1.
As NATO continues to adapt to the post-Cold War security situation,
several defence issues have emerged as challenges to the unity of the
Alliance. During the Cold War, the
Soviet threat compelled the Allies to resolve their differences to ensure the
common defence of their territories.
Today, as an Alliance without an adversary, NATO finds that its
long-simmering differences risk boiling over, threatening the transatlantic
link that has served the democracies of the North Atlantic region so well for
more than half a century.
2.
In the past year, it has become clear that the European allies and
Canada are concerned about some of the possible consequences of the American
effort to develop a missile defence system to protect the 50 United States from
long-range missiles that might be fired by “rogue states.” At the same time, several of the Allies
outside of the European Union have begun to view with varying degrees of
concern the EU’s efforts to build an autonomous European Security and Defence
Policy, which some fear could undermine the Atlantic Alliance. If ESDP enhances NATO’s capabilities to
project force and sustain it longer, it will be successful and could help
resolve long-standing American criticisms about unfair burdensharing. If it results in no additional military
capabilities, it could lead the United States to question why it continues to
pledge American lives and dollars for the defence of a continent that should be
willing to do more for itself. And
these potential divisions come as the Alliance will consider the admission of
new members next year, a process that could exacerbate differences of opinion
within NATO and lead countries that are refused membership to question their
participation in the Partnership for Peace Programme.
3.
This report will endeavour to inform members about the major issues in
Alliance defence policy, in order to facilitate discussion and debate among
members, both in the Assembly and in their home capitals. This interim spring
report will attempt to frame the debate; the final version in the autumn will
probe these questions in greater detail.
4.
Recognising the importance of some of these issues, this Committee has
charged its subcommittees with the task of examining key issues in more
depth. The Sub-Committee on
Transatlantic Defence and Security Co-operation will continue its look at ESDP
in the report by Wim van Eekelen, of the Netherlands. That report will provide a detailed look at developments in ESDP
over the past six months. Likewise, the
Sub-Committee on Future Security and Defence Capabilities will continue its
work on the Defence Capabilities Initiative and defence reforms in NATO
countries in its report by Giovanni Lorenzo Forcieri, of Italy. Your Rapporteur will use his report to
provide his own modest views on some of the consequences on the Alliance if
ESDP and DCI fail to ameliorate the problems of burden-sharing that have
plagued NATO since its founding.
5.
This report will focus most of its efforts on missile defence, both
long-range missile defence to protect North America and shorter-range, Theatre
Missile Defence (TMD) systems, which would protect troops deployed abroad, as
well as the territories of European allies facing shorter-range threats. This issue has emerged as one of the most
controversial within the Alliance, and it is not dealt with elsewhere in the
Committee. This report will reflect
information on missile defence and arms control gained by the Committee during
its meetings in Washington this winter with officials of the new Bush Administration,
the Congress, and outside experts, as well as other research.
6.
This report also will look at enlargement and the progress that
candidate countries have made. The
preliminary information in this interim spring report will be augmented in the fall,
after greater examination of the defence reforms in the nine candidate
countries. This report will also review
the experience of NATO’s last round of enlargement.
7.
Finally, the report will examine the situation in the Balkans and in
Russia and Ukraine, particularly the progress in defence reforms in the two
countries.
8.
Since the Committee debated the issue of ballistic missile defence in
Berlin last November, discussion of the issue has taken a more conciliatory
tone. The election of George W. Bush as
the new U.S. president has reinforced the American position that a National
Missile Defense (NMD) system to protect the 50 states is a question of “when,
not if.” But the new administration has
been quick to promise consultation with allies on the issue, as well as to
de-emphasize the “national” in National Missile Defense, expressing a
willingness to include all U.S. allies under a missile defence umbrella. For their part, the European allies and Canada
have signalled a willingness to take Mr Bush at his word and discuss the issue
with the new administration rather than inveighing against NMD.
9.
The main stumbling block, as ever in missile defence, is the 1972
Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty, which prohibits the United States and
Russia from deploying NMD systems; that is, systems that would protect their
national territory from intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs). Each side is permitted a small site of 100
interceptors to protect the national capital or an offensive missile
installation, but not the entire national territory. Arms control advocates argue that the ABM Treaty enabled the
subsequent strategic arms limitation and reduction treaties (SALT and START) by
assuring each side that its remaining missiles would be able to get through to
their targets, enabling each side to maintain deterrence with fewer
missiles. Many proponents of arms
control oppose NMD because they fear that abrogating the ABM Treaty will lead
Russia to abandon the START process and retain 6,000 missiles at a time it
cannot afford to maintain such an arsenal safely. They also fear that China may feel compelled to greatly increase
its arsenal of 18-20 ICBMs so that it can continue to deter a U.S. attack,
though China has taken a more confrontational tone toward the United States and
is planning to build up its arsenal anyway.
Nevertheless, a Chinese arms build-up could lead to an arms race with
India and Pakistan.
10.
Another concern expressed by NATO countries is that NMD is designed
only to protect the United States, leaving the rest of the Alliance vulnerable
to ballistic missile attack. Officials
in the Bush Administration have told this Committee that they recognise that
the term “NMD” indicates a potential decoupling of the United States from its
allies. Defense Secretary Donald
Rumsfeld said in March 2001 that the distinction between NMD and TMD is not
useful. He noted that while TMD may be
deployed to protect forces in a theatre, it would defend the territory of the
nation where those forces are deployed.
11.
Nonetheless, there is still an important distinction between national
defence against ICBMs, which is prohibited by the ABM Treaty, and defence
against shorter range missiles, which is permitted. As is discussed in greater detail below, the United States and
several other NATO countries are developing Theatre Missile Defence (TMD)
systems against shorter-range missiles.
NATO itself is conducting a TMD study that will develop an Alliance-wide
TMD requirement by 2004. TMD comprises defences against anything from
short-range threats against troop concentrations to theatre-wide systems that
aim to protect a given territory against all missiles with a range of less than
3,500 km. Given that several potential
missile threats are within this range of Europe, a TMD system could serve to
defend the entire national territory of a European country. Conversely, threats to the United States and
Canada would come from ICBMs.
12.
This chapter will begin by assessing the threat to Alliance homelands
from missiles and other means of delivery.
It will then look at the current state and likely development of the
American programme to develop long-range missile defence and TMD programmes in
NATO and among its member countries. It
will conclude by examining the likely path of arms control in the Bush
Administration, including the prospect of dramatic unilateral reductions in the
U.S. nuclear arsenal.
13.
One controversial question surrounding missile defence is whether there
exists a threat great enough to justify the financial cost and possible
political consequences of building missile defences. American intelligence analysis, upon which the U.S. programme is
based, indicates that several medium powers with interests contrary to those of
the United States could have the capability to launch ballistic missiles
against the United States by 2015 and can already strike one or more European
allies. These countries, known as
“rogue states” or “states of concern” depending on the political climate in
Washington, are in addition to declared
nuclear powers Russia and China. Some
critics of the programme challenge these conclusions about the missile threat
or argue that there are more cost-effective, less destabilising ways to deal
with the problem.
14.
A focus on ballistic missile threats ignores that other means of
delivering nuclear, biological or chemical (NBC) weapons are more probable,
less detectable, and cheaper than ballistic missiles. A nuclear device could be smuggled into a country in a suitcase
or carried on a freighter that is sailed into a major port city. Chemical weapons could be dispersed in a
crowded subway. Biological weapons
could target a city’s water supply or be dispersed by aerosol to cover a wide,
populated area. The recent
foot-and-mouth disease outbreak in Europe illustrates the tremendous cost that
could be exacted by biological weapons aimed at agriculture. In addition, while missile launches would
invite immediate and devastating retaliation, it can be difficult to pinpoint
the source of state-sponsored terrorist attacks. It may well be that an adversary wishing to use NBC weapons
against a NATO country would use rather low-tech means of delivery, leaving
ballistic missile defence a high-cost programme that fails to meet more
probable security threats.
15.
An unclassified intelligence briefing from the U.S. Defense
Intelligence Agency (DIA) to this Committee in February stated that several
“rogue states” are soon likely to have the capability to launch
intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) against the United States. North Korea could test an ICBM at any time,
and it would be willing to sell ICBM technology to any willing buyer, DIA said. While testing of the two-stage Taepo Dong 2
ICBM is currently delayed for political reasons, DIA stated that the missile
could carry a nuclear warhead at least 7,000 km, which would reach Alaska and
Hawaii; if North Korea succeeds in adding a third stage, the missile could
possibly travel as far as 12,000 km, which would threaten most of North
America. DIA said Iran could possibly
test a nuclear-capable ICBM by 2010 and is likely to do so by 2015. Iraq could test an ICBM by 2015 if sanctions
prove ineffective and Russia offers assistance, or if Iraq buys an ICBM from
North Korea, which has proven willing to sell missiles and technology. Iran and Iraq are said to be actively
seeking assistance for their missile programmes from the former Soviet Union.
16.
As for threats against the European allies, the Office of the U.S.
Secretary of Defense (OSD) in January 2001 published a report on
“Proliferation: Threat and Response.”
That report found that Iran currently possesses SCUD missiles with a
range of 500 km, which could threaten the eastern third of Turkey. It states that Iran is developing a Shahab 3
missile, based on the North Korean No Dong, with a range of 1,300 km, which
would threaten most of Turkish Anatolia.
Iran may also be interested in purchasing North Korean Taepo Dong
missiles: A Taepo Dong 1 (known by Iran
as a Shahab 4) could reach all of Turkey and Greece; a Taepo Dong 2 (Shahab 5)
could threaten all 17 European allies.
The OSD believes that Iran is pursuing programmes to develop NBC
weapons; the nuclear programme would require assistance from Russia or China or
the illicit acquisition of fissile material to produce a nuclear warhead.
17.
The report by the U.S. Office of the Secretary of Defense states that
Iraq possesses missiles with a range of 650 km, capable of striking the eastern
half of Turkey. Iraq is believed to be
developing its own missile with a 950 km range. The OSD states that Iraq is continuing its programme to develop
NBC weapons, particularly given that United Nations weapons inspections have
been suspended since 1998. While Iraq
is not expected to have a nuclear capability for at least five years, that
time-frame could be reduced if Iraq is able to obtain fissile material.
18.
In addition, DIA told the Committee that Libya is looking into buying
the existing North Korean No Dong missile, with a range of 1,300 km, which
could threaten much of Southern Europe, including all of Greece, most of Italy,
the western half of Turkey, and the Mediterranean coasts of Spain and France,
including the Balearics and Corsica.
The OSD states that Libya’s existing SCUD missiles have a range of 300
km, which could reach Crete, though their operational status is
questionable. Libya has had a chemical
weapons programme, which is inactive, and is believed to be developing
biological weapons. Its nuclear
programme is said to have made “little progress.”
19.
Syria also has a SCUD missile arsenal with a range of 500 km, which
could reach most of Turkey, according to the Office of the Secretary of Defense
report. The OSD says Syria possesses chemical weapons and could produce
biological weapons, but is not pursuing a nuclear programme.
20.
North Korea suspended its nuclear weapons programme in 1994 as part of
an agreement with the United States, and it is believed to have complied with
that agreement. OSD, however, believes
there may be evidence that North Korea is continuing to procure nuclear weapon
technology should it decide to restart the programme. In addition, U.S. officials believe North Korea may have diverted
sufficient plutonium for at least one nuclear warhead prior to the 1994
agreement. The OSD believes that North
Korea possesses a large chemical weapon stockpile and has the infrastructure to
produce biological weapons, if it has not already done so.
21.
In addition to the “rogue states,” Russia and China both possess
ICBMs. The United States and Russia
still operate in a world of mutually assured destruction (MAD), in which each
side understands that a nuclear first strike would lead to an all-out
counterstrike, destroying its own society.
Russia had 5,870 strategic warheads at the end of 2000, according to
OSD, a figure that should drop below 3,500 by 2007 under the START 2
treaty. China is believed to have about
18‑20 ICBMs with a range of 13,000 km, capable of reaching all of North
America and Europe. The American report
says that China has tested a mobile missile with a range of 8,000 km, which
could reach all of Europe, western and northern Canada, Alaska, Hawaii, and the
U.S. Pacific Northwest. OSD believes
that this programme and a longer-range mobile missile programme “likely will
increase the number of Chinese warheads aimed at the United States.”
22.
Critics of missile defence question some of the conclusions about
technical capabilities reached by DIA and OSD.
For example, a report by the Federation of American Scientists (FAS)
finds that an untested North Korean Taepo Dong 2 missile armed with a nuclear
warhead have a maximum range of 6,000 km and could only strike Alaska. FAS indicates that North Korea would have to
conduct nuclear tests to develop a lighter-weight nuclear warhead that would
allow the Taepo Dong 2 to reach any of the lower 48 states, or substitute a
chemical or biological warhead. As for
a three-stage missile that could threaten all of North America, FAS states,
“Although it cannot be doubted that time and effort could eventually achieve
this result, deployment of a credible, let alone reliable, ICBM of this class
would clearly require a more extensive infrastructure than has been evident to
date.” As for Iran, FAS does not dispute
that Iran could deploy a Shahab 4 or 5 missile based on the North Korean Taepo
Dong, but expects that Iran would test such a missile before deploying it. While a Shahab 5 could threaten all of
Europe, an ICBM to threaten North America would require extensive
infrastructure and development, according to the report.
23.
Critics also note that threat is a product of capability and intent,
and they question whether a country like North Korea or Iran would be willing
to launch a nuclear missile at the United States at the risk of a devastating
nuclear counter-attack that would destroy their countries and their
regimes. Critics note that the logic of
deterrence that averted a nuclear exchange between the superpowers during the
Cold War still applies, making such countries unlikely to ever launch a missile
against the United States. Missile
defence proponents respond that if “rogue states” could put an American city at
risk, the United States might be unwilling to engage in operations like the
Persian Gulf War to assist friends and allies around the world.
24.
One way of reducing both the threat and the capability from a country
like North Korea is diplomacy. Reports
indicate that the Clinton Administration in December 2000 was near an agreement
with North Korea under which Pyongyang would pledge not to produce, test or
deploy missiles with a range of greater than 500 km in exchange for about $1
billion a year in commodity assistance, such as food and coal. Such a halt in the North Korean missile
programme could have reduced the need for the United States to rush to deploy
long-range missile defences. With the
Bush Administration indicating it will pursue a harder line with North Korea,
Pyongyang in February 2001 warned it might resume testing of long-range missiles. Russia has also been interested in using its
diplomatic resources to persuade North Korea to give up its long-range missile
programme. Reports indicate such a deal
would promise North Korea assistance in launching its satellites and financial
assistance to make up for the money North Korea earns through missile exports.
25.
The September 2000 decision by President Clinton to defer construction
of an NMD system and the election of President Bush leave the future direction
of the American missile defence programme unclear, though Mr Bush has stated
that he will pursue a “more robust” missile defence system than his
predecessor. The first question
surrounds whether Mr Bush will go forward with the Alaska-based system, which
could be deployed by 2006 at the earliest.
A decision would have to be made in Spring 2001 so that ground can be
broken on a radar station during the short Alaskan building season; a decision
not to proceed would delay the programme by another year. At the same time, experts have variously
pushed for a sea-based element to a long-range missile defence system and for
any system to use boost-phase technology, which aims to intercept a missile
shortly after launch. Some analysts
suggest that TMD technology could be further developed to help defend against
long-range missiles. More ambitious
proposals call for Mr Bush to move forward with a space-based system that, in
effect, would provide global missile defence against missile launches anywhere,
a resurrection of the Reagan-era Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI), derided by
its critics as “Star Wars.”
26.
On the other hand, some observers note that
the Joint Chiefs of Staff are unenthusiastic about missile defence, concerned
that it will take funding away from other defence programmes they judge more
critical. This may lead to a debate in
the Pentagon between the office of Secretary Rumsfeld, a strong supporter of
missile defence, and the military services, who prefer that defence budgets
fund other procurement programmes. This
debate will also be played out in Congress, where Pentagon lobbying is
traditionally effective, when Members are confronted with the choice between
funding existing defence programmes in their districts or funding missile
defence.
27.
Speaking at the Wehrkunde conference in Munich in February, U.S.
Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld pledged to consult with the European allies
on missile defence. “The United States
intends to develop and deploy a missile defence designed to defend our people
and forces against a limited ballistic missile attack and is prepared to assist
friends and allies threatened by missile attack to deploy such defences,” Mr
Rumsfeld said. Daniel
Fried, the Senior Director for Europe and Eurasia at the National Security
Council, told the Committee in January that the new Administration will view
missile defence “in an Alliance context.”
28.
David Martin, Deputy for Strategic Relations
at the Ballistic Missile Defense Organisation (BMDO), told this Committee in
February that BMDO is continuing to develop the Alaska-based NMD system
initiated under President Clinton. He
said plans remain to complete 21 flight tests by 2005, and he said the system
could be operational in 2006 or 2007.
He said future issues for NMD include dealing with countermeasures,
looking into boost-phase intercept concepts, examining the role of navy systems
in NMD, and addressing long-range missile threats to Europe.
29.
Some experts have suggested that the Clinton Administration system
should be scrapped, and that the United States instead should focus its efforts
on its more promising TMD systems, including the land-based
Theatre High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) system and the Navy Theatre Wide
programme. Experts, including former
U.S. Defense Secretary Harold Brown and two former deputies, have advocated
that any system for national missile defence should evolve from TMD research
already underway.
30.
Stephen Hadley, the Deputy National Security Adviser to President Bush,
wrote last year that the United States should “develop on a crash basis some
interim or even experimental capabilities to defend the United States against
ballistic missiles,” with a goal of deploying such a system before 2005. He suggested that one or two Aegis cruisers
be outfitted with the interceptor being tested for the Navy Theatre Wide system
and supported with a separate sea-based or land‑based radar. This would provide an “emergency deployment
option” that the United States could send by sea to a crisis zone to deter or
intercept a hostile missile launch.
“Even a system of limited effectiveness may discourage countries from
acquiring ballistic missiles and help to persuade a potential adversary that
blackmailing or coercing the United States from aiding a friend or ally will
not succeed,” he wrote. Mr Hadley went on to call for an Alliance missile
defence that would protect all of North America and U.S. allies in Europe and
Asia. One question, however, would be
whether U.S. allies in Europe and Asia would be willing to pay for such a system.
31.
Some experts, notably Richard Garwin of the Council on Foreign
Relations and Theodore Postol of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology,
have argued that the Alaska-based system is doomed to failure by the difficulty
of performing hit-to-kill intercepts in space, when it would be relatively easy
for the attacking missile to deploy countermeasures. They say that better reliability can be achieved with boost-phase
systems, which would seek to intercept missiles within five minutes of launch,
while the missile is still moving relatively slowly and burning intensely. Instead of a lid over the United States (and
perhaps its allies), boost-phase would put a lid over North Korea or another
threatening country. Proponents of
boost-phase missile defence note that it would be possible to deploy such a
system on a ship based off the coast of North Korea. Iran and Iraq might post a more difficult challenge because of
their size and location. One option
might be if Turkey would offer to host missile defences near its borders with
Iraq and Iran. Another might be to ask
Russia for assistance.
32.
Indeed, Russia has offered to work with NATO on a joint missile defence
plan. A boost‑phase plan aimed at
specific countries appears more appealing to Russia than limited defences
against long-range missiles that might be expanded to neutralise Russia’s
nuclear deterrent. Russia in February
2001 offered NATO Secretary General George Robertson a proposal for ballistic
missile defence, but reports indicate that the plan emphasized joint threat
assessment and political solutions, rather than sharing technology to develop
new missile defence systems. While the
American response has been cautious, there is a willingness to examine the Russian
proposals. Some U.S. officials have
noted that the Russian proposal is an implicit recognition that there is indeed
a “rogue state” missile threat that must be addressed. Co‑operation with Russia holds some
promise of enabling effective missile defence while addressing Russian
concerns, which would help preserve the strategic arms reduction process and
reduce the negative consequences of deployment of long-range missile defences.
33.
While most of the talk about long-range missile defence has focused on
limited systems aimed against “rogue nations,” some supporters advocate nothing
less than an all-out, space‑based global missile defence as proposed by
President Reagan in his Strategic Defense Initiative. Such a system, using space-based detection and lasers to destroy
missiles in the boost phase, could in theory protect the entire world from
missile attack. While the technology is
a decade or more away, supporters’ enthusiasm for SDI has never died. Space-based defences, however, are likely to
be viewed by many countries as markedly more destabilizing than terrestrial
systems.
34.
While the exact architecture of the U.S. missile defense programme in
the Bush Administration is still being debated, the reaction of allied
governments to long-range missile defence is less hostile than a year ago. Secretary General Robertson said in March
that he believes the willingness of Washington to consult with its allies on
the subject has helped address allied concerns. British Foreign Minister Robin Cook said in February that missile
defence could result in a “net gain” in security, and Prime Minister Tony Blair
has said he believes the matter can be “handled with care” so as to address
concerns. In Germany, Foreign Minister
Joschka Fischer reportedly made clear to Russian officials that Germany would
stand by the United States on the issue.
In France, while President Jacques Chirac continues to criticize NMD as
“a strong incitement to proliferation,” Foreign Minister Hubert Védrine more
cautiously noted that France merely “has questions” about the project. Mr Védrine said he was pleased that his
American counterpart was consulting with allies on the issue and reserved judgment until details of the
U.S. plan are known. Canadian Defence
Minister Art Eggleton has been supportive of NMD, while wanting to know more
about the costs and benefits to Canada.
35.
The constructive approach taken in the first months of the new
Administration is to be commended.
Officials have recognised that the European allies and Canada have
legitimate concerns about the possible consequences of the American plans to
deploy long-range missile defence and have shown a willingness to consult with
U.S. allies and take their concerns into account. The de-emphasis of the “national” part of National Missile
Defense is welcome and reflects that missile proliferation would threaten
allies on both sides of the Atlantic.
While there remain reasonable questions about whether the threat
justifies the cost of long-range missile defence, U.S. officials have made it
clear that they intend to go ahead with the project.
36.
As for the European allies and Canada, they should not become
cheerleaders for the American project; instead, they must continue to ask tough
questions about whether U.S. plans will increase the security of the Alliance
or contribute to a destabilising arms race.
At the same time, European allies must remember that the Washington
Treaty pledges them to defend North America just as the North American allies
are committed to defend Europe. This
point cannot be overstated. An attack
on any one ally must be viewed as an attack on all, whether that ally be in
Europe or in North America. NATO does
not exist only to protect Europe; it exists for the common defence of the
entire North Atlantic region. Just as
the United States and Canada must consider the effect of their defence plans on
Europe, so too must the European allies ensure that their policies toward
missile defence contribute to the effective defence of North America.
37.
As
stated above, NATO itself is conducting a TMD study that will develop an
Alliance-wide TMD requirement by 2004. The studies will put NATO in a position
to make an informed decision on TMD, based on existing programmes and the
additional capabilities NATO will need in order to provide flexible, layered,
Alliance-wide TMD. NATO has allotted
$35 million for two industry-led feasibility studies, and total cost for a NATO
TMD system could exceed $2 billion.
38.
In
January 2001, four groups submitted bids to conduct the feasibility studies,
each of which is for $13.5 million (the remainder of the budget is to cover
overhead). A major requirement for
applicants was a strong US-European balance. Of the four main bidders -
Lockheed Martin's Missiles and Fire Control, Raytheon-Thales, Science
Applications International Corporation (SAIC), and Northrop Grumman's Logicon
Unit - each has several strong European partners; the European Aeronautic
Defence and Space Company (EADS), for example, is on all four teams.
39.
Awards are expected in June 2001, and industry teams will have 18
months to design an allied TMD system. These studies will be completed at the
end of 2002, at which time NATO will define its requirement and move to the TMD
project development phase, to be completed by 2004. Essentially, the feasibility studies give NATO, particularly the
Europeans who lack a TMD capability, a better idea of what the capability gap
is likely to be and an outline of the potential costs of developing a layered
system, linking what already exists.
40.
Furthermore,
the feasibility studies will focus specifically on tactical defence of forces,
limiting allied TMD to a range of approximately 3,000 km. While it would be
possible to use TMD to defend populations (PAC-2 systems were used to protect
Israelis civilians against Iraqi SCUD missile attacks during the Persian Gulf
War), allied TMD will primarily be a tactical system designed to protect
deployed forces in theatre. No NATO staff requirement has been proposed for an
upper-tier system that would be able to defend European countries and
populations.
41.
In
addition to the NATO TMD project, various TMD systems are being developed on a
bilateral and multilateral level by the Allies, many of which may figure as
components of NATO's Alliance-wide TMD system.
These include land-based and sea-based systems, as well as lower‑tier
and upper-tier systems. The best-known
of the land-based, lower-tier systems, is the US Patriot air defence system.
The latest version, the Patriot Advanced Capability-3 (PAC-3) is said to be a
significant upgrade of the PAC-2 (used during the Gulf War but heavily
criticised for its limited capabilities) and is due to enter service in the
next few years. Following complaints of high costs by European allies, the unit
price of the PAC-3 missile has recently been reduced below $2.7 million
per missile. The Germans and Dutch are looking to buy PAC-3 enhancements to
acquire a lower-tier capability. Greece is also planning to buy PAC-3 variants.
42.
France
and Italy are currently engaged in the joint Sol-Air Moyenne Portée/Terre
(SAM/T) programme. The SAM/T is a land-based, lower-tier system, which is
scheduled to come into service around the middle of this decade and is based on
the Aster missile. Aster could be upgraded to give the French and Italians a
lower-tier TMD capability. France is currently looking into the Aster upgrade,
based on its technological feasibility and cost.
43.
The Medium Extended Air Defence System (MEADS) is a tri-national
land-based, lower-tier TMD project being undertaken by the United States,
Germany and Italy. Based heavily on the Patriot, MEADS uses PAC-3 missiles but
is scheduled to come into service later, possibly towards the end of this
decade. The MEADS system has been
specifically designed to satisfy the requirement for a limited area defence,
including the protection of forces against tactical ballistic missiles, cruise
missiles and other targets, such as aircraft and unmanned aerial vehicles.
Progress on the project has been slow, mostly as a result of political hesitation
on key decisions. The United States, for example, was reluctant to share
sensitive technology related to the PAC-3 interceptor, the centrepiece of the
MEADS programme. There were also problems earlier this year in relation to
cost. Germany had concerns regarding the pricing of the programme, specifically
of the PAC-3 missiles. No overall price estimates for MEADS are available,
although one source estimates the figure for the design phase to be $2.5
billion.
44.
Regarding
sea-based, lower-tier TMD systems, the United States is developing the Navy
Area Defense, which is based on the PAC-3 but will be integrated into Aegis
cruisers and destroyers already in service. Initial deployment is planned for
2004. The Dutch Navy is also looking at the SM 2 Block IVA for its next
generation frigate. Spain has decided to buy the Aegis air defence system for
its new F-100 frigates, but without the SM 2 Block IVA missile that would give
it TMD capability. The remaining allies
have no plans to acquire a TMD capability.
45.
As mentioned above, the main negative consequence foreseen from U.S.
deployment of long-range missile defences is the possible abrogation of the ABM
Treaty. Arms control advocates believe
that treaty is the cornerstone of strategic stability that enabled the
strategic arms reductions between Washington and Moscow. If the United States withdraws from the
treaty, they fear, Russia would renounce its obligation under START 2 to reduce
its nuclear arsenal below 3,500 warheads and would refuse to pursue further
reductions under a START 3 treaty. Arms
control advocates also point to the likelihood that China would increase its
stockpile of ICBMs, though China already has embarked on two new missile
programmes and is dramatically increasing its spending in all spheres of
defence, indicating that it will increase its missile arsenal regardless of the
future of the ABM Treaty. Many fear
that a Chinese missile build‑up will lead India to respond in kind,
increasing instability in South Asia.
46.
Some proponents of missile defence in the United States claim that the
ABM Treaty is a “relic.” As an
agreement between the United States and the Soviet Union, they argue, the
treaty became moot when the Soviet Union broke up 10 years ago. It is the view of
the U.S. State Department, however, that the ABM Treaty remains in force, with
Russia as the legal successor to the Soviet Union. Ukraine, Belarus and Kazakhstan are additional parties to the
treaty under a 1997 agreement, which the State Department believes need not be
ratified by the U.S. Senate. However,
leading Senators have stated their view that the succession agreement will not
come into effect until two-thirds of the Senate gives its advice and consent,
as is the case with all international treaties that the United States signs,
and amendments to them.
47.
Analysts who met with the Committee in
Washington this winter indicated that key Bush Administration officials are
likely to recommend U.S. withdrawal from the ABM Treaty unless Russia agrees to
the modifications needed for deployment of an NMD system. While no one in Washington expects the Bush
Administration to put a great deal of effort into saving the ABM Treaty, it is
unclear whether the United States will withdraw from the treaty quickly or wait
several years until the technology needed for NMD is actually ready for
deployment. Daniel Fried, Senior
Director for Europe and Eurasia at the National Security Council, said the new
administration would “have to look at the ABM Treaty and see how it fits the
new strategic environment.”
48.
What also remains unclear is the exact
interplay between amending the ABM Treaty to permit the United States to deploy
a limited long-range missile defence, and negotiating further arms reductions
between the United States and Russia.
In an article in Foreign Affairs in September 2000, Russian Foreign
Minister Igor Ivanov stated that Russia would regard U.S. withdrawal from the
ABM Treaty as giving Russia the right to withdraw from START 1 and 2 and would
affect drafting of START 3. Since then,
the Russian position has evolved slightly to acknowledge the political momentum
for long-range missile defence in the United States. Gen. Vladimir Yakolev, Commander of Russia’s strategic
rocket forces, proposed linking missile defences to deeper cuts in missile
arsenals. President Vladimir Putin in
November 2000 held out this possibility, stating that Russia was prepared “to
consider even lower levels” than the 1,500 warheads per side that it had
earlier proposed as the START 3 target.
Some reports indicate that Mr Putin is envisioning cuts as low as 1,000
warheads on each side, likely driven by Russia’s financial difficulties and the
cost of maintaining a large nuclear arsenal.
This Russian position is praiseworthy, and your Rapporteur endorses the
idea of deep, dramatic cuts in both sides’ nuclear arsenals. Meanwhile, some U.S. experts have proposed
that lower START 3 levels be explicitly linked in a “grand bargain” to modifications
of the ABM Treaty needed for the United States to deploy a limited missile
defence system.
49.
Looking at the likely shape of arms control
in the Bush Administration, analysts note two paradoxical views. One is that many in the new administration
are philosophically opposed to arms control treaties, believing that they
restrict American freedom of manoeuvre while being disregarded by Russia when
convenient. The other is that
dramatically deeper cuts in the U.S. nuclear arsenal are in the American national
interest, because billions of dollars are being wasted every year maintaining
nuclear warheads that are not needed in the post-Cold War world. As a result, the Bush Administration may
eschew negotiations on a START 3 treaty at the same time that it drastically
and rapidly cuts the nuclear stockpile.
50.
A State Department official told the
Committee that the Bush Administration will conduct a comprehensive strategic
review that will look at American offensive forces and non-proliferation
objectives. He said the review would
examine whether the United States can cut its nuclear arsenal below the level
of 2,000 to 2,500 nuclear warheads that is necessary to carry out the current
strategic nuclear plan, a level that has been put forward by the United States
as the goal of START 3 negotiations. He
said, “The President has made it clear that he is looking for ways to reduce
offensive weapons,” such as START 3 or deeper “mutual unilateral
reductions.” Reducing nuclear arsenals
outside of an arms control treaty has the advantage of enabling reductions to
occur more rapidly, which would allow both countries to save billions of
dollars currently spent on maintaining thousands of unneeded warheads; however,
the lack of a treaty could reduce pressure on Russia to follow through with
promised reductions. As of this
writing, there has been little news about the Bush Administration’s nuclear
policy review. It does seem likely,
however, that the new President will be able to sell any unilateral reductions
in the U.S. nuclear arsenal to a Republican Congress that trusts him more than
his predecessor.
51.
Your Rapporteur believes that the United
States is unlikely to withdraw from the ABM Treaty in the near future because
it would realise little short-term benefit while generating a tremendous,
negative reaction from its allies and Russia.
Because the technology to successfully perform long‑range missile
defence is several years away, it is more likely that the Bush Administration
will continue a robust research programme while putting at least some effort
into negotiating ABM Treaty changes with Russia in the meantime. At the same time, the prospect of deep
“mutual unilateral reductions” is to be welcomed, though codifying these cuts
in a treaty would be more desirable.
52.
At its 1999 Washington Summit, NATO pledged
to revisit the issue of enlargement its next summit, to be held no later than
2002. That meeting has now been
scheduled for November 2002 in Prague, leaving the Alliance with less than two
years to decide which of the nine candidate countries has met the political and
military criteria for membership that were set out in the 1995 NATO enlargement
study. The nine countries themselves -
Albania, Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, the former Yugoslav Republic of
Macedonia, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia - proposed in 2000 that they be
admitted together, a strategy that has come to be known as the “Big Bang.” Officials from NATO countries have admitted
that such a step is unlikely. At the
same time, some observers have argued that a failure to invite at least one new
member in Prague will lead these countries to question the “open door” policy
that NATO has pursued since 1995.
Admitting only a few of the candidate countries, however, runs the risk
that those left out will question the value of their co-operation with NATO and
the Partnership for Peace programme, possibly undermining the success that PfP
has enjoyed in reaching out to the new democracies.
53.
The experience of the latest round of
enlargement in 1999 --- the fourth enlargement round in NATO’s history ---
provides some lessons for the Alliance for its next round. Ultimately, the decision on which countries
to admit will depend on a subjective judgment as to whether they are liberal democracies
with market economies that will make a net contribution of security to
NATO. This chapter will first examine
some of the conclusions drawn from the last round of enlargement, then provide
a brief overview of the nine candidate countries. This chapter will be expanded in the fall, and it is expected to
become a full-fledged report when the Sub-Committee on Future Security and
Defence Capabilities takes up the subject of enlargement next year. The
Political Committee this year is assessing which of the candidate countries
meet the political criteria for enlargement; this Committee next year should
then evaluate which of those countries will be able to make a net contribution
to the defence and security of the Alliance.
54.
An
October 2000 report by the U.S. Congressional Budget Office offers an interim
assessment of the three new allies’ contribution to the Alliance. The CBO found that some measures indicate
that the new allies are moving towards making proportional contributions to the
Alliance. Poland and the Czech
Republic have increased their defence budgets relative to gross domestic
product (GDP) to about the average for the other European NATO members. All of the new allies are contributing
personnel to Operation Joint Guardian in Kosovo (KFOR) at levels that are comparable to those of similarly sized
long-standing NATO members. All three
have successfully created Western-style command structures and are taking steps
to modernise their forces.
55.
The new allies share some common
challenges as well, especially in restructuring their militaries and overcoming
the debilitating legacy of Warsaw Pact
military doctrine. While the armed
forces of all three new members are firmly in the hands of civilian defence
ministries, the CBO found that a lack of civilian defence experts in the
legislative branch has resulted in less parliamentary oversight than might be
desired. Moreover, all of the new
allies need to develop larger non-commissioned officer (NCO) corps and junior
officer corps, and imbue these new officers with an better leadership
qualities, moving away from the Warsaw Pact model of absolute reliance on
top-down, centralised authority. All
three countries share a need to modernise their equipment. But this is a lesser problem that can be
addressed mainly by upgrading weapons platforms and buying communications gear
that is interoperable with NATO’s systems.
56.
Although the new allies are
progressing along the same lines and facing similar challenges, their current
contributions to the alliance vary widely.
Poland, the largest of the three, brings a military that is twice the
size of the Czech Republic and Hungary’s combined, and a strong commitment to
funding its armed forces. The Czech
Republic is increasing its defence budget and has already exceeded some of its
spending goals. Hungary spends the
least on defence, but it provides a key strategic position that has already
aided NATO in its efforts to stabilise the Balkans.
57.
Most of the costs of defending the new
allies will be paid by the countries themselves. However, there are also common costs of enlarging the Alliance
that NATO has agreed to bear collectively, totalling almost $1.5 billion (€1.65
billion) for the 10 years 1999-2008.
That figure is composed of costs associated with expanding NATO’s
command-and-control network into the three countries ($130 million over 10
years); incorporating the new allies into the NATO Integrated Air Defence
System ($581 million); building reception facilities to accommodate
reinforcements from allied countries ($699 million); and conducting training
and exercises ($42 million). The
financial costs, however, do not take into account the increased contingent
liability to NATO member countries of taking on the commitment to help defend
three additional countries.
58.
At this early
stage in the process, it is not yet possible to undertake a comprehensive
evaluation of the military capabilities of the nine candidate countries. Your Rapporteur aims in this interim report
to provide a brief overview of the nine countries, based on documents and
information currently available to him.
He welcomes any additional information that his colleagues may be able
to provide and intends to incorporate it in a more detailed analysis in the
final report.
59.
According to its
Membership Action Plan, Bulgaria plans to completely reorganise its
military, slash the size of its armed forces, and modernise weapons – all with
a three-year budget of approximately $415 million (€463.7 million) per year,
roughly 2.85% of GDP. Bulgaria's 2004
force plan has a personnel target of 45,000, compared to 107,000 in 1998. The
plan calls for more than 7,300 personnel to be released from the armed forces
this year, with overall personnel strength of 71,000. While informed outside assessments are rare, one analyst, Jeffrey
Simon of the U.S. National Defense University, points out that Bulgaria did
little to reform its military from 1990 to 1997, which means that the social
and economic strains caused by Bulgaria’s commitment to cut its armed forces in
half will be felt later than they were in the three new allies. Bulgaria’s stable macro-economic
environment, strict fiscal policy, and economic growth of 5.5% in 2000 has kept
defence spending on track. Over the
next few years, the Bulgarian government states that it will not only be able
to invest in building adequate forces, but will be able to spend more on NATO
compatibility plans, such as reinforcing its acquisition process and a command,
control and communication (C3) system begun in 2000.
60.
Romania has begun to implement a restructuring plan
that will create a smaller, more professional military, but a 2000 assessment
by the North Atlantic Council (NAC) found that the country needs to better
identify priorities for spending its limited defence budget. Under an eight‑year plan,
restructuring is to be completed by 2003 and equipment modernisation by
2007. Those targets could be in
jeopardy, however, if the country’s under-performing economy fails to generate
the growth needed to meet spending targets.
Plans call for spending $890 million (€994 million) on defence this
year, or 2% of GDP, compared to 1.86% in 2000.
The Romanian government projects real economic growth of 4% to 6%,
though it estimated growth in 2000 at just 1.3%, which followed several years
of economic contraction. Continued
economic stagnation could lead to an inability to implement restructuring and
modernisation plans. Under its
restructuring plan, Romania plans to reduce personnel levels from 168,000 to
112,000 in 2003, and the proportion of career soldiers is to rise to 71% from
the current 55%.
61.
During the Assembly’s 2000 Annual Tour, defence officials in Estonia
emphasised their ongoing co-operation with NATO through PfP and in
peace-keeping operations like SFOR and KFOR.
They said they are working to improve interoperability with NATO by
improving English‑language training and communication and information
security capabilities. Their co‑operation
also extends to the multinational formations that comprise the three Baltic
countries, such as the Baltic Battalion (BALTBAT), Baltic Naval Squadron
(BALTRON), and the Baltic Defence University.
Estonian officials said their armed forces currently number less than
4,000 active duty personnel, with a 7,000-strong national guard, comprised
mostly of volunteers. The future goal
is to develop a total force of about 25,000 to 30,000 personnel, with a small
active force augmented by a reserve that can be mobilised. The government has set a target for defence
spending of 2% of GDP by 2002, which would represent an increase from 1.6% in
2000.
62.
As
discussed by the country’s defence officials during the Annual Tour, Lithuania
is focused on building a capability that will enable it to defend its territory
against any aggressor and to operate together with NATO forces should the
Alliance assist them in this effort.
Plans call for Lithuania to use the country’s natural hills, rivers,
swamps and forests to create a realistic self‑defence plan. The "Target Force 2008" plan calls
for a military force of 24,000, formed into four combat brigades and a
logistics brigade. In case of
aggression, Lithuania plans to be able to arm 100,000 citizens, drawn from its
reserve forces and from Lithuanians trained as Soviet conscripts. As a result, Lithuania will maintain conscription
to add to this reserve pool of trained citizens, though it was not stated
whether former conscripts would be given further training. Defence resources are limited, with only
1.69% of GDP spent on defence; plans call for that to reach 2.2% of GDP by
2008, and officials hope that projected 4.5% annual GDP growth will facilitate
funding. Lithuania is also developing
units that can be used in multinational peace‑keeping operations.
63.
Latvia faces
considerable budgetary challenges in reforming its defence structure. According to Defence Minister G.V. Kristovskis, plans call for increasing the 2000
defence budget of $68 million (€76 million) to $160 million (€178 million) by
2003. This would represent an increase
from 1.04% to 2% of
GDP, which Mr Kristovskis said "is a very difficult task for
us". The Defence Minister said his country is focusing
efforts on developing a self-defence capability for the national territory,
becoming interoperable with NATO forces, and participating in international
peace-keeping operations. The Commander
of the Latvian armed forces, Col. R. Graube, said Latvia’s armed forces consist
of 4,500 professional troops and 2,000 active-duty conscripts, plus a
14,500-strong national guard.
Capabilities focus on mobilisation and territorial defence, with an
emphasis on anti-tank and air defence, as well as maintaining a peace-keeping
battalion.
64.
In an effort to find gaps between Slovakia's political goals and defence
capabilities, the US Department of Defense conducted an Assessment Study of the
Slovakian armed forces last year. The
study has been instrumental in updating Slovakia's future force plans,
particularly regarding civilian control of the military. It notes that needed legislation like the
Slovakian National Security Concept have been drafted, but governmental and
parliamentary approval is still pending.
Since the defence budget in 1999 was 1.7% of GDP (down from 2.6% of GDP
in 1995) and has been increasing a mere 0.1% per year, Slovakia needs to
prioritise scarce resources. According
to a published interview with Defence Minister Pavol Kanis, Slovakia's 2000
defence budget of $327 million (€366 million) was a modest $26 million
(€29 million) increase from 1999.
Despite a delay in army restructuring and the impeded retention of
officers, the Slovakian government aims to reduce its armed forces from
approximately 44,000 personnel to around 30,000 over the next three years.
65.
Among the nine
candidates, Slovenia last year ranked at or near the top in most categories according to the
spring NAC report, but that document on Slovenia’s progress pointed to the lack
of transparency in the defence budget and the poor coordination of the work
between the military headquarters and the MoD.
The Slovenian government says it has addressed the criticisms and will
continue to restructure and modernise its armed forces, ranging in strength
from 8,200 to 9,400 personnel, over the course of a three-phase planning
period. Its strong economy enabled
Slovenia to reach the average defence expenditure of European NATO member
states as a share of GDP. Slovenian
officals say defence expenditure is expected to rise from 1.87% of GDP,
approximately $365 million (€408 million) in 2001, to 1.98% in 2003 and 2.3% in
2010.
66.
Albania is still confronted with the legacy of social unrest in 1997. As was discussed during the Assembly’s 1999
seminar in Tirana, that chaos resulted in the virtual disintegration of the
Albanian military and police forces, as thousands of weapons simply
disappeared. The result was a need to rebuild the country’s defence
establishment and civilian security structures virtually from scratch. In
addition, press reports on NATO operations in Albania during the 1999 Kosovo
crisis reflected how the poor infrastructure in that country slowed NATO
operations, though the government is to be commended for its cooperation. Under
its National Security Strategy passed last year, Albania in January 2001 began
to transform its armed forces. The goal
for 2006 is to reconstitute a force of 19,000.
The priority for this year is to implement the command of doctrines and
exercises and to switch over to the new structure of military units, primarily
the three commands of its armed forces.
Further steps may be taken by the Albanian government after review of a
five-month assessment by the US Department of Defense that began in August
2000.
67.
During a meeting last year in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia
with Defence Minister Nikola Kljusev,
the Sub-Committee on Transatlantic Defence and Security Cooperation learned
about his plans to organise the military so it can become interoperable with
NATO. Plans call for the military to
comprise one active and one reserve corps, with 14,000 to 16,000 active duty
and 60,000 reserves. This structure
should be achieved in five years, with the first active brigade being organised
last year. In addition, a border brigade
of 1,500 troops will be formed, and about half will be professional
soldiers. The national government
spends $76 million (€85 million), or 2.17% of gross domestic product, on
defence. The country’s defence
situation after gaining independence from Yugoslavia has resulted in an uphill
struggle to develop a modern, well-equipped military. Yugoslavian federal officials removed nearly all defence
equipment and installations from the republic, Mr. Kljusev said, leaving
officials scrambling to outfit their forces.
For example, while defence officials have been seeking donations of main
battle tanks from NATO countries, they have had to rely on donations from
Bulgaria of aging Warsaw Pact T-55 tanks.
68.
Your
Rapporteur wishes to draw attention to some troubling trends in the development
of European Union’s European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) that could
exacerbate tensions in the transatlantic relationship. First, while ESDP is a natural part of the
evolution of the EU, some of the more ambitious visions of European unity are
unlikely to be realised. Because the EU
lacks a natural leader to serve as a catalyst for agreement, it is not likely
that there will be a consensus on a Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP)
for the EU. In fact, as contentious
issues arise, it will be very difficult to form a common position. Rather than focus on a goal of having the 15
EU members act as one in all foreign policy matters, it is probably more
realistic to structure ESDP to facilitate coalitions of the willing, which are
a more viable vehicle for European countries to take action when NATO as a
whole is not engaged.
69.
While
much of the controversy about ESDP is in regard to the degree of autonomy it
will have from NATO and the degree of involvement the non-EU NATO allies will
enjoy, it is likely that these differences can be resolved. If ESDP succeeds, NATO should be stronger as
a result because the same assets needed to implement the Headline Goal are
those needed to fulfil NATO’s new roles and missions. NATO’s Defence Capabilities Initiative will help the European
allies develop capabilities not only to carry out NATO missions, but EU
missions as well. The threat to NATO is
not that ESDP will succeed; it is that ESDP will fail. ESDP, in part, is a European response to 50
years of American complaints about unfair burdensharing within the
Alliance. If ESDP succeeds in adding to
NATO’s capacity to project power and sustain forces, the European allies will
be in a position to make a fair contribution to NATO; however, it is very
likely that the United States will react negatively if the allies in the EU
fail to come through on the high‑profile promises they have made to
achieve their Headline Goal.
70.
The
early developments in ESDP are not encouraging. Your Rapporteur has seen no evidence that it has resulted in
anything more than soldiers wearing extra hats. There is little or no evidence that it has resulted in more
forces or additional capacity to project power. If this trend continues, the United States will perceive ESDP as
another EU bureaucracy that detracts from NATO, rather than adding value to the
Alliance. Such a perception runs the
risk of American reconsideration of the transatlantic relationship, which would
leave both Europeans and North Americans worse off. In short, the European allies must increase their efforts to
ensure that ESDP does create additional capabilities that will strengthen NATO.
71.
As
your Rapporteur was preparing this report, the actions of ethnic Albanian
rebels in southern Serbia and in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia were
raising serious questions for NATO and its involvement in Balkans
peace-keeping. The fighting in the
latter country had spread from the mountains along its border with Kosovo to
the outskirts of its second-largest city, Tetovo, which has an ethnic-Albanian
majority. The government in Skopje has
shown commendable openness in including its Albanian minority in the government
and civic life, and NATO should provide any necessary assistance to Skopje as
it strives to neutralise the rebellion.
In southern Serbia, the activities of ethnic-Albanian fighters in the
demilitarised buffer zone along the border with Kosovo led NATO to allow
Serbian forces into the zone. If they
behave with appropriate restraint, this could mark the first step in
co-operation between NATO and the new government in Belgrade. Your Rapporteur will continue to monitor the
situation in the Balkans and analyse events at greater length in the fall
report should events warrant. At the
same time, the Bush Administration should be commended for its decision to keep
U.S. peace-keepers in the Balkans as long as necessary. It is understandable that the United States
and other NATO allies will continue to draw down forces in Bosnia, where the
situation continues to stabilise, but NATO must retain a robust, transatlantic
presence in Kosovo as long as the risk of fighting remains.
72.
In March 2001, Russian President
Vladimir Putin replaced his Defence Minister, Marshal Igor Sergeyev, with
Russia’s first civilian Defence Minister, Sergei Ivanov. Mr. Ivanov, however, had been a Lieutenant
General in the Russian intelligence service before retiring last year. Reports indicate that Mr. Putin made the
move because he was frustrated with the pace of defence reforms, though
officially he stated that a civilian was installed in the post “as a step
toward the demilitarisation of society in Russia.” Mr. Putin in November 2000 had announced a plan to reform the
armed forces that would cut personnel levels from 1.2 million to 850,000, while
maintaining or increasing the defence budget of $7.2 billion (€8 billion). The plan aims to transform the military into
a smaller, more professional force that provides greater funding on a
per-solider basis.
73.
Andrei Nikolaev, Chairman of the Duma
Committee of Defence, said the slow pace of Russian military reform is due to a
lack of political direction. Other
analysts note that this slow pace is also due to insufficient defence funded
and a nostalgia for the days of the Soviet military by some in the Defence
Ministry and the armed forces, which motivates them to block reform. Some believe that Mr. Putin faces political
risks in further reducing the size of the armed forces because much of his
support comes from the security services, though defence analysts believe
Russia must transform its military if it is to effectively defend the country
against security threats.
74.
Foreign
assistance, particularly from the European Union and United States, is an
important source of support for a number of programmes aimed at accelerating
reform and preventing proliferation of crime, corruption, and arms
smuggling. The EU itself has allocated
€24 million ($21.6 million) to support officer retraining in 23 centres across
Russia that have retrained 17,000 decommissioned officers.
75.
Ukraine has embarked on a reform of
its defence establishment to reflect budgetary constraints and the need to develop
a modern, professional force. Economic
hardship, particularly the decline in tax revenue, has made the need for
defence reform more urgent. “The State Programme of the Ukrainian Armed Forces
Reform And Development Until 2005” lays out a goal of “the establishment of
modern armed forces, which will be optimum in strength, mobile, well‑equipped,
supported and trained, capable of fulfilling their missions in any environment,
and at the same time not a burden on country's budget.”
76.
Personnel levels and defence budgets are expected to
remain nearly constant through 2005.
The Ukrainian Ministry of Defence expects active-duty military personnel
to number 295,000 in 2005, compared to 310,000 in 2000. Plans are to configure land forces along the
lines of rapid‑reaction forces, kept at high readiness; main defence
forces, designed to be engaged in middle-intensity conflicts; and reserve
forces. While the Ukrainian military is
largely a conscript force, plans call for 30 percent of personnel to be
contract professionals by 2005, with a completely professional force by
2015. Western analysts estimate the
2000 defence budget at $441 million.
77.
Western analysts have called the
programme a realistic and practical step forward in the military reform of
Ukraine. Nevertheless there are some
issues that have to be addressed as the weak pieces of the document; for
example, the budgetary constraints caused by Ukraine’s economic
circumstances. Your Rapporteur will
examine the Ukrainian defence reform plan at greater length in his final report
this fall.
_________________
%204_files/image002.jpg)