that the parliamentary dimension must be developed within the
EU framework. The EP has also placed great importance on its co-operation with
the NATO PA as both a European and transatlantic forum for discussing security
and defence matters.
67.
The WEU Assembly has long served as the
parliamentary dimension for European defence, bringing together representatives
of the parliaments of 28 participating countries. Recognising the need for an inter-parliamentary assembly to
oversee ESDP, the WEU Assembly in 2000 added the name Interim European Security
and Defence Assembly to its title.
Established by the 1948 Brussels Treaty, the WEU Assembly is a fixture
that can only be abolished by a treaty amendment ratified by the 10
signatories. But with the WEU itself
becoming nothing more than an administrative shell, an assembly that only
oversees the WEU has become pointless.
68.
Given the legitimacy enjoyed by national
governments and parliaments in the field of defence, the best forum for legislative
oversight of ESDP would be an international assembly. Such an assembly should bring together individual members of
national parliaments and members of the European Parliament. There are two ways to proceed to establish
this. One would be to implement the EP
initiative for a body consisting of members of national parliaments and the EP
itself, though some provision would have to be established to include non-EU
countries as associate members. The
other would be for the EP to gain a special status within a transformed WEU
Assembly, which would have to be expanded to give full membership to the five
EU countries that are not WEU members.
Regardless of the institution chosen by the 15 EU member states, it is essential
that national members of parliament and members of the European Parliament
obtain sufficient information to form an opinion on the state of ESDP.
69.
The effort by the European Union to develop
its European Security and Defence Policy holds real hope for filling a need in
European security in the post-Cold War era.
The Soviet threat that necessitated an emphasis on common defence has
disappeared, but Europe faces areas of instability and crises to be managed. While the transatlantic link has served both
Europe and North America, the new security environment requires additional
tools. It is not surprising that
European countries have recognised the need to be able to manage crises without
having to depend on NATO in every case, and ESDP could provide a valuable means
to address such security challenges in the future. At the same time, it holds the potential of rectifying the
long-standing imbalance in burden
sharing between the United States and the European allies.
70.
But while the idea is welcome, the execution
will be difficult. Europe bearing a
greater share of the defence burden is desirable, but undermining NATO would
ultimately leave both sides worse off.
Including the European allies outside of the EU in ESDP is essential,
because these countries have pledged their soldiers and their funds to help
defend their NATO allies, in some cases for more than a half-century. Because European defence budgets are
limited, there must be a minimum of duplication of capabilities available at
NATO, but the non-EU allies must work with the EU to assure that both sides
will have access to these assets.
71.
ESDP will
remain an intergovernmental process.
As this Assembly has noted, only democratically elected governments and
parliaments have the democratic legitimacy to send their citizens into harm’s
way; they must not abdicate this role.
Therefore it is important that they are provided with ample information
and, at the same time, are able to participate in multinational consensus
building. A mixed body, working at 28
and composed of national parliamentarians and a number of members of the
European Parliament, would seem to be the best solution for the time-being.
72.
Finally, it is critical that ESDP develop
the defence capabilities that are needed for the European countries to carry
out the missions that have become critical to European security. European countries will have to be able to
get their forces to where they are needed, ensure they have what they need to
accomplish their mission, and sustain them in the field as long as necessary to
be successful. European countries must
spend their defence budgets smarter, on capabilities for today and not
yesterday, and some must even spend more.
Ultimately, the success of ESDP will not be judged by the size of its
staff, but on whether the European countries are willing to devote the
resources needed to build effective forces for crisis management.
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