2.
With the end of the East-West conflict, the clearly
identifiable common threat from a hostile alliance - or the USSR - disappeared.
The Alliance's security policy agenda is now dominated by regional conflicts
and ecological, economic and other threats to stability. As a result, there are highly diverse views
- and often conflicts of interest - on how the Alliance should respond in
individual cases.
3.
Since the end of the East-West conflict, transatlantic
relations have been in a state of flux. Two key changes will determine their
future development. The bipolar
structure of the international system has collapsed. With the Charter of Paris for a New Europe, the CSCE states have
pledged their commitment to the principles of democracy, the rule of law, the
market economy and European security.
No longer faced with the Soviet threat or ideological confrontation, the
European partners' dependence has decreased in real and psychological
terms. But the conflicts in South-East
Europe showed that security and stability in Europe are still crucially
dependent on the commitment of our transatlantic partners, the USA and
Canada. And it was there that NATO was
compelled to take military action for the first time - not for defence but in
response to regional conflicts. Today's security policy challenges tend to be
internal, rather than external, in origin.
4.
At the same time, technologies are radically changing
our lifestyles and economies. The Internet and the "new economy" are
creating new opportunities and posing different challenges. As the globalisation of communications and
economic processes continues, national borders are becoming more fluid, and the
state's protective role is undermined. Greater integration opens up more
opportunities for contacts such as international networking by businesses,
NGOs, scientists and academics, etc., but it creates more friction too. And as
more channels of communication open up, the differences in culture and values -
and the conflicts of interest - are brought into sharper focus.
5.
The USA is the last remaining global power. It alone has the capability for long-term
military power projection. But that is
not all: its global role is based on its historically unique combination of
economic power, global leadership in the setting of cultural and scientific
standards, and military might. It thus
has far greater scope than any other state to enforce its positions as
international norms.
6.
Together, the EU member states are a significant
economic force, yet the EU's role as a political - or indeed an economic policy
actor - has been minimal so far. The
European Union is now seeking to enhance its capacity to "speak with one
voice" on the international stage. Although the military dimension has
dominated this debate over the last two years, the EU's real potential lies in
economic, monetary, trade and development policy, where it can face the USA and
Canada as an equal partner.
7.
At WTO level, Europe and the USA are focussing on
different priorities in the run-up to the next trade round, depending on the
sectors which they see as most significant in terms of their economic
competitiveness and market potential. [Yet
there is also a common interest in maintaining and strengthening the framework
of rules to settle conflicts in the global markets.
8.
On monetary issues, there is a common interest in
maintaining the stability of the international monetary system. There is a consensus that the Bretton Woods
institutions - the World Bank and the IMF - must be reformed and equipped to
deal more effectively with international crisis management. The EU is called upon to define a common
position here.
9.
Many people believe that the transatlantic
relationship is now at a cross-roads.
They are concerned about what they see as the lack of mutual
understanding and the widening gap between the partners. Emotive words such as
"bananas", "genetically-modified foods", "hormone-treated
meat", "steel", "Airbus subsidies",
"hushkits", "neo-Nazis on the Internet", "data
protection", "Scientology", "child abduction",
"the death penalty" and "American unilateralism" dominate
the media image and antagonise the general public and politicians alike. From the Rapporteur's point of view, these
issues do not cast doubt on the transatlantic community of values or overshadow
our common interests. They are simply one outcome of ever-closer transatlantic
relations, which are assuming more of a domestic policy character. We are all
committed to the same values: what differs is our interpretation and our way of
asserting them in practice. Naturally,
there are substantial differences between the European partners in some areas
too. These differences must be analysed
carefully so that we are able to deal with them more effectively.
In den USA genießt das
Recht auf freie Meinungsfreiheit einen uneingeschränkten Vorrang in der „bill
of rights“. In Deutschland hat sich dagegen aus der Erfahrung mit dem
Nationalsozialismus heraus, das Konzept der „wehrhaften Demokratie“ entwickelt.
Dieses läßt unter bestimmten Umständen eine Einschränkung der Meinungsfreiheit
für die Feinden der Demokratie zu (s. Art. 18 Grundgesetz). Aktuell treten
diese Unterschiede beim Umgang mit rechtsextremistischer Propaganda zutage.
Während sie in den USA keinen Beschränkungen unterliegt, stellt ihre
Verbreitung in Deutschland einen Straftatbestand dar. Über das Internet läßt
sich Propagandamaterial jedoch ohne Probleme von amerikanischen websites
abrufen. Nur ein Beispiel wie die Globalisierung die Wahrnehmung staatlicher
Schutzfunktionen untergraben kann.
10.
[In the USA, freedom of religion is
given pre-eminence in the Bill of Rights alongside freedom of speech. Although there is a strict separation
between state and religion in the USA too, American society and politics are
strongly influenced by religious beliefs and tenets. Ein ähnlicher Unterschiede besteht auch bei der
Religionsfreiheit. In Europe, most societies are becoming
increasingly secularised. There is a
stark conflict between the two approaches in their response to
Scientology. Whereas in the USA freedom
of religion is absolute, Germany, for example, emphasises the state's duty to
protect democracy and the individual from threats, even if they emanate from
organisations claiming to be motivated by religion.
11.
The right to life is protected on both sides of the
Atlantic. In Europe,
it is recognised as an absolute human right on which other rights are based,
with the state having no powers of intervention. All the members of the Council
of Europe have therefore abolished the death penalty. In many US states, however, the state's duty to protect citizens
and property from criminal assault plays such an important role that the
state's intervention in the right to life is tolerated. Retribution for murder and deterrence from
the most serious forms of crime are cited as justification for the death
penalty. But there is a highly-charged
debate about this issue in the USA too.
12.
As these conflicts have great significance for the
transatlantic agenda, it is useful to cite an example from trade relations as
well. The USA views
genetically-modified foods as a way of producing sufficient food for
everyone. In America, consumer choice
will determine whether these products are successful in the marketplace. In
Europe, on the other hand - not least as a result of the BSE crisis - consumer
protection is given priority. But many
Americans feel that the Europeans' rejection of genetically-modified products
has far deeper roots, reflecting a general hostility to technological progress
as well as protectionist attitudes in the EU.
13.
These conflicts show that close contacts are required
between the transatlantic partners to prevent misunderstandings from
arising. What is needed, in addition to
the regular contacts already existing at government level, is the expansion of
links at parliamentary level and between opinion leaders. The NATO Parliamentary Assembly can make a
significant contribution to this process.
14.
This report, however, will focus on three security
policy themes which are likely to determine the transatlantic agenda this year
and next: the shaping of the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP), NATO
enlargement, and the USA's plans for a national missile defence system
(NMD).
16.
As the three main themes are dealt with in separate
reports by the Political Committee's two sub-committees and - in the case of
ESDP/ESDI - a report in the DSC, they will not be examined in detail here. Instead, this report will focus on the
Alliance partners' divergent perspectives on these themes and their
significance for the future development of the transatlantic relationship.
17.
The key issue arising in the context of ESDP is how it
is perceived in the USA and other non-EU partner countries. And how can we
shape relations between NATO and the EU so as to avoid unnecessary duplication
of structures and achieve complementarity between these two organisations?
18.
In light of the forthcoming decisions on NATO
enlargement, the first task is to evaluate the outcomes of the first round of
enlargement and examine how much importance member states attach to continuing
the integration process. What are the
strategic priorities of the Alliance's further expansion in terms of enhancing
its credibility and capacity to act? Is it easier to reach a consensus among
members on this issue than on others?
20.
Die The European Union's efforts since the 1997 Treaty
of Amsterdam to develop a European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) are part of the
strengthening of the European integration process in the 1990s. Just as seit dem Amsterdamer
Vertrag von 1997 laufenden Bemühungen der Europäischen Union um die Entwicklung
einer Europäischen Sicherheits- und Verteidigungspolitik (ESVP)
sind Teil einer Verstärkung des europäischen Integrationsprozesses in den 90er
Jahren. Wie aus demeconomic and monetary union evolved from the internal market, the Common FBinnenmarktprojekt
die Europäische Wirtschafts- und
Währungsunion hervorgegangen ist, sooreign and Security
Policy is a key element on the path towards political union. A first attempt to create a
European Defence Community failed in
1954 bildet
die Außen- und Sichertheitspolitik die ESVP ein ein zentraless
Element auf dem Weg zur Politischen Union. [Ein
erster Anlauf zur Bildung einer Europäischen Verteidigungsgemeinschaft war 1954
gescheitert.] The intensification of
efforts to develop a Common Foreign and Security Policy and its enhancement through the ESDP are partly a response to
Europe's impotence
when faced with the conflicts in the former Yugoslavia. The process gained new
impetus after the Franco-British Summit at St Malo when Britain overcame its reservations regarding ESDP. The Kosovo conflict also contributed to this, as it revealed the capability gap between the European and US Alliance
partners. The USA bore the lion's share
of the military burdens, and therefore took most of the operational decisions as
well.
21.
Since the Cologne European Council in 1999, there
has been a greater political will for joint action in this area, and the EU's political cohesion has increased. Seit dem
Kölner EU-Gipfel 1999 ist der Wille zu gemeinsamenm
Handeln stärker ausgeprägt It has begun to und die politische
Kohäsion der EU gewachsen. Sie hat damit begonnen, sich die create the
instruments and capacities necessary to implement common policies in the fields of crisis
management and conflict prevention. In this way, the EU is seeking to equip itself with the capacity to act in
cases where
NATO as a whole is not engaged. In the military field, the EU will confine its
activities to the "Petersberg tasks": Instrumente und
Kapazitäten zur Umsetzung gemeinsamer Politiken in den Bereichen
Krisenmanagement und – PPrävention
zu schaffen. Die EU will damit auch in solchen Fällen handlungsfähig sein, wenn die NATO einmal nicht in Aktion tritt. Die EU beschränkt sich im militärischen Bereich auf die sogenannten
„Petersberg- Aufgaben“: humanitäarian and rescue
tasks, peacekeeping, and crisis management operations, including peacemaking. re und
„search- and
rescue“-, sowie friedenserhaltende („peace-
keeping operations“ -
PKO) und
friedensschaffende Operationen
(„peace-making operations“). Für
die NATO alone will remain responsible
for
collective defence.
22.
Mit der Entwicklung derESDP ESVP verbindet sich offers a great opportunity to develop an integrated
response to regional crises. die eine große
Chance, mit einem integrierten Ansatz auf regionale Krisen zu reagieren.Until now, the EU has
been a
purely civil organisation. Yet through its financial, trade and development policy (accounting for 55%
of ODA worldwide), it has countered the escalation of crises and supported civil reconstruction in a war-torn society. Now, with its new military and non-military instruments, it will have recourse at any stage in a
conflict to
the means to prevent or curb an escalation. To this end, the EU's foreign and
security policy not only requires additional capacities, but also a new conceptual
focus and coordination between new and existing instruments. There is currently no other international organisation which combines such diverse competencies. If the EU is successful, it will be able to respond appropriately
to crises
without relying on the capacities of
many other organisations. Die EU ist bislang eine rein zivile
Organisation. Bisher hat sie allein Mmit
ihrer Finanz-, Handels- und Entwicklungspolitik (55% der offiziellen
Entwicklungshilfe weltweit) verfügt sie über
Instrumente, die der Eskalation von
Krisen entgegenwirken
vorbeugen oder zum zivilen
Wiederaufbau einer kriegszerstörten Gesellschaft beitragen können. Jetzt treten
militärische und andere zivile Instrumente hinzu, so daß [Wenn
sich die ESVP auf die Entwicklung eines militärischen Instrumentariums
beschränken würde, wäre sie wahrscheinlich überflüssig.] Wenn ssie jedoch
über eine ausgewogene Kombination ziviler und militärischer Mittel verfügt,
kann in jeder Phase eines
Konfliktes auf
ein adäquates Mittel zurückgreifen kanngefunden
werden, um eine Eskalation zu verhindern oder sie zu stoppbremsen.
[Dazu bedarf die
Außen- und Sicherheitspolitik der EU nicht nur
zusätzlicher Kapazitäten, sondern auch einer
konzeptionellen Neuausrichtung und Koordinierung der vorhandenenr und der neuen
Instrumente. ]Bislang gibt es keine
internationale Organisation, die so unterschiedliche
Kompetenzen unter einem Dach vereinigt. Wenn die EU Erfolg hat, kann sie auf Krisen differenziert
reagieren, ohne auf die Kapazitäten
zahlreicher anderer Organisationen angewiesenThis will reduce problems
with coordination and - if action is coherent - prevent individual
actors from sending out conflicting signals.
zu sein. Das
verringert die Koordinationsprobleme und verhindert – bei kohärentem Handeln -widersprüchliche Signale der einzelnen Akteure.
23.
At the Helsinki
European Council in December 1999, the EU adopted two key decisions. Firstly, it agreed Auf dem Gipfel in
Helsinki hat die EU im Dezember 1999 zwei wichtige Grundsatzentscheidungen getroffento set up autonomous interim bodies which
are responsible for the . Zum
einen wurde die Errichtung eigenständiger Interims-Gremienplanning/command and control
of crisis management. beschlossen, die für die Planung und Führung des Krisenmanagements zuständig sind. Die
Strukturen einesThe structures of the standing Political and
Security Committee (PSC), the Military Committee, the Military Staff, and the Policy Planning and Early
Warning Unit under Javier Solana, High Representative for the CFSP, mirror the NATO
institutions
to a large extent. Politischen und
Sicherheitspolitischen Komitees (PSK), eines Militärausschusses, eines Militärstabes sowie
einer Planungs- und Analyseeinheit beim Hohen Repräsentanten für die GASP, Solana, spiegeln
weitgehend Institutionen der
NATO wider. Das ermöglicht es grundsätzlich,
Entscheidungen in enger Zusammenarbeit mit derThis enables decisions to be taken
in close co‑operation with NATO or autonomously. The second decision
attracted far
more public attention. With its European headline goals, the EU undertook to
create additional military capacities by 2003, when Member States must
be able to deploy 50 000-60 000 troops within 60 days and sustain them in the field for at least one year. Including the necessary reserves,
this amounts
to a total
of around 150 000 soldiers.
24.
NATO oder eigenständig
zu treffen. Größere öffentliche
Aufmerksamkeit hat die zweite Entscheidung erhalten. Die EU legte sich mit *„European
Headline Goals“ darauf fest, bis zum Jahr 2003 zusätzliche militärische Kapazitäten zu schaffen.
Dann sollen mobile Einsatzkräfte im Umfang von 50 - 60.000, die binnen
60 Tagen verlegbar und zu
Operationen über einen Zeitraum
von mindestens 1 Jahr fähig sind, zur Verfügung stehen. Mit den nötigen Reserven bedeutet dies einen Umfang
von etwa
150.000 Soldaten.In advance of the
Feira European Council in June 2000, the EU then pressed ahead with the plans to expand the civil
dimension which had been on the agenda since the Finnish
Presidency. It established an
interim committee for civilian aspects of crisis management and agreed a first
specific headline goal in this field. In view of the problems associated with
guaranteeing
internal security in Kosovo, Member States have
undertaken that by 2003 they will be able to provide up to 5000 police officers
for international missions across
the range of conflict prevention and crisis management operations; they have also undertaken to be
able to identify and deploy up to 1000 police officers within 30
days. From April to October 2000, the Eurocorps took
over the
command of KFOR - a first test which the European Command and
Control capacities
passed, fortunately without major
complications.
Bis zum Gipfel von Feira im Juni 2000 wurde dann auch die seit der finnischen Präsidentschaft
vorliegenden Pläne zum Ausbau der zivilen Dimension vorangetrieben. Die EU richtete einen Interims-Ausschuß für ziviles Krisenmanagement ein und beschloß auch im zivilen Bereich ein erstes konkretes „Headline Goal“. Angesichts
der Probleme
bei der Gewährleistung der inneren Sicherheit im Kosovo sollen
bis zum Jahr 2003 5.000 Polizisten für internationale Missionen bereit stehen,
von denen 1.000 innerhalb von 30 Tagen einsetzbar sein sollen. Vom April-Oktober 2000 hat
das Eurokorps die Führung von KFOR übernommen und damit einen ersten Test
(PKO) peuropäischer Führungs- (Command and Control)-Kapazitäten
- mit etwas Glück - ohne große Komplikationen
bestanden.
26.
Mit ihren BemühungenThe EU's efforts to take on
greater responsibility for security policy issues are a response to
the decades of calls, not least in
the US Congress, for "fairer burden-sharing" within the Alliance ,
größere Verantwortung in sicherheitspolitischenne
Fragen zu übernehmen, entspricht die EU den jahrzehntelangen Forderungen, nicht
zuletzt des US-Kongresses, nach einer „gerechteren Lastenteilung“ in der
Allianz [on this point, see details contained in the report
in the s. dazu im einzelnen den
Bericht im Committee on Civilian Aspects of
SecurityC]. Trotzdem waren die amerikanischen Reaktionen auf
das neue europäische
Selbstbewußtsein ambivalent. Das ZielHowever, American reactions to Europe's new-found self-confidence have been ambivalent. The aim of creating additional military
capacities is welcomed as a contribution to strengthening NATO zusätzliche militärische Kapazitäten zu schaffen wird als Beitrag zur Stärkung der NATO
begrüßt.[1] However, the possibility that the EU might link its enhanced capacities with a
claim for greater influence over political and
operational decisions in the Alliance is viewed as problematical. If the EU follows words with deeds, a shift of weight within the
Alliance is inevitable.[2] Probleme hat man dagegen mit
der Perspektive, die EU könne mit größeren Kapazitäten auch den Anspruch auf größeren Einfluß auf die
politischen und operativen Entscheidungen im Bündnis verbinden. Wenn die EU den Worten Taten folgen läßt, wäre die Verschiebung der Gewichte in der Allianz eine unweigerliche Folge.
27.
Until the end of 2000, as the intensive debates about the ESDP continued, the Daher
werden die Bestrebungen der EU auch grundsätzlich unterstützt, bspw. im
Kommunique des Washingtoner Gipfels vom April 1999. Aber die Skepsis ist weit
verbreitet, ob die ESVP nicht zu einer Schwächung der NATO führen wird oder
sich eher komplementär zu ihr entwickelt. Eloquent hat die frühere
amerikanische Außenministerin Albright diese Bedenken mit den 3 Begriffen
„de-coupling“, „duplication“ und „discrimination“ zusammengefaßt. Es schien
als seien die amerikanischen Vorbehalte im Zuge der Verhandlungen mit der Die Clinton -Administration
gradually
appeared to be coming to terms with this notion. Now, the process of
reaching
an understanding must begin again with the Bush Administration.[3] It must first gain confidence in its
European partners' objectives and intentions. And there is reason to be optimistic, for here too, the argument that the EU's efforts will
strengthen transatlantic
cohesion and
lead to
security gains for the Alliance as a whole is persuasive. schien sich bis
Ende 2000 im
Zuge der intensiven Auseinandersetzungen über die ESVP an diesen
Gedanken allmählich zu gewöhnen. weitgehend
ausgeräumt worden. Nun beginnt der
Verständigungsprozeß mit der Bush-Administration von vorne. Sie muß erst
Vertrauen zu den Zielen und Absichten der europäischen Partner fassen. Es
gibt Grund zur Zuversicht, daß auch hier die Kraft der Argumente zu der
Überzeugung führt, daß die Bemühungen der EU den transatlantischen Zusammenhalt stärken und der
Sicherheit des der
Sicherheit im Bündnisses zugute kommen.
Bedenken amerikanischer Kritiker
29.
Die im Rahmen
derThere will be "double-hatting" of the rapid reaction
forces to
be established under the „European
Hheadline gGoals“; in other words,
they will be
available for EU and NATO missions. vorgesehenen mobilen Einsatzkräfte sollen „doppelt assigniert“ werden, also für
Operationen von EU und NATO bereitThey will thus help to fulfil the objectives
of NATO's stehen. Sie dienen damit auch der Erfüllung
der Ziele der „Verteidigungskapazitäts-Initiative“ („Defence
Capabilities Initiative“ -( DCI)) der NATO, which is seeking to establish a total capacity of
400 000 soldiers in this area. die in diesem Bereich insgesamt ein Potential von 400.000 Soldaten
anstrebt.
31.
Underlying the call for greater financial expenditure is undoubtedly the desire for the EU to take on more
responsibility for security on the European continent and, if necessary, contribute to
peacekeeping missions and crisis management outside Europe. Indeed, there are many indications that this increased involvement by the EU is in fact the condition for the USA's lasting commitment in EuropeHinter der Forderung nach
größeren finanziellen Aufwendungen steht durchaus der Wunsch, die EU möge eine
größere Verantwortung für die Sicherheit auf dem europäischen Kontinent
übernehmen und ggf. Beiträge zu friedenserhaltenden
Missionen und Krisenmanagement
außerhalb Europas leisten. Vieles deutet darauf hin, daß ein stärkerer Einsatz der
EU im Grunde sogar die Bedingung für ein dauerhaftes Engagement der
USA in Europa ist.[4] This trend is likely
to increase under the Bush
Administration. On a pragmatic level, the new Administration is
concerned about "over-commitment" and
"overstretch" of America's capacities as a stabilising force in the world. It would like to dismantle unnecessary international commitments
and link international
operations more
directly to the USA's national interests. Under
these circumstances, the EU's efforts may come at the right time.Dieser Trend dürfte sich
unter der Bush-Administration weiter verstärken.
Realpolitisch fürchtet sie ein
„over-commitment“ und eine Überforderung der amerikanischen Kapazitäten als
globale Ordnungsmacht. Sie möchte überflüssige
internationale Verpflichtungen abbauen und internationale Operationen enger an
nationale Interessen der USA binden. Unter diesen Umständen
kommen Ddie Bestrebungen der EU vielleicht kommen da nicht ungelegen.
32.
Eine strikte Arbeitsteilung im transatlantischen
VerhältnisA strict division of work within the transatlantic
relationship, as envisaged by National Security Advisor Condoleeza Rice during the election
campaign, would be counterproductive, however. ,
wie sie von der Nationalen Sicherheitsberaterin Rice im Wahlkampf avisiert
wurde, wäre jedoch
kontraproduktiv.
SMs Rice proposed that US troops be withdrawn from Kosovo, arguing
that the USA should concentrate on combat missions in which its combat forces, air force, long-range weapons, and superior command
and control structures would come into their own. ie
hatte einen Abzug von US-Truppen aus dem Kosovo mit dem Hinweis angeregt, die USA solle sich auf Kampfeinsätze konzentrieren, bei denen ihre
Kampfverbände, Luftstreitkräfte, Abstandswaffen und überlegene Kommunikations-
und Kommandostrukturen voll zur Geltung kommen. The EU, on the other hand, could provide ground
troops for peacekeeping and the clear-up operations in Kosovo. Die EU könne dagegen die
Bodentruppen bei friedenserhaltenden
Einsätzen (PKO) und Aufräumarbeiten im Kosovo
übernehmen. This would undoubtedly create
major tensions
between the Alliance partners who would feel that they had
generally been excluded from operational decisions in the other's "field of competence" or had been left to
deal with problems on their own. In the
interests of the Alliance's cohesion, joint action and joint responsibility for operations across
the full spectrum of NATO tasks are required.Das würde unvermeidlich zu erheblichen Spannungen zwischen den
Bündnispartnern führen, die sich einerseits von operativen Entscheidungen
im „Kompetenzbereich“ des anderen weitgehend ausgeschlossen oder andererseits mit den Problemen allein
gelassen fühlen könnten. Im Interesse des Zusammenhalts
im Bündnis sind
ein gemeinsames
Handeln und gemeinsame Verantwortung für Operationen über das gesamte
Aufgabenspektrum der NATO hinweg nötig.[5]
33.
The Es war ein wichtiges Signal vonSecretary of State, Colin
Außenminister
Powell, sent out an important signal at the beim
Ministerrat
(NAC
Ministerial
Meeting at the end of
February 2001 when he said that the USA would not withdraw unilaterally but
would see
the shared task of stabilising South-East Europe) through to the end.
Naturally,
this also includes
a process of joint decision-making within NATO on possible troop
reductions and the ending of the SFOR and KFOR missions in light of
developments in the security situation.Ende Februar 2001, daß sich die USA nicht einseitig
zurückziehen würden, sondern die Aufgabe der Stabilisierung
Südosteuropas gemeinsam zu ende führen wollen.
Dazu gehört es selbstverständlich,
im NATO-Rahmen im
Lichte der Entwicklung der Sicherheitslage
über mögliche Truppenreduzierungen und
die Beendigung von SFOR und KFOR gemeinsam zu ]entscheiden.
34.
There was never any real danger that the EU would be decoupled from the security policy
debate within
the NATO framework. It is the Alliance,
after all, which continues to be solely responsible for collective defence. Admittedly the EU's "David", at
France's insistence, has rightly stressed to NATO's
"Goliath" that both organisations make autonomous
decisions. In reality, however, all the other EU members except France - including those such as Sweden and
Finland which
are not members of NATO - have a great interest
in NATO's,
and thus the US's, involvement on issues of security policy. Eine Abkopplung der
EU von den sicherheitspolitischen Erwägungen im Rahmen der NATO war
nie eine ernsthafte Gefahr.
Denn für die kollektive Verteidigung
ist weiterhin die NATO allein zuständig.Die
Zweifel beginnen bei den Zielen der ESVP. Zwar betont der
„David“ EU auf Drängen Frankreichs gegenüber dem „Goliath“ NATO zurecht, daß beide
Organisationen autonom Entscheidungen fällen. Erklärungen,
welche die Unabhängigkeit der EU-Entscheidungen betonen, schüren Befürchtungen,
daß die EU sich von de USA abkoppeln will. Tatsächlich sind jedoch
außer Frankreich alle anderen, auch die nicht dem Bündnis angehörenden
EU-Mitglieder wie Schweden und Finnland, sehr stark an einer Beteiligung der
NATO und damit
der USAeiner Führung der USA
bei sicherheitspolitischen Fragen interessiert. Sie
befürchten vielmehr einen schleichenden Rückzug der USA aus Europa, wenn die EU
keinen größeren Beitrag zu Bewältigung globaler Aufgaben leistet.
35.
For practical reasons too,Auch aus praktischen
Erwägungen the fears of a
decoupling are unfounded. Fully autonomous EU operations without recourse to third-party resources will not be feasible for
another 10-15 years. spricht
wenig für die Abkopplungsängste. Vollkommen
eigenständige EU-Operationen, ohne Rückgriff auf Ressourcen Dritter
sind
erst in 10-15 Jahren denkbar.[6]
By then, alongside the rapid
reaction force planned for 2003, the EU should also have established capacities in the fields of command and control, intelligence and
strategic transport. Dann
soll die EU neben der für 2003 avisierten mobilen Eingreiftruppe („Rapid
Reaction Force“)
auch über Kapazitäten zum strategischen See- und Lufttransport,
Aufklärungssysteme
sowie
Führungs-(„Command
and Control“)-Kapazitäten
verfügen.
Until that time, only operations which are
based a) exclusively on
NATO
assets, or b) on NATO and EU assets are feasible. In these instances, every
NATO member will be involved
in the decision on whether the EU may use these
resources for its operations.
36.
In practice,
parallel consultations will take place within and between the two organisations in times of crisis. Only " werdenwerden bei Krisen parallele
Konsultationen innerhalb und zwischen beiden Organisationen stattfinden. Nur „wo die Allianz als
ganzes nicht engagiert ist“ („where the alliance as a whole is not engaged“)wenn
keine Aktionen im Bündnis absehbar sind does the question of
an EU operation arise. However, if no consensus is reached within the Alliance, the
EU must have options for action and cannot be condemned to take no action on principle.
F.
consultation
mechanisms, stellt sich die Frage nach
einer EU-Operation.
Falls kein Konsens im Bündnis
zustande
37.
The issue of consultation arrangements has played a key role in the discussions on EU‑NATO relations. The aim is to guarantee maximum transparency on each side in order
to avoid misunderstandings and ensure coordinated action between the
two organisations.
38.
After
lengthy discussions on an EU-NATO framework agreement, detailed proposals have
now been put forward. NATO's decision-making body, the North Atlantic Council,
and the EU's Political and Security Committee will meet three times under each
six-month EU Presidency, and one Ministerial meeting between NATO and the EU
will also be held. Consultations with the non‑EU European Allies (15+6)
and with the accession candidates (15+15) will also take place. In times of
crisis, consultations will take place on an ad hoc basis as well, prior
to a possible decision by the EU.
1. jedoch selbständigallein
über die Beendigung der Operation. Sofern NATO-Ressourcen genutzt werden,
wird der NAC vom PSK vor einer bevorstehenden Entscheidung des Rates
informiert.
Canadian interestsKanadische InteressenInsbesondere
die WEU-Mitglieder fühlen sich ihrer Rechte beraubt, seitdem die EU die
wesentlichen Kapazitäten der Organisation übernommen hat.
40.
Canada signalled at an early stage that it would like to join EU operations, and attended the Kanada
hat frühzeitig
Interesse signalisiert, daß es sich an
EU-Operationen beteiligen möchte und sich
an der Streitkräftebeitragskonferenz („"Capabilities Pledging Conference“) onam 20 November. 11.2000. beteiligt. Alongside the
consultations with the NAC and the non-EU European Allies, the EU has proposed an exchange of views on
the development of the ESDP and military crisis management issues, to take place regularly with the PSC every six weeks. In times of crisis, the Council will
convene additional meetings if necessary. Canada is
generally satisfied with these consultation mechanisms.Die
EU
hat neben den Beratungen
mit dem NAC und den europäischen Alliierten
einen
Meinungsaustausch über
die Entwicklung der ESVP und
Fragen des militärischen Krisenmanagements vorgeschlagen, der routinemäßig alle sechs Wochen mit dem PSK stattfinden soll.
In Krisensituationen beruft der Rat ggf. zusätzliche Treffen ein. Kanada ist mit
diesen Konsultationsmechanismen insgesamt einverstanden.
2.
43.
However, the Mit der Entwicklung derdevelopment of the
ESDP offers the opportunity for Europe to make an
effective contribution to international crisis management ESVP eröffnet sich
jedoch die Chance, einen effektiven europäischen Beitrag zur Bewältigung internationaler Krisen zu leisten. To open up
participation to all non-EU NATO members, the European Union has already begun consultations with these states
("15+6") in the wake of the Feira Summit. However, full
participation in the internal decision-making processes is not Um allen europäischen
NATO-Mitgliedern eine Mitwirkung zu eröffnen,
hat die EU nach dem
Gipfel von Feira bereits
Konsultationen mit diesen Staaten ( „15+6“) aufgenommen. Eine
volle Beteiligung an den internen Entscheidungsprozessen
ist jedoch ausgeschlossenan option.. Die This would lead, de facto, towards
part-membership of the EU - a move which isses würde de facto auf eine Teilmitgliedschaft in
der EU hinauslaufen. diametrically opposed to the EU's strategic goal of
deeper integration. All those who wish for full rights
- and duties - can apply for accession to the European Union. The majority have already done so. Das läuft dem strategischen Ziel der
EU, zu einer vertieften
Integration zu gelangen, diametral entgegen. Alle, die volle Recht - und Pflichten - wollen, können die Aufnahme in die EU beantragen. Die meisten haben dieses bereits getan.
45.
Insgesamt Damit liegen
sehr weitreichende VorschlägeOverall, the EU's
proposals are very far-reaching. The
intensive consultation arrangements fall little short of formal participation in the
organisation's decisions. The EU
cannot really go much further if it wishes to maintain its claim to
autonomy. Admittedly, the other non-EU
European Allies have voiced
reservations, but finally it was Turkey alone which blocked the conclusion
of a framework agreement
between NATO and the EU at the NATO Ministerial Meeting in December 2000. Zugeständnisse
der EU vor. Die intensiven
KonsultationsverfahrenConflicts over the substance of the accession partnership
with the EU and
disagreements at domestic level over the country's
aim of EU accession, also played a role in this context. enden nur knapp unterhalb der förmlichen
Beteiligung an den Entscheidungen der Organisation. Viel wWeiter wirdkann die EU kaumnicht gehen können, wenn
sie den Anspruch auf Autonomie wahren will. Zwar haben auch die anderen
europäischen NATO-Partner noch Bedenken angemeldet, aber letztendlich hat
allein die Türkei den Abschluß einer Rahmenvereinbarung zwischen NATO und EU
beim NATO-Ministerrat im Dezember 2000 blockiert.
47.
Die Frage einer parlamentarischen Kontrolle de ESVPThe issue of
parliamentary control of the ESDP does not play a particularly significant role
in the transatlantic relationship. However,
it is extremely important for the work of the NATO Parliamentary
Assembly and will therefore be examined briefly at the end of this
chapter. So far, the issue of spielt
im transatlantsichen Verhältnis zwar kein große
Rolle, ist aber für
die Arbeit
der Parlamentarsichen Versammlung
der NATO (NATO
PV) von so großer Bedeutung, so
daß auf sie zum Abschluß dieses Kapitels kurz eingegangen werden soll.parliamentary control
has been left out of the intergovernmental negotiations. As the resources for ESDP projects are drawn from specific
contributions from the Member States and not the EU budget, the European
Parliament's involvement is limited to the half-yearly hearings of Secretary-General
JavierDie parlamentarische Kontrolle blieb bei den Regierungsverhandlungen
bisher außen vor. Da die Mittel für ESVP-Projekte durch spezifische Beiträge der Mitgliedsstaaten und nicht über das EU-Budget bereitgestellt werden, beschränkt sich die Mitwirkung des Europäischen
Parlaments (EP)
auf
die halbjährlichen Anhörungen des Generalsekretärs Solana vor dem EP-Ausschussbefore the EP's
Committee on Foreign Affairs, to which a delegation from the NATO Parliamentary
Assembly is now also invited.
Nonetheless, the EP sees itself as the key instrument of parliamentary
control of the ESDP. für Auswärtige Beziehungen, zu denen nun auch eine Delegation der NATO PV
eingeladen ist. Das EP sieht sich dennoch als den entscheidenden Träger parlamentarischer
Kontrolle der ESVP.
In terms of
parliament's role in foreign and defence
policy, there are different national traditions within the EU. Im Hinblick auf die Rolle
des Parlaments in der Außen- und Verteidigungspolitik gibt es unterschiedliche nationale Traditionen in der EU. In einigen Ländern werden die nationalen Parlamen In some countries,
the national parliaments will push for a role in decisions on key issues such as
the deployment of troops abroad; in Germany, for example, this is mandatory and is anchored in the
constitution. At present, it is unclear
whether in
the long term, the EP, a new EU inter-parliamentary body or both together will take over the
task of parliamentary control.te bei einer
so essentiellen Frage wie Truppeneinsätzen im Ausland auf eine Beteiligung drängen; in Deutschland ist sie bspw.
zwingend in der Verfassung vorgesehen. Derzeit
ist nicht absehbar, ob
langfristig das EP, ein neues
interparlamentarisches Gremium der EU oder beide gemeinsam, die parlamentarische Kontrolle
übernehmen werden.
48.
Das
EP will The European
Parliament wishes to take over WEU Assembly functions immediately and oblige the Council to
present an annual report on the ESDP. It is also seeking to intensify co‑operation with the
NATO Parliamentary Assembly. The WEU Assembly, on the other hand - which
recently changed its name to the European Security and Defence Assembly - takes the
view that the EP cannot replace the WEU Assembly at present, as the latter reports
back to the national parliaments. The competencies cannot be clarified until the next
Intergovernmental Conference in a few years' time. So the NATO Parliamentary Assembly's decision to invite a full
delegation from the EP to its annual sessions from now on is very welcome. Furthermore, during the transitional period, a broad security policy
dialogue should
also be
maintained with the WEU Assembly - which, like the NATO Parliamentary Assembly, brings together experienced experts
from the national parliaments - in order to bundle the options for national
control. ab sofort Funktionen der WEU-Versammung (WEUV) übernehmen, den Rat auf die
Vorlage eines jährlichen Berichts
zur ESVP verpflichten, und
strebt eine
stärkere Zusammenarbeit mit der NATO PV an. Die WEUV, die sich vor kurzem in European Security and
Defense Assembly (ESDA) umbenannt hat, vertritt hingegen die Position, das EP könne die WEUV derzeit nicht ersetzen kann, weil hier die Rückbindung an die nationalen
Parlamente besteht. Die
Kompetenzen werden erst mit der nächsten Regierungskonferenz
Mitte des Jahrzehnts geklärt werden können. Deshlab ist es zu begrüßen, daß die NATO PV nun eine volle Delegation des EP zu den
Plenartagungen einlädt. Darüber hinaus sollte in der Übergangsphase
auch mit der WEUV, die
ebenso wie die NATO PV erfahrene Experten aus den nationalen Parlamenten
zusammen bringt, einen
breiten sicherheitspolitischen Dialog pflegen, um die
nationalen Kontrollmöglichkeiten zu bündeln. Ziel der Europäer in den Konsultationen mit den USA ist es, auf die Einbettung des
MD-Systems in eine umfassende Strategie zur Non-proliferation und multilateraler Rüstungskontrolle zu dringen.
49.
After
the tumultuous events of 1989/90, NATO was confronted with an entirely new
security policy situation in Europe.
The "velvet revolutions" in Central Europe had changed the
world. The East-West conflict was over,
the Berlin Wall had come down and the way was clear for German
unification. With the dissolution of
the Warsaw Pact, the reform states were keen to become subjects of European
policy and clamoured to join the West's institutions. The opening of the Alliance is part of NATO's contribution to the
creation of "a Europe whole and free".
50.
The
accession to NATO by Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic on 12 March 1999
was an important first step along this road.
The Washington Summit in April 1999 specifically identified Albania, Bulgaria,
Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Macedonia, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia as
accession candidates. Admittedly this did not guarantee accession, but NATO
pledged to review their progress in 2002.
At the same time, co-operation within the framework of "Partnership
for Peace" was enhanced through the adoption of Membership Action
Programmes (MAP) for each of these countries.
These programmes - similar to the EU's accession partnerships - are
designed as a step-by-step process to help countries wishing to join the
Alliance meet the required standards and prepare for possible future
membership.
51.
NATO
will decide on further enlargement at its next Summit in Prague at the end of
2002. This year, a key task is to
conduct a debate about the preparations for this decision. The following
questions are important in this context:
·
Will
the Alliance's capacity to act be adversely affected by the accession of new
members? Are institutional reforms
therefore necessary prior to these accessions?
·
Which
states are likely to fulfil the criteria by the end of 2002 and should be
invited to commence accession negotiations?
·
Will
membership result in security policy gains for the accession candidates and the
Alliance?
·
Will
the accessions help to strengthen security and stability in Europe?
52.
This
report will not provide a detailed assessment of the progress achieved by the
candidate countries, as this has been covered by the Rapporteur of the
Sub-Committee on Central and Eastern Europe, Bert Koenders. Instead, it will
discuss the conditions, options and strategic factors which are significant for
next year's decision.
53.
The
outcomes of the first enlargement round will play a key role at the 2002
Summit. The political integration of Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary has
been successful. Even during the critical weeks of the Kosovo conflict, the
Alliance's cohesion was never seriously in jeopardy.[8]
As a neighbour country, and in light of the situation of the Hungarian minority
in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, Hungary's military contribution during
the conflict was limited, but the political objectives were supported in full.
Today, all the Alliance members contribute to peacekeeping in Kosovo.
54.
So
far, all three new members have adopted a consensus-based approach to
decision-making in the Alliance. Deliberations in the North Atlantic Council
(NAC) may take rather longer now, but
the increased number of members has not made them any more difficult. During the
Kosovo conflict, Hungary frequently brought its influence to bear on the
discussions with constructive proposals, e.g. on dealing with the Serbian
opposition. Poland, too, has recently put forward more positions of its own.
55.
Fears
that NATO's capacity to act might be undermined by the accession of new members
have proved unfounded and thus play no part in discussions at political
level. Reforming NATO's internal
organisational structures is a key priority for the Secretary General this
year. However, this must be dealt with
separately from the issue of enlargement in order to take account of NATO's new
crisis management role and its co-operation with partners. In contrast to the EU, the issue of
fundamental changes to decision-making processes does not arise.
56.
In the
areas of military integration and defence sector reform, the outcomes are less
positive. The pace of reform has slowed down significantly since the new
members' accession. The restructuring
and modernisation of the armed forces have faltered, and interoperability with
NATO structures, especially in the personnel field, has therefore fallen short
of expectations.
57.
Progress
in adapting to NATO standards within the MAP framework is therefore likely to
be given more priority in 2002 than in the first enlargement round.[9]
There is no need for individual assessments at this point.[10]
Suffice it to say that the MAP process is regarded as a valuable instrument by
accession candidates and members alike. The Alliance's increasingly specific
criteria enable the accession candidates to structure their reforms in line
with clear priorities. This allows maximum adjustment to NATO standards prior
to accession, thereby minimising problems with interoperability in practical
co-operation.
58.
When
the decisions are taken at the Prague Summit in late 2002, the heads of
government will have four basic options open to them:
59.
Owing
to the widespread view that the Alliance's military capacities have not
increased significantly as a result of the first enlargement, the general staff
and defence ministries of most member states appear to attach little priority
to a further enlargement round today. Postponing the invitation to accession
candidates until 2004/2005 would be seen as a welcome breathing-space and an
opportunity for consolidation.[11]
60.
Politically,
however, this is unlikely to be a viable option. The decision on the timetable for accession has already been
postponed once, at the Washington Summit, and clear decisions on enlargement
are now required. Otherwise, NATO's
"open-door" policy will be jeopardised, frustrating the accession
candidates and paralysing their reform efforts. If the prospect of accession recedes further into the distance,
there is a risk of a "renationalisation" of security and defence
policy in these states, resulting in arms stockpiling and instability in the
regions concerned.
61.
An
invitation to all nine accession candidates would be in line with the Vilnius
Statement, adopted on 19 May 2000, in which the nine foreign ministers pledged
to work cooperatively for integration into NATO. This option would remove any conflict over the candidates'
different levels of progress and strategic priorities. However, in view of the mixed success of
efforts to strengthen operative capacities during the first enlargement round,
this approach is unlikely to find much support among NATO members.
62.
It
would therefore be helpful - regardless of which option is selected - if in
2002 the Alliance could set a date for the next enlargement round in 2004, or
2005 at the latest. This would offer the countries which are not included in
the second round a clear framework for their future reform processes.
63.
A
"mini" round would focus exclusively on Slovenia and Slovakia.
64.
Slovenia
has not only made substantial progress in the field of political and economic
reform; it has also achieved significant advances in its implementation of the
MAP objectives since 1999. Indeed,
Slovenia had the chance of an invitation to commence accession negotiations as
early as 1997, but this was opposed by the USA. At that time, Slovakia's democratic deficits ruled out any real
possibility of accession to NATO. The change
of government in 1998 has removed these impediments and Slovakia has made up a
great deal of ground. Slovenia's
accession would also send out a political signal to South-East Europe that the
region has not been de-coupled from the process of integration into the
Euro-Atlantic institutions.
65.
In
practice, the accession of Slovenia and Slovakia would result in an adjustment
of the borders of the NATO area. This
option, which is supported by Italy and Hungary, appears to be accepted in the
majority of member states.
67.
Romania
and Bulgaria play a key role in stabilising South-East Europe. Politically, both countries - and various
others as well - made a major contribution to NATO's success in the Kosovo
conflict. Measured against the criteria
of internal stability and reform, however, these two countries lag far behind
the Baltic states. Giving priority to
these two countries cannot be justified in objective terms. It would be apparent that the Baltic states
had been passed over solely out of consideration for Russia.
68.
The
accession of Romania and Bulgaria is supported by Turkey and Greece. France
worked intensively on Romania's behalf in 1997.[12]
70.
Denmark
and numerous supporters in the USA - in the US Congress and outside - are
calling for the accession of at least one, but preferably all three Baltic
states.[13] Poland is a fervent supporter of its
neighbour Lithuania. The decision on
the Baltic states' accession will undoubtedly trigger heated debates,
especially due to its impact on relations with Russia.
71.
Russia
was vehemently opposed to the first enlargement round. It has now come to terms
with the accession of Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary, probably because
the Alliance was prepared to offer security policy concessions. For example, the CFE upper limits were
revised, and NATO pledged that there would be no permanent stationing of foreign troops and nuclear weapons on its
new members' territory.
72.
Russia
feels particularly threatened by the accession of states which were once part
of the USSR. This, in Russia's view, crosses a "red line". In the current debate, this applies
especially to the Baltic states.
73.
In its
relations with Russia, the Alliance must seek to clarify its policies and
engage in confidence-building. This
could help to persuade Russia that the Baltic states' permanent integration in
the EU and NATO will also safeguard Russia's long-term stability on its Western
border.[14]
74.
NATO
must convince its Russian partner that NATO is not interested in "expansion",
but that the "open-door" policy reflects the wishes of the accession
candidates. If candidates fulfil the Alliance criteria, NATO cannot deny them
entry, for this would call into question the credibility of the "open-door"
policy. NATO has therefore repeatedly
stressed that there can be no third-party veto over the accession of new
members - and that this applies to
Russia too.
75.
An
effective response must be found to Russia's concerns that it will be excluded
from security policy co-operation in Europe.
Support for Russia's economic reform processes and practical
co-operation within the framework of the NATO-Russia Founding Act must be
expanded. Alongside disarmament
initiatives and measures to combat the
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, other co-operation
projects are conceivable, ranging from the peaceful use of space to common
security measures such as Russia's proposed development of a missile defence
system. This enhanced co-operation could extend to the offer of a comprehensive
treaty on security and co-operation.
76.
The
Kaliningrad enclave is a particular problem. Here, Russia's fears of isolation
are even more acute than in relation to EU enlargement. If the Baltic states are invited to commence
accession negotiations, separate talks must be held to identify a solution
which takes account of Russia's security interests.
77.
Even
during the first enlargement round, a connection was made between the EU and
NATO integration processes. They are
seen as complementary developments to strengthen pan‑European security,
and it is assumed that ideally there will be greater linkage between the
membership of the two organisations at the end of the process. But how will the relationship progress until
that point? This is a controversial
issue. In terms of the Baltic states,
it is frequently assumed that EU integration takes priority. The European integration process covers the
full spectrum of social and economic issues, and so the EU's criteria for the
progress made by accession countries at domestic level are far more stringent
than NATO's. In practice, NATO has
therefore forged ahead of the EU. This
situation is likely to continue, even if the EU admits its first Central and
Eastern European members by 2004. As
regards Bulgaria and Romania, which will not be included in the first tranche
of EU accession states, some people are particularly concerned about the
adverse effects of a "dual rejection" and call for their early
accession to NATO.
79.
In
transatlantic relations, it is likely to be easier to achieve a consensus on
enlargement than on the other two issues. It offers a positive point of
reference for the promotion of the Alliance's shared values and security and
stability in Europe. There is one
discrepancy at present, however. The new US Administration supports enlargement
on principle, although - like Canada - it has yet to adopt a firm position on
this issue. However, an intensive
debate about priorities has already begun in Congress and among security policy
experts. The Administration is obliged to submit a report to Congress, one year
before the Summit decision, on the integration of the three new members and the
progress achieved by the nine candidates.
It must therefore adopt a position on enlargement by the end of 2001 if
it is to overcome the hurdle established by the Senate during the ratification
of the first enlargement round.
80.
The
European partners should make their interest in this key issue clear and
commence an open debate in their parliaments this year. This would ensure that over the next
eighteen months all sides can move towards a consensus within the Alliance
which transcends the different views on the progress achieved, strategic
priorities, and national preferences.
81.
The Bush Administration has announced that it is
committed to developing and introducing a missile defence system (MD) as
quickly as possible. However, it is
still unclear what form this will take, and no timetable has yet been
established. A review is currently in
progress to establish whether the concept of a land-based National Missile
Defence system (NMD) envisaged by the Clinton Administration can be enhanced
with tactical missile defence capabilities (TMD) which could also protect the
USA's allies.
82.
The project enjoys substantial support in Congress.
This may also be due to the fact that a major investment project of this kind
would give a significant technological boost to the US economy and can count on
the backing of a highly influential lobby.
In Congress, the debate will focus on technical feasibility and
cost. However, various
"think-tanks" have voiced fundamental criticism of the project,
highlighting the detrimental effect on relations with Russia and the threat of
an arms race in Asia. So there is still
scope for the NATO partners to influence the development of these plans.
83.
US supporters of NMD point to the findings of the
Rumsfeld Commission in 1998 and the 1999 National Intelligence Estimate
(NIE). Both analyses highlight the
increasing capacities of "rogue states" or "states of concern"
- i.e. North
Korea, Iraq and Iran - to develop WMD using nuclear intercontinental ballistic
missiles (ICBM) or medium-range missiles (MRBM) as delivery systems. They warn that by 2015 at the latest, these
states will be able to threaten the US's allies or US troops with medium-range
missiles in regional crises or prevent US intervention through the threat of an
ICBM assault on US territory. However, the
predictions of these and other experts as regards the timeframe tend to vary
considerably.
84.
In the context of these analyses of proliferation
risks, it is repeatedly claimed that ABC weapons could be used by terrorist
groups to perpetrate acts like the AUM sect's attack on the Tokyo
underground. However, a missile defence
system offers no protection from this type of threat.
85.
European supporters of a missile defence system point
out that the missiles being developed will reach the European continent before
the US. Before the end of the next
decade, Iran will have the capability to target Europe with medium-range
missiles (MRBM). The same applies to
the re-arming of Iraq or even Libya.
They argue that this will greatly restrict Europe's scope for action in
a region where it has a great many interests to protect. They also claim that protecting US territory
through NMD also accords with Europe's interest in America's unrestricted
freedom of action in defence of Europe or to protect the West's common interests
outside Europe.
86.
Despite these arguments, the majority of European
governments have so far responded with restraint or have adopted a "wait
and see" approach to the US plans on the missile shield. This article will therefore examine why
there are different assessments of the threat emanating from existing/emerging
military potential.
87.
A country's threat perceptions draw primarily on its
analysis of political and military developments in individual states and regions,
as well as the power constellations and
political intentions within the international system. However, a
straightforward attempt to examine the facts objectively has its limits. Every
individual human perception is necessarily subjective and selective. It is a combination of historical experience
and ideological orientation, which highlights some aspects and suppresses
others. If there is no awareness or discussion of the different perceptions,
fundamental misunderstandings threaten to arise in the transatlantic
discussions. And if the differences
focus on the best way of achieving security, it is easy to lose sight of common
goals.
88.
The USA has not experienced war in its own country
since the American Civil War and the
attack on Pearl Harbour. This
historical experience of unassailability is the reason for the USA's determined
efforts to avert any potential threat to US territory. As long as the technological and military
resources are available, American parliamentarians and presidents, irrespective
of their political affiliations, see it as their moral duty to take every
possible measure to protect the American people. The state of inviolability is viewed as a fundamentally
attainable goal and a highly-prized asset which may also justify substantial
financial outlays. Only against this background is it possible to understand
why the debate about the missile defence system has penetrated the public
consciousness far more deeply in the USA than in Europe. While politicians in the USA now have to take
public opinion into account, the European governments still have relatively
broad scope to shape their position.
Europe's threat perception, which differs from America's, is also the
product of its historical experience of permanent external threat and conflict,
either in Europe as a whole or in its individual societies - an experience
which stretches far back into antiquity and has continued almost unbroken to
the present day. The European nations have never been able to protect
themselves effectively from all these threats by technical or military means
alone. They have always had to take account not only of military potential but
also the underlying political intentions in order to identify, and concentrate
their forces on, the most acute threats. As a result, considerable importance
is also attached to diplomatic and other political measures as a response to
risks. Inviolability has never seemed
attainable in Europe. Indeed, this recognition is reflected in the ancient saga of "Siegfried", the heroic
figure in the , selbst für den er Song of the Nibelung on which
Richard Wagner's Ring cycle is based. ]
89.
Alongside these historical reasons, however, the
Europeans' and the Americans' different threat perceptions are also rooted in
their divergent roles in global politics. Even if both sides draw similar
conclusions about the significance of a given country's nuclear capacities and
intentions, the Americans - as a result of their greater military commitment as
a stabilising force in the Middle East and Asia - take the aspirations of
"rogue states" far more seriously as a fundamental threat than the
Europeans do.
90.
A more significant factor in the European states'
security policy thinking is the need to respond to regional conflicts. The conflicts in the Balkans or on Europe's
periphery have a direct impact on Europe, e.g. through migration flows and the
spread of organised crime through illegal arms- and drug-trafficking.[15] Global climate change can also trigger
conflicts over resources such as water or territory. If the financial and other means to resolve these problems are
limited, the question which inevitably arises is: which task should take
priority? Indeed, is it conceivable
that the USD 60 billion estimated by the Congressional Budget Office solely for
the limited version of an NMD system could actually contribute as much, if not
more, to security if it were used for climate protection or other environmental
measures? There are many signs that
conflicts over scarce resources will increase.
This applies not only to oil but also to drinking water or fertile soil
which are becoming scarcer as a result of desertification and climate change
(Kyoto Protocol).
[*auch
die Bedrohung durch Terroranschläge, die in Bedrohungsanalyse zur
Proliferationsgefahr immer wieder auftaucht, wird nicht vermindert.]
91.
Among the various reasons for many governments'
restrained response, a key concern is often the impact on relations with Russia
in the context of the start of a new arms race in space and the development of
cost-effective counter-measures.
However, the Putin Government's prime interest is to maintain the ABM
Treaty which is viewed as the basis for strategic arms control and
stability. There is every indication that
as part of an initiative to reduce strategic nuclear weapons (START-III) from
3 500 to fewer than than 1 500 systems, agreement will be reached on
the modification of the ABM Treaty.
This type of solution would appeal to Russia, not only on account of its
economic position.
92.
In view of the situation in the Caucasus and Central
Asia, Russia appears to share America's evaluation of potential support for
Islamist movements from nuclear powers in the Middle East. During the NATO
Secretary General, Lord George Robertson's, visit to Moscow in February 2001,
President Putin proposed that instead of investing in an NMD system, the risk
of a missile attack should be reduced through international co-operation and,
if necessary, a mobile European missile defence system could be established
jointly with NATO. As it is likely that
a balance of interests will be achieved which takes Russia's security interests
into account, the following section will provide a more detailed analysis of
the threat of a new nuclear arms race in Asia as a result of the creation of a
missile shield.
93.
China's nuclear arsenal, which currently comprises
around 20 ICBMs, would be downgraded even by the limited version of NMD, and
China's policy of minimal deterrence would be undermined. China could respond by speeding up the
expansion of its ICBM arsenal. This
would prompt India - which sees China as its main rival for regional
predominance - to increase its weapons stockpiles, which in turn would probably
encourage Pakistan to do the same.
94.
In the interests of domestic stability, the Chinese
leadership has so far given more priority to economic development and higher
living standards Die Angts vor einem Rüstungswettlauf relativiert
sich angesichts der ökonomischen und sozialen Lage in den meisten Staaten
etwas. than to foreign policy aspirations. Das läßt der Regierung
wenig Spielraum für eine - über das unabhängig von NMD bereits geplante Maß
hinausgehenden - Aufstockung und Modernisierung der Raketenstreitkräfte. Die hohen Wachstumsraten der
chinesischen Volkswirtschaft dürfen nicht darüber hinwegtäuschen, daß das
nationale Budget aus einer Reihe interner Gründe im internationalen Vergleich
relativ niedrig ist und es auf absehbare Zeit auch bleiben wird. Angesichts der
tatsächlichen Kräfteverhältnise zwischen den USA und China stellt sich die
Frage, ob hier nicht möglicherweise ein neuer Gegner beschworen werden soll, um
die öffentliche Meinung für Rüstungsvorhaben und damit verbundene Budgets zu
gewinnen.
95.
However, such consideration is generally less of a
feature of authoritarian states than democratic societies and ends when the
issue of national unity is at stake.
This goal has absolute priority.
China's weapons stockpiling is designed first and foremost to keep open
the option of violent unification with Taiwan if Taiwan fails to respond to
overtures by the People's Republic in the medium term. If the US Administration decides this spring
to export modern radar systems and interceptor missiles, the way would be clear
for Taiwan's integration into an Asian TMD component of the American missile
shield. This would be extremely difficult for the Chinese leadership..[16] In addition to accelerating the planned
expansion of China's medium-range missile arsenal, it would also be likely to
result in an increase in China's ICBM stockpiles. The credible threat of
attacks on US forces and US territory would be designed to prevent the US from
intervening in a conflict in the Taiwan Straits.
96.
If the Chinese Government felt compelled to undertake
this fundamental re-allocation of resources, this would have adverse effects on
its economic and political opening. It
could also prompt North Korea to rethink its more open approach, which is based
on the Chinese model, and continue to concentrate its resources on expanding
its security apparatus.
97.
Many critics
fear that a missile shield which is specifically developed in line with a
military "ceteris paribus" concept could be a self-fulfilling
prophecy. They argue that ignoring political options will lead to a
confrontation from which real threats could emerge.[17] There are signs that even in the US
Administration, MD is not an entirely uncontroversial choice. The State Department - like many Alliance
partners - is pushing for a comprehensive strategy to deal with proliferation
risks. This would aim to enhance the defence system with political, diplomatic
and economic initiatives, whereas the Pentagon appears to be opting solely for
military/technological security precautions.
99.
Additional export control measures would have a direct
and immediate impact on the speed of availability of key technologies. The further development of the Missile
Transfer Control Regime (MTCR) into a global control system was proposed by
Russia informally at the G8 Summit in Okinawa. Seit Oktober 2000 liegen dazu konkrete
Vorschläge Großbritanniens vor.
100.
A very promising approach to constructive
non-proliferation policy, on the other hand, is based on technical and economic
co-operation between prosperous states with an interest in non‑proliferation,
and economically weak states working on an WMD programme. The USA's 1996 KEDO Programme, which offers North Korea
comprehensive technical and financial assistance in the civil use of nuclear
energy in exchange for the renunciation of its weapons development programme, can serve as a model in this context. In the case of Iraq, too, the question which
arises is whether the isolation of Saddam Hussein's regime is actually
achieving its objectives. Neither the
comprehensive UN sanctions nor the numerous military strikes since 1997[18]
have weakened the regime, while the suffering of the civilian population is
boosting anti‑Western solidarity among the Arab public. After the
controversial bombing of Baghdad in February 2000, it is to be welcomed that
the Secretary of State, Colin Powell, and the British Prime Minister, Tony
Blair, now wish to support the calls, already voiced by many Allies, for a
review of the sanctions regime. In line
with the Yugoslavia model, sanctions should focus more strongly on the
Government ("smart sanctions"), if in return Iraq
expresses its willingness to resume UN weapons inspections.
101.
Die Einrichtung eines institutionaliserten Continuous
political dialogue with the relevant states could lead to the opening of
isolated regimes and strengthen reform-oriented forces. North Korea's interest in economic reforms
on the Chinese model, and its greater openness to contacts with South Korea,
offer an opportunity to learn more about, and if possible influence, the
political calculations of the elites.
The EU's resumption of contacts with Libya within the context of the
Mediterranean dialogue, or the visits by German and British representatives to
Iran, are based on similar thinking.
102.
The European states are aware that the building of a
missile defence system is ultimately a domestic decision for the US. However, in view of its far-reaching
implications for international security, they voiced their concerns and
interests at an early stage. Via the
consultations in the Alliance, they are seeking to influence the US's
decision-making on this issue. While
France initially adopted a highly critical approach, it now appears to have
come round to the more cautious position of Great Britain and Germany, which
have raised a number of critical questions:
·
Will a land-based "national missile defence
system" create different zones of security within the Alliance, thus
risking a decoupling of the US from Europe?nach sich ziehe.
In response to this fear, the Bush Administration has changed the project's
name and is now examining the possibility of expanding its range. It has also assured the European Allies that
they will be involved in consultations, and has offered them an opportunity to
participate in the project.
·
How can regional arms races be prevented? Here, the fears focus particularly on
Asia. All the leading powers in the
region think in terms of military power and are seeking to achieve - or have
achieved - nuclear status. Based on the
possible expansion of China's nuclear capacities, India has already announced
that it will take appropriate counter-measures.[19]
Further knock-on effects in Pakistan, possibly via Iran, and in Iraq, Syria or
other Middle East states are also conceivable.
·
What initiatives are necessary to strengthen the
international non-proliferation regime?
Alongside CTBT, other options under discussion include more effective
export controls, e.g. through the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), or
a review of sanctions against Iraq in conjunction with the resumption of UN
weapons inspections.
103.
In addition to these strategic considerations, issues
concerning the technical feasibility and effectiveness of a missile shield, as
well as the high costs involved - which also influence the design proposed by
the Bush Administration - will play a role in the EU states' final evaluation
of the project. Prior to participation,
a key issue which must also be resolved is whether the USA is prepared to
engage in technological co-operation on
the basis of equality, which would enable the European Allies to benefit from
the economic advantages resulting from the project's substantial expenditure on research and development.
104.
Despite their similar concerns, a common EU position
is not yet in sight. At present, the EU
member states are waiting for the Bush Administration to define its plans in
more specific terms. No decision on
participation will be made until then.
Conservative opposition leaders in Britain and Germany have now come out
in favour of participation.[20]
Although it is still too early for a final evaluation, the issue of
participation will, sooner or later, raise one key issue for all EU member
States. Are they convinced that in
addition to expanding the ESDP capacities they will be able to find the
financial resources necessary for full and equal participation in an MD system?
105.
As yet, no forum for opinion-forming has been set up
in the EU. The EU has tried for some
years, within the CFSP framework, to reach common positions on arms control and
non-proliferation.[21] However, the nuclear powers France and Great
Britain would like to keep all nuclear issues, in the narrower sense, out of
the EU. , da d wollenFor
this reason, coordinating the positions in future is likely to take place
through bilateral contacts and the NATO consultations.
106.
Many observers now assume that the Bush Administration
will need 18-24 months to define the contours of the US system after further
tests. This would give the European
partners enough time to influence the development of the plans.
107.
Denmark and Great Britain have a special status among
the European partners. In both countries, there are potential deployment sites
for the radar systems required for the early warning and control systems of the
NMD initiative proposed by the Clinton Administration. Both countries do not wish to snub the USA
under any circumstances and, despite sometimes substantial protest at local
level, they have signalled that they are open, in principle, to co-operation.
108.
All the EU partners are likely to focus on their
efforts, by means of proposals on non-proliferation policy, on integrating the
USA to the maximum extent in multilateral regimes and preventing the USA's
withdrawal as far as possible. They
will face widespread scepticism in the US Administration and Congress about the
usefulness of international regimes in general and the effectiveness and
verification of arms control agreements in particular.[22] The new US Administration's concept of
security threatens to be unilateral in that it emphasises its own protection
and capacity to act - also in the interests of the Allies.[23]
109. This
conflicts with the philosophy of the system of arms control and
non-proliferation treaties to which the European Allies are more committed. In
line with this concept, security always means security for others as well. The US position now emerging weakens efforts
to achieve stability and security through international treaties, i.e. through
a legal framework for
international relations.
·
With the end of the East-West conflict, there is no
longer one clearly identifiable common threat. The transatlantic agenda is now dominated by
regional conflicts and ecological, economic and other global problems. There are highly
diverse views - and often conflicts of interest - on how the Alliance should
respond in individual cases.Mit dem Wegfall der klaren Bedrohung des Kalten Krieges bestimmen Regionalkonflikte, wirtschaftliche, ökologische und andere globale Problem die transatlantische Agenda. Dabei treten
unterschiedliche Bewertungen und Interessenkonflikte zu Tage. This requires a more
intensive transatlantic dialogue so that common values and the common interest in
conflict resolution mechanisms and international security are not obscured. Das erfordert eine
Intensivierung des transatlantischen Dialoges, damit davon nicht die
gemeinsame Werteordnung sowie das
gemeinsame Interesse an Streitschlichtungsmechanismen und internationaler Sicherheit überdeckt wird.
·
Die Bemühungen der EU The EU's efforts to
acquire its own crisis management capabilities aim to achieve a more equally
balanced transatlantic partnership. um die Fähigkeit zu eigenständigem Krisenmanagement zielen auf eine gleichgewichtigere
transatlantische Partnerschaft.
·
Die ESVP bietet die
ChanceThe ESDP offers the opportunity to combine civil,
political and military crisis management and conflict prevention. The non-military crisis prevention instruments,
in particular, complement and enhance NATO's capacities, ziviles, politisches und militärisches
Krisenmanagement und Prävention zu verbinden. Insbesondere die Instrumente
ziviler Prävention bilden
eine Ergänzung der
NATO-Kapazitäten.
·
Die Glaubwürdigkeit der BemühungenThe credibility of
the efforts to strengthen the Alliance will depend on whether the EU
fulfils
the civil and military European headline goals by 2003. um eine Stärkung der Allianz hängt davon ab, daß die EU die zivilen und militärischen „European Headline Goals“ bis zum Jahr 2003 erfüllt.
·
Konkrete VorschlägeThere are specific
proposals for an EU-NATO framework agreement and the non-EU European Allies' involvement and
consultation. Further blocking by Turkey is likely to result in
the unnecessary duplication of capacities.
In the interests of transatlantic co-operation, this risk must be
averted.
·
Enlargement of the Alliance is a core task in the joint efforts to build security and stability in Europe.für ein Rahmenabkommen
EU-NATO und zur Teilnahme und Konsultation der europäischen Partner liegen vor.
Eine weitere Blockade durch die Türkei beschwört eine unnötige Duplizierung von
Kapazitäten herauf. Im Sinne
transatlantischer Kooperation gälte es diese Gefahr
abzuwenden.
·
In 2002, a number of countries should be invited to commence accession
negotiations. Selection should be based
on the progress achieved by the candidates and the implications for
pan-European security.
·
There must be no
fundamental exclusion criteria.
·
In addition, the Alliance should set a
date for the next round of enlargements.
This would offer states which are not included in the second round a
clear framework for their reform process in future.
·
In future, all EU states should have the right to
join the Alliance if they wish.
·
In parallel to the discussions on the opening of
the Alliance, security co‑operation with Russia should be expanded.
[Im Jahr 2002 eine Reihe von
Staaten zur Aufnahme von Beitrittsverhandlungen einladen. Die Auswahl sollte
sich nach dem Vorbereitungsstand
der Kandidaten und den Auswirkungen auf die gesamteuropäische Sicherheit
richten.
Grundsätzliche Ausschlußkriterien darf es dabei nicht
geben.
Darüber hinaus soll das Bündnis ein Datum für die
nächste Erweiterungsrunde festlegen. Das würde auch denjenigen Staaten, die in der zweiten Runde
nicht zum Zuge kommen, einen klaren Rahmen für die Ausrichtung des zukünftigen
Reformprozesses bieten.
Alle Staaten der EU sollten in Zukunft das Recht
haben, dem Bündnis beizutreten, sofern sie dieses wünschen.
Flankierend zu den Beratungen über die Öffnung des
Bündnisses sollte die sicherheitspolitische
Kooperation mit Rußland ausgebaut werden.]
·
The debate about the development and introduction
of a missile defence system is potentially the greatest challenge for transatlantic co‑operation. It may reflect a drifting apart of
security policy analysis and strategy. Die Diskussion um die
Errichtung eines Raketenabwehrsystems stellt potentiell die größte
Herausforderung für die transatlantische Zusammenarbeit dar. Dahinter steht ein
mögliches Auseinanderdriften von sicherheitspolitischer Analyse und Strategie.
·
Die Entscheidung der Bush-AdministratioThe Bush Administration has now taken the
decision to build a missile shield. n
für den Bau eines Raketenabwehrsystems
ist gefallen. However,
it is still unclear what form this will take, and no timetable has yet been
established. The Allies can bring influence to
bear on this issue in the consultations with the USA. Das
Wann und Wie sind aber wieder völlig
offen. Die Verbündeten können darauf in den Konsultationen mit den
USA darauf Einfluß ausüben.
·
There is general agreement that proliferation is a
real threat. However, views vary
on the importance of the threat posed by ballistic missiles compared with other
security risks (e.g. regional conflicts).Weitgehende Übereinstimmung herrscht, daß eine Proliferationsgefahr besteht. Unterschiedlich
fällt die Bewertung der Priorität der Bedrohung durch ballistische
Raketen im Vergleich zu anderen
Sicherheitsrisiken (z.B. Regionalkonflikte) aus.
·
The European partners fear that an unintended
consequence of the missile defence system will be a new arms race in Asia, with
possible implications for the Middle East situation, as well as in space. Die europäischen Partner
befürchten als unbeabsichtigte Konsequenzen des MD-Systems einen neuen Rüstungswettlauf in Asien mit etwaigen
Rückwirkungen auf den Nahen Osten sowie im erdnahen Weltraum.
·
In the consultations with the USA, the Europeans'
objective is to embed the missile defence system in a comprehensive
non-proliferation and multilateral arms control strategy.
NOTES AND REFERENCES
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