1.
Two issues currently dominate the security agenda of
the transatlantic alliance: ballistic
missile defence and European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP). Though not directly linked to one another,
the debates both directly and indirectly influence each other and will
considerably shape core areas of Alliance security.
2.
Following the decision by outgoing US President Bill
Clinton in early September last year to postpone a decision whether to proceed
with plans for developing and deploying a limited defence against weapons of
mass destruction (WMD) mounted on ballistic missiles, the public debate has
become relatively calm in this area.
3.
The Bush administration has declared the terminology
coined under the previous administration, "National Missile Defence"
(NMD) and "Theatre Missile Defence" (TMD) as "not helpful".
4.
This report is a follow-up to the 2000 Sub-Committee
report titled "NMD and Political Implications for the Alliance". It thus provides an update of the latest
developments concerning the plans of the United States to develop and deploy
long-range Ballistic Missile Defence (BMD) and possible implications for the
Alliance and its member states.
Moreover, the report addresses some of the key issues in greater detail. Among the questions raised in this
preliminary report are the origins of the threat and how can it be
contained? Who are the states of
concern and how can the Alliance as well as the international community at
large deal with them? What instruments,
both incentive and coercive, in addition to building missile defences, can be
applied to rein in "states of concern" or at least control their
behaviour?
5.
During the last two years, the Sub-Committee has also
closely followed the development of the EU’s plans to build a European Security
and Defence Policy (ESDP). The second
part of this paper briefly summarises the progress in this area after the Nice
Summit and describes the current status of the debate as well as listing the
immediate tasks ahead.
6.
The autumn report will evaluate relevant aspects of
the issues in greater detail, including a more comprehensive view of the
challenges lying ahead for the transatlantic partnership.
7.
US Missile defence initiatives and transatlantic
debates over the issue date back to the 1960s ("Sentinel" and
"Safeguard" systems), and bounced back in the 1980s ("Strategic
Defence Initiative" ‑ SDI -).
Their coming back on the agenda in the early 1990s is due to several
factors. First, the possible missile
and WMD threat from potentially hostile states, due to the spread of ballistic
missile technology and the risk of WMD materials or know-how leaking from the
former Soviet Union became increasingly real.
Second, the United States’ technological advances in areas relevant for
missile defence, notably computers, advanced-sensor and micro-thruster rocket
technologies. Third, the significant
improvement of its budgetary picture with estimated annual surplus projections
of approximately US $200 billion which would easily allow for spending some US
$6 billion per year for nation wide anti-missile defence.
8.
Against this background and the increased political
momentum in the United States, US President Clinton signed the National Missile
Defence Act of 1999 stating that "it is the policy of the United States to
deploy, as soon as technologically possible, an effective National Missile
Defence system capable of defending the territory of the United States against
limited ballistic missile attack".
However, President Clinton tied a future deployment decision of a
system to four criteria, namely to the threat assessment, to the technological
feasibility, to the strategic environment (i.e. taking into account arms
control and nuclear non-proliferation objectives), and the costs. Following two consecutive test failures,
President Clinton decided in early September 2000 to defer a decision to deploy
a National Missile Defence (NMD) system.
This decision was welcomed in the United States as it leaves enough time
to evaluate the technology and the design more carefully, and it was greeted
with relief by America’s allies, which had originally been sceptical of
NMD.
9.
Since then the debate on Ballistic Missile Defence
(BMD) has been changing in a number of ways.
The Bush administration seems committed not only to accelerating the
development and deployment but also of expanding the concept of BMD. During the 2000 election campaign, though he
did not propose a specific plan of his own, the then governor George W. Bush
had criticised the Clinton administration's approach to missile defence as
inadequate and identified the defence of "our people and allies against
missiles and terror" one of the top security priorities of his
administration. Moreover, he stated that
NMD must be designed to protect "all 50 states, our friends and allies and
deployed forces overseas".
10.
The new administration has not yet provided details
about its plans for a more "robust" missile shield. However, it is currently conducting an
extensive review of the programme including a much wider range of technologies
with, among others, space-based sensors which are banned under the
Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty.
11.
Currently, the cost and design factors primarily
appear to determine the debate on missile defence. Estimated costs of a "Clinton-style" long-range BMD
were as high as US $60 billion. A
system as envisaged by President Bush could cost much more and estimates of
missile defence advocates mentioned the additional price tag could reach as
high as US $8 to 10 billion per year.
According to the latest, but incomplete, estimate, published by the
Ballistic Missile Defence Organisation (BMDO) acquisition costs of the eight
highest profile anti-missile systems would cost at least US $80 billion. President Bush had indicated earlier that he
plans to increase US defence spending by approximately US $45 billion over a
period of ten years. However, the Bush
administration has not yet unveiled how much money will be spent on defence and
the President left it open whether spending for long-range BMD would come out
of the US $45 billion increase or from additional funding. At the same time, President Bush has said
that he plans to reduce revenues by cutting taxes by between US $1.6 trillion
and US $1.2 trillion.
12.
Anti-ballistic missile defences enjoy strong, but not
unanimous, support in the US administration and Congress. Apart from supporters of arms control, some
leading congressional policymakers have raised the question whether too much
emphasis on long-range missile defence could leave the military short of
funds. For example, Senator Lieberman,
expressed concern that the President's announced tax cut, totalling
approximately US $1.6 trillion, might hurt US national security. With regard to the current discussion on a
nation wide BMD, the key questions are over the design and timing.
13.
Concerning the architecture of a more “robust”
system, some proponents of long-range BMD, among them senior US Navy officials,
have advocated an alternative sea-based programme. A 1999 Heritage Foundation report proposed a plan calling for
deploying long-range BMD aboard US Navy Aegis cruisers and destroyers. But proponents and critics of sea-based,
long-range BMD differ over whether such a system would produce cost savings and
could be deployed both easily and quickly.
14.
Critics of the Clinton administration’s NMD design,
as well as a number of experts, suggested concentrating on a boost phase
defence. Boost phase defence would
shoot down a missile shortly after launch before it leaves the atmosphere (or
shortly after) and before deploying its multiple warheads or decoys. The interceptors could be deployed at sea,
on land, or in space provided they were sufficiently close to a missile within
the first few minutes of its launch.
15.
Even though President Bush has made long-range BMD
one of his top priorities, it will take several years to build. Pentagon officials estimate that even if
everything goes according to plan, a "small scale" version of the interceptor
system comparable to the one foreseen by the Clinton administration, could not
become operational before 2006.
16.
While a majority of US policymakers and experts had
accepted the conclusions of the so-called Rumsfeld commission published in 1998
(see the 2000 report of the Sub-Committee), European counterparts were
initially reluctant to do so. This was
due to a number of factors, among others because America’s allies were, and to
some extent remain, concerned about a violation of the 1972 Anti-Ballistic
Missile (ABM) treaty and possibly negative consequences for relations with
Russia and China, as well as arms control in general. Europeans were also afraid of possibly suffering from the
consequences of a crisis between Moscow and Washington. Moreover, other concerns have been raised
about BMD triggering an arms race, thus forcing the allies to spend huge
amounts of money for a system whose feasibility many doubted. More importantly, European allies feared a
possible decoupling of American from European security by creating two
different zones of security. A paper by
Nicole Gnesotto, Director of the Western European Union (WEU) Institute for
Security Studies, published in early 2000, had summarised European scepticism
over American plans for NMD as the "Four Ds":
·
Délégitimation –
possible de-legitimisation of nuclear deterrence;
·
Découplage –
possible transatlantic decoupling;
·
Déstabilisation –
potential destabilisation of the strategic balance; and
·
Détournement –
possible siphoning of European budgetary resources towards missile defence.
17.
Following the decision by President Clinton to postpone a deployment
decision, the transatlantic exchanges over the desirability and possible
ramifications of missile defence has turned considerably conciliatory in
tone. The attitudes toward BMD have
been changing on both sides of the Atlantic.
Speaking at an American Enterprise Institute forum in early March 2001,
NATO Secretary General Lord Robertson said that the Bush administration moves to
drop the "national" from national missile defence, and to put missile
defence into a larger strategy of nuclear and WMD security has helped address
European concerns. America's allies, it
seems, have accepted that the United States is most likely to press ahead with
missile defence. Other reasons for
changing views among the allies include a perceived American determination to
speed up development and deployment of long-range BMD. It appears that a number of European leaders
are either supporting what could become a Global Missile Defence (GMD) or
moving towards supporting it. There are
signs that co-operation in the deployment of what could be called a Global
Missile Defence (GMD) could be feasible.
Such a GMD system could combine long-range BMD and TMD systems that
would defend the United States and its allies, as well as US and allied forces
deployed overseas against attacks by ballistic missiles armed with nuclear,
biological or chemical weapons. Thus,
the United States and its allies have been moving away from possible
confrontation over the development and deployment of a long-range missile
defence shield in the last year.
18.
Due to their closer proximity to countries acquiring WMD-armed
ballistic missiles, America’s allies are expected to face the threat of limited
attacks sooner than the United States.
Most intelligence services share the assessments of the technological
progress of these countries. However,
differences remain over the intention of the
regimes in question, as well as over the intensity of the discussion in
Alliance member countries.
19.
As to the United Kingdom, in a joint statement with
President Bush during his visit to Washington, Prime Minister Tony Blair
endorsed US BMD plans, saying "we need to obstruct and deter these new
threats with a strategy that encompasses both offensive and defensive weapons
systems". Foreign Secretary Robin
Cook said the United States administration’s missile defence plans could
deliver a "net gain" and indicated that the United Kingdom would help
the United States if it decided to upgrade the American Fylingdales radar
station. Conservative leader William
Hague said he backed President Bush’s plan for a more robust missile defence
and would help persuade other European allies to co-operate.
20.
In Germany, the main government party the SPD, and
the opposition have said that they support the idea of developing long-range
missile defence. Chancellor Gerhard
Schroeder, though previously critical of NMD, said in early March 2001 that
Germany could participate in developing long-range missile defences. German Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer said
during a visit to Moscow that Germany stood by the United States on this
issue. In June 2000, Mr Fischer
suggested that Germany expected three things from the United States. Firstly, that, because of their direct
interest in the issue, NMD deployment should not be decided without
consultations with US allies. Secondly,
that the arms control and non-proliferation regime should be reinforced not
dismantled. Finally, that NMD should
not trigger new arms races, particularly between the United States and Russia,
or between the United States and China.
21.
Italian Prime Minister Amato expressed in late
January 2001 in an article in the daily La Repubblica that
"whatever operational and concrete solutions are adopted by the Bush
administration, the perplexities and doubts of Europeans should be taken into
account". Other allies remain
sceptical, though. French President Jacques
Chirac, however, assailed the proposed US long-range BMD as "an invitation
to proliferation" and Greek Defence Minister Apostolos Tsohatzopoulos
called it a "one-sided decision" adding that "it is obvious that
there will be criticism".
22.
Within NATO itself, a TMD study to develop an
Alliance wide TMD requirement by 2004 was made earlier this year. At the moment, industries have formed into
four main groupings, with strong representation from both the United States and
Europe within each. Of these groupings, which will compete for the feasibility
study funding, two will be selected to proceed with the TMD research. The overall costs of a TMD system are
estimated to exceed $2 billion.
23.
The NATO TMD system will be an architecture of many
smaller lower- and medium-tier systems, based upon existing TMD projects that
are already under development. There is
no NATO staff requirement for an upper-tier system: the NATO TMD system is expected to be based on lower- and medium-tier
systems and have a range of approximately 3,000 Km. While it would be possible to use TMD to defend populations (for
example, US PAC-2 TMD systems were used during the Gulf War to protect
Israelis against Iraqi Scud attacks), NATO TMD will primarily be designed to
give deployed forces protection in theatre.
24.
Many NATO countries are already developing TMD
systems. The United States is upgrading
its lower-tier Patriot Advanced Capability system from the PAC-2 (used during
the 1991 Gulf War) to the PAC-3.
Germany and the Netherlands are considering buying PAC-3, while Greece
may buy PAC-3 variants. The United
States is the only NATO country developing upper-tier (longer/higher range) TMD
systems. These include the Theatre High
Altitude Area (THAAD) and the Navy Theatre Wide, as well as "Boost
Phase" technologies, which seek to intercept and destroy ballistic
missiles shortly after launch.
25.
France and Italy are developing the Sol-Air
Moyenne Portée/Terre (SAM/T), a land-based, low-tier system, planned to
come into service around the middle of this decade. Germany, Italy and the United States are involved in the Medium
Extended Air Defence System (MEADS), a land-based medium-range TMD system,
planned to come into service towards the end of this decade. The MEADS project encountered difficulties
earlier this year due to disputes over cost.
The United Kingdom is not developing a TMD capability.
3. Russian TMD Proposal
26.
On 20 February 2001, Russian President Putin
presented to Secretary General Lord Robertson, a joint TMD proposal. The proposal outlined Russia's intention to
work with NATO on the development of a transportable, limited TMD system that
could be used against "unpredictable and hostile" states. The proposal includes: close assessment of
existing and future missile threats; averting such threats by joint political
efforts; and deploying a mobile anti-missile force near a potential aggressor
only as a last resort.
27.
As to the perceived
threat, there are two main differences which have an impact on the
transatlantic debate. Firstly, while
there are no significant differences over the increasing ballistic‑missile
or WMD capabilities, the Allies hold partially differing views of whether or
not these states would have the intention to use them. Secondly, the impact of these assessments,
or more precisely their interpretation on the political debate and the
priorities are very different than those in the United States. European debates about possible threats
posed by "states of concern" tend to be more concerned about the potential reactions of Russia and
China towards the development and deployment of long-range missile
defence.
28.
Even though there is no
common definition of what constitutes a "state of concern", the term is usually applied to Iraq, Iran,
North Korea, Libya, and sometimes Syria.
Their apparent intentions to acquire the know-how to produce WMD and the
increasingly easy availability of technology constitute worrisome trends for
the international security system. In
1980, the German Intelligence Agency (Bundesnachrichtendienst – BND)
estimated that only three countries were trying to retrieve missile technology:
Libya, Iraq, and North Korea. By 2000,
already nine countries are actively pursuing to obtain missile technology. According to BND estimates, particularly
Iraq and Iran are actively pursuing the acquisition of medium - and long-range
missiles. When the Sub-Committee
visited Brussels in October 2000, the head of NATO’s WMD Centre, Mr Ted
Whiteside, told members that more than 25 countries possess, or develop,
chemical or biological weapons.
1. Threat Assessment
A very
brief overview of the current status of the so called states of concern,
particularly regarding the development, production and proliferation of missile
systems provides the following picture
29.
Today
Iran is producing two surface-to-surface ballistic missiles, particularly the
Shahab-1 (similar to the SCUD-B missile) with a range of 300 km, and Shahab-2
(similar to the SCUD-C missile) with a range of 500 km. Shahab-3, partially based on North Korean
technology (No Dong) delivered by Russian companies, was tested in 1998 and can
hit targets 1,300 km away, including most of the Turkish territory. Iran is currently developing the Shahab-4
capable of hitting targets approximately 2,000 km away, capable of reaching the
eastern regions of Hungary and Poland, for example. This missile could be completed by 2005 and Iran might be able to
test a nuclear capable Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (ICBM) around 2010
according to US Defence Intelligence Agency (DIA) estimates. Iran is also working on the development of
solid fuel booster rockets comparable to modern Western systems. According to the Director of the DCI
Non-Proliferation Centre, Iran has continued to pursue further development of
nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons with assistance from Russian
companies.
30.
According
to the DIA, Iraq possesses missiles with a range of 650 km, capable of striking
the south-eastern part of Turkey. The
country is believed to have developed a missile with a range of up to 1,000
km. Until the 1991 Gulf War, Iraq had
two major missile programmes under way and possibly came close to developing a
missile with a range of up to 3,000 km.
Despite Iraq’s heavy investment in obtaining infrastructure to produce
nuclear, chemical and biological weapons, many missile production facilities
were destroyed by United Nations inspection teams before they departed in
August 1998. Recently, however, the
Iraqis have intensified efforts to rebuild facilities, with BND estimates
suggesting pre-Gulf War levels obtained in only three to five years time. The estimates also suggest the biological
and chemical weapons programmes remain active with potential for the production
of medium-range missiles and WMD weapons in just a few years. Accordingly, acquisitions of both components
to build chemical plants, as well as projects to produce the chemicals (and
biological weapons), have increased significantly since 1999. Also, the involvement of Indian companies
working jointly with the Iraqis in such programmes, ranges as high as 80
chemical projects, twenty of which are related to weapon systems.
31.
Libya
has tried to develop surface-to-surface missiles since the late 1970s, but its
attempts to develop ballistic missiles, namely the Al Fatah, were not
successful. Libya does, however,
co-operate with Iran on the development of missile technology, according to the
BND. It possesses SCUD-B missiles with
a range of 300 km and has, according to the Korean Institute for Defence
Analyses bought 50 No Dong-1 missiles from North Korea with a range of up to
1,300 km. Nonetheless, Libya has not
signed the Chemical and Biological Weapons Conventions (CWC and BWC respectively);
subsequently, it has attempted to develop chemical weapons since the late
1970s. Libya has produced small amounts
of Sarin and Lost at a facility in Rabta, however, production was halted in
early 1990.
32.
The
Demoratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) produces SCUD-B and SCUD-C missiles
and tested the No Dong in 1993. North
Korea tested the Taepo Dong 1 in mid 1998.
Development of the Taepo Dong 2, which could have a range of up to 5,000
km, according to DIA even up to 7,000 km, has been halted. North Korea is currently the only country
selling complete missile systems as well as components. According to a report by the Korean
Institute for Defence Analysis, the DPRK has exported at least 540 missiles to
Libya, Iran and other Middle-Eastern countries since 1985. In addition, it sells know-how, training and
assists in the build-up of production facilities. For example, the DPRK helped Iran and Syria build up their
missile production facilities and also sells No Dong missiles to Pakistan.
2. Non-military responses to the threat
33.
Building
missile defences constitute part of a possible answer to defend against threats
emanating from states of concern.
However, there are also a number of non-military options in place which
can be part of a much more comprehensive strategy. Existing options described in detail below can be divided in to
the following categories and applied either individually or in different
combinations:
·
Diplomacy
via non-proliferation mechanisms
·
Economic
co-operation
·
Export
controls
·
Economic
sanctions
a. Diplomacy via
non-proliferation mechanisms
34.
International
diplomacy remains the primary tool to influence the behaviour of states. Bilateral and multilateral agreements
include a wide range of areas, of which non-proliferation arrangements can
constitute the most important parts.
For example, NATO has made non‑proliferation a top priority. At the December 2000 Ministerial in
Brussels, NATO Defence Ministers iterated that the proliferation of nuclear,
biological and chemical (NBC) weapons and their means of delivery continues to
be a matter of serious concern for the Alliance. The declaration states that "the principal non-proliferation goal of
the Alliance and its members is to prevent proliferation from occurring or,
should it occur, to reverse it through diplomatic means".
In the framework of the Permanent Joint Council (PJC) and the
NATO-Ukraine Commission (NUC), NATO consults with Russia and Ukraine on
proliferation related matters and prepares discussions with partners under the
EAPC/PfP framework, and with Mediterranean countries within the Mediterranean
Dialogue.
35.
Preventing
the proliferation of WMD and missiles, as well as missile technology, is a top
priority to contain existing and emerging threats, and subsequently has
resulted in a number of international agreements, the most pertinent of which
are described briefly below. The
nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), which entered into force in 1970 had an
original mandate for review conferences every five years. This, however, was extended indefinitely at
the 1995 Review and Extension Conference.
As of January 2001, there were 187 parties to the NPT; out of the UN
member signatories, only Cuba, India, Israel and Pakistan had not yet joined
the treaty. The so-called "full-scope" safeguard agreements with the
International Atomic Energy Organisation have been designed to provide for
verification of treaty measures.
36.
The
Australian Group is an association of approximately 30 countries to agree on
standardised parameters for the export control of chemicals, as well as
chemical or biotechnological production facilities. The Biological Weapons Convention (BWC), dating back to April
1972, banned the development, production, and storage of bacteriological
(biological) and toxic weapons. The Chemical
Weapons Convention (CWC) was set up as an additional measure to ban chemical
weapons. It has been signed by 169
countries and became effective on 29 April 1997. In 1987, the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) established a system for the
control of technology exports required for the development or production of
missiles with a range above 300 km. The
1994 Wassenaar Arrangement took this further in an effort to co-ordinate export
controls for dual use systems.
37.
Economic
incentives can be a valuable tool in restraining "states of concern".
The 1994 Framework Agreement (FA) with North Korea provides an
illustration of a partially successful mechanism where the country had promised
to stop its nuclear programme in exchange for the delivery of civilian nuclear
reactors. Subsequently, at an autumn
2000 meeting between the Clinton administration and North Korean officials, an
agreement was nearly documented. It was
foreseen that North Korea would call off its missile programmes to the other states of concern, programmes which
generate revenue of approximately US $1 billion each year. Accordingly, the North Korean regime
proposed not to produce, test or deploy missiles with a range above 300 miles,
thus halting also the sale of missiles, components, technology and
training. Despite making more progress
than anticipated, the Clinton administration was unable to reach an accord by
the end of its term with the agreement verification still unresolved and
discrepancies remaining regarding the value of non-monetary aid North Korea
should receive.
38.
The new
Bush administration, however, considers that the DPRK did not abide by the 1994
agreement and has announced an extensive review of US policy on North
Korea. Moreover, US defence officials
have expressed concern about continued weapons acquisitions and military
strengthening by North Korea that may have been made easier by aid from Western
governments and the international community at large. After a meeting between President Bush and South Korean President
Kim Dae Young in March 2001, US Secretary of State Colin Powell said that the
United States had no plans to resume talks soon on ending the North Korean
missile programme. Robert Galluci,
former chief US negotiator of the Framework Agreement (FA), has suggested
earlier this year a revision of the agreement so as to provide conventional
rather than nuclear power facilities to the North Koreans. Kim Dae Young wants
to continue his "sunshine" or engagement policy toward North Korea
despite domestic criticism for an alleged lack of reciprocity from the
North. While economic relations between
the two Koreas are developing slowly and little progress has been made
regarding mutual understandings, Kim Dae Young made an historic visit to the
Pyongyang in June 2000 and South Korea continues to provide 70% of the funds
for the FA, valued at US $4.6 billion.
39.
Export
controls are applied by a sovereign state usually in response to unfavourable
behaviour of a particular country. In
the United States, for example, such restrictions are placed on terrorist
supporting countries. Although there is
no agreed definition of an export restriction for arms and the term is used
differently among national export control systems world wide, a growing number
of states have begun to co-operate in an effort to authorise specific transfers
without a multilateral regime in
place.
40.
Since
December 2000, the European Union and the United States have been working
jointly to encourage all arms exporting countries to adopt the principles and a
degree of transparency applied to their exports. Both the EU and the United States maintain comprehensive arms
export control policies. The EU has
expressed its determination to promote common, high level standards in this
field with the adoption of the first set of common criteria for arms exports in
1991 and 1992 by the Luxembourg and Lisbon European Councils,
respectively. More recently, the EU has
adopted the 1998 Code of Conduct for Arms Exports introducing a mechanism for
notifications and consultations, the only one of its kind.
41.
The
United States has established numerous policies which range from the
registration of manufacturers and exporters of defence articles and services
subject to US jurisdiction, a case‑by‑case review of applications,
and effective enforcement measures.
Recently, an April 2001 report released by the US Congressional Study
Group on Enhanced Multilateral Export Controls for US National Security, recommended
three steps to establish a new and more effective framework for multilateral
export controls listed below:
·
In the
short term, to work to improve the Wassenaar Arrangement and other multilateral
arrangements, with the long term goal of merging them into a single, effective
body;
·
To
develop a new supplemental framework for co-ordinating multilateral export
controls based on "harmonising" participating countries’ export control
policies and improving defence co-operation with key allies and friendly
nations; and
·
The
report also calls for necessary reforms in the US export control system. For example, a "balanced and updated" Export Administration Act should be
passed as soon as possible.
42.
Consequently,
these measures significantly increase the level of transparency in arms exports
and promote convergence of the national arms export policies, with hopes of
encouraging others to follow suit.
43.
According
to UN records, the Security Council had only imposed sanction regimes on two
occasions prior to 1990; namely, on Rhodesia and South Africa. However, in the post Cold War era, 11
sanction resolutions have been authorised, of which eight remain in force. Although most have been imposed
unilaterally, few existing studies have focused on the efficacy of UN sanctions;
instead, they have examined the totality of sanction regimes. This suggests
that the success or failure in coercing target countries to change their
behaviour has become the criterion for effectiveness and thus explains an
overwhelming negative assessment on the efficacy of sanctions.
44.
Sanctions
seek to achieve goals such as stigmatising and containing non-compliant states
as well as serving as instruments of prevention and deterrence. According to a 1998 study of the
Washington-based Institute for International Economics, it is questionable
whether economic sanctions can still be a viable policy tool. The results concluded that sanctions have a
poor record of achieving their set foreign policy goal and only 17 % of US
sanctions applied between 1973 and 1998 had worked, the result of unilateral
implementation disregarded by other allies.
More specifically, unilateral sanctions such as the Helms-Burton Act or
the 1996 Iran-Libya Sanctions Act have also strained relations between the
United States and its allies.
45.
Targeted
sanctions on Iraq stipulated in UN Security Council Resolution 1284 having
failed to meet their objectives, is yet another illustration. Sanctions were set to be lifted when Iraq
revealed that it had destroyed its existing missiles, as well as its ability to
produce WMD systems. However, there is
no evidence that Saddam Hussein’s
regime has met this requirement despite the fact that UNSCOM weapons
inspectors were asked to withdraw from Iraqi territory in 1999. Despite these efforts, Hussein has managed
to manipulate the sanctions to his advantage, smuggling UN humanitarian aid
through Syria, Turkey, Jordan and Iran vis-à-vis the "food-for-oil" process. Consequently, it is an
estimated 400,000 barrels of oil per day, generating an annual revenue of
approximately US $1 billion, which is
funnelled to the Iraqi regime.
46.
On the
other hand, in some instances sanctions can assist in achieving the set
goal. For example, if multilateral
sanctions are imposed with relatively moderate goals, it is possible that the
behaviour of the "state of concern" could adapt to the conditions. Sanctions can also be successful on regimes that are economically weak and
politically unstable, particularly if the
regimes have several trade or economic transactions. A recent task force headed by US
Vice-President Cheney reportedly acknowledged that sanctions can "advance" important national security and
diplomatic goals and has thus indicated plans to initiate a comprehensive
sanctions review with the US Congress.
Accordingly, US Secretary of State Powell has also recently announced
plans for the development of "smart", selective sanctions that would specifically target the
members of Hussein’s regime in
particular, not the Iraqi population at large.
47.
US plans for the development and deployment of
long-range BMD have become a central issue dividing the United States and
Russia, as well as China.
48.
Russian leaders fear that the envisioned missile
defences are part of a conscious US strategy to maintain global strategic
superiority. Russian officials,
including Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov, argue that a US decision to deploy
would destroy the foundation of the agreements comprising the modern
architecture of international security.
They warned that Russia would no longer be bound by its obligations to
reduce strategic armaments if the United States withdrew from the ABM treaty. Thus, the process of nuclear disarmament
will inevitably be terminated, if not reversed, they add. Although Putin did not reject US calls to
consult Russia on the future of the ABM treaty, for example, he has warned of
the severe consequences which a unilateral US decision to cancel the treaty
would trigger. Doing so would cause
Russia to react very harshly, forcing it to respond with neutralizing measures
to ensure its own security and ultimately, to consider a withdrawal from all
major existing arms control arrangements.
49.
The US administration is reportedly reviewing its
policy towards Russia. Different views
exist, some favour a continuation of a policy of engagement and co-operation
with Russia, while others argue that an adjustment of the course towards Moscow
would be necessary, partly to show Washington’s disapproval of its opposition
to American policy initiatives in missile defence and non-proliferation. Senior Bush administration officials have
been accused by the Russians of making "openly
confrontational"
statements by labelling Russia as an "active
proliferator" of
dangerous weapons technologies, including ballistic missile technology to
Iran. European allies are generally
more in favour of continued co-operation with Russia. From a Russian perspective, NATO’s opening to the East, the 1999
Kosovo air campaign, and the Alliance new Strategic Concept have increased
concerns about Western intentions.
50.
However, Russia has also signalled the political will
to compromise. Russia has also admitted
serious concerns about proliferation.
More specifically, Russia has spoken of states of concern and about the
dangerous leakage of missile technology and the threat to countries close to
the states of concern. This might indicate the possibility to
strengthen the non-proliferation
regimes for weapons of mass destruction and their means of
delivery. What is more, President Putin
has initiated a debate about seeking deeper cuts into US and Russian strategic
nuclear arsenals under the future START III treaty than envisaged earlier.
51.
Putin has proposed a pan-European non strategic
missile defence system which targets short- and medium-range missiles instead
of inter-continental weapons. The
concept rests on a four-step process:
·
Evaluating any missile threats against European
nations;
·
Developing a missile defence concept;
·
Determining development and deployment of
anti-missile units;
·
Establishing a joint early warning centre.
52.
The Russians suggest that mobile batteries can be
shifted to protect particular regions.
The proposal envisions creating a single database with the
characteristics of all known non strategic ballistic missiles, opening a joint
centre with the Europeans to share information from launch warning systems
similar to one envisioned earlier with the United States, and testing new equipment
using existing Russian facilities. A diagram included with the plan suggests a
multi-layered shield, with one type of system targeting missiles at a height of
144 km (89 miles) and smaller batteries within the larger umbrella aimed at
enemy missiles at a height of 30 km.
53.
Putin first proposed the alternative, "non-strategic"
missile defence proposal last June.
Such a theatre-based system could protect against ballistic missile
attacks from states of concern without undermining existing disarmament pacts. Former Russian Defence Minster Igor Sergeyev
provided Lord Robertson with a broad outline of the initiative during his visit
to Moscow in February 2001.
54.
The plan, however, offers little technical evaluation
and no cost estimates, development timetables or organizational
structures. Instead, it provides a
theoretical framework for how a mobile European-based system might be developed
using Russian technology. Implementation
of the Russian concept might be feasible in the framework of a package deal that
included a START III favourable to Russia and a revised ABM treaty that allowed
for the kind of strategic defence that the United States deems necessary for
its security.
55.
Deployment of long-range missile defence is most
likely to trigger Chinese counter-reaction as it has voiced strong concerns
about United States plans. China fears
that a national US missile defence shield would further strengthen what it
perceives as US dominance in world affairs and particularly in the region. China is particularly sensitive in matters
concerning Taiwan and thus fears a US TMD system supplied to what it considers
a renegade province. China appears set
to counter a national BMD deployment by expanding and accelerating development
of sophisticated intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs). China announced earlier this year that it
would increase defence spending by a record 17.7 % this year as it overhauls
its armed forces to adapt to "drastic
changes" in the world's military
situation.
56.
It is unclear how rapid and how large an increase in
its arsenal China will pursue.
Currently, China has about 20 long-range ballistic missiles armed with
nuclear warheads. Assuming China seeks
to maintain its deterrent, estimates predict that by 2015, China will likely
have tens of missiles targeted against the US, having added a few tens of more
survivable land- and sea-based mobile missiles with smaller nuclear
warheads. The United States has signed
a missile non-proliferation arrangement in November 2000, which commits China
to not assisting other countries in developing nuclear capable ballistic
missiles in any way, and to put in place comprehensive missile related export
controls. China’s reaction will depend
on a number of variables, defined by a complex mixture of domestic politics and
its foreign and trade interests However, at a time pending China's bid for
membership in the World Trade Organization (WTO), Western technology transfers,
direct investment and market access could be jeopardized. Bilateral US-Chinese relations will play a
crucial role in determining how China will accommodate in the international
security system. However, relations
are strained after the collision of a US reconnaissance plane and a Chinese
fighter aircraft in early April this year.
57.
Taiwan announced in May 2000 that it would develop a
missile defence system unilaterally to neutralize the only credible weapon
Beijing wields to intimidate Taiwan, depending upon finances and technological
progress. Despite refusing to embrace
Beijing's "one-China" policy, President Chen Shui-bian has spoken of "continuity"
to maintain Taiwan's autonomy until re-unification with the mainland can be "peaceful and painless." To do so, however, requires engagement with
Beijing so as to increase cross-Strait relations that would accelerate the
mainland's socio-economic development and reform, and to avoid providing
Beijing with an excuse for using military force against Taiwan. China's dramatic increase in military
spending threatens to alter the existing military balance in the Taiwan Strait
in 2005. Under the Taiwan Relations
Act, the United States is obliged to sell the island enough arms to defend
itself and the US government has decided to sell advanced weapons, but no Aegis
class destroyers, to Taiwan.
58.
Recently, India has increased its awareness of the US
missile defence programme because its national interests, namely economic
development and growth, could be at stake.
Ironically, India has taken a sudden interest in arms control,
particularly due to the negative international reaction to its underground
nuclear tests in 1998, which were followed by Pakistani tests. Also, China's increased strategic military
capability would put pressure on India to do the same in order to maintain its
minimum deterrence; thus adding pressure for higher military spending. In early March 2001 India announced that its
new Agni-2 ballistic missile which can carry a one-ton nuclear warhead more than
2,500 km was ready for mass production.
India has supported Russian views on the possible negative repercussions
of national missile defences.
59.
For the most part, NMD has indirect effects on
Pakistan's national interests.
Considered mainly to be a problem for Russia and China, China's
strategic build-up would, however, help check rival India, thus threatening
Pakistan's deterrent force. The Indian
build-up would raise tensions and leave Pakistan with no choice but to increase
its nuclear and missile capabilities, despite its current state of economic
recovery and reform. More importantly,
in an effort to incur international isolation, Pakistan continues to open a
security dialogue with India, restraining the Muslim fighters confronting India
over Kashmir, and managing the militant Islamic movement within Pakistan.
60.
The most likely, and most immediate, effect of
building long-range missile defence would be on the ABM treaty. The treaty would allow TMD systems but would
prohibit building a nation-wide missile shield. If the United States and Russia agree on amending the ABM treaty,
it could be maintained. However, it
would fall if Russia would refuse adjustments and if the United States decided
to build a long-range missile defence system.
Senior US administration officials, including Secretary of Defence
Donald Rumsfeld, consider the ABM treaty a "relic". Secretary
of State Colin Powell stated that the United States might have to abrogate the
ABM treaty "if it is
no longer serving our purposes or if it is not something that we can
accommodate our programmes within".
61.
Should the United States decide to withdraw from the
ABM treaty, the timing and context could be of considerable importance for the
impact on arms control. Secretary
Powell said that, "it is not
something that’s going to happen tomorrow, and it’s not something that’s going
to happen without full consultation with our friends and allies and full
consultation with the Russians. And
beyond that, full consultation with other nations that have an interest in this
in Asia, Japan, Korea, and China".
62.
In his May 1 speech President
Bush has said he is prepared to make deep cuts in America’s nuclear arsenal,
currently numbering approximately 7,000 strategic warheads. During the election campaign, President Bush
had announced his willingness to unilaterally reduce the US arsenal below the
3,500 warheads allowed by the START II treaty.
A review of the nuclear strategy has recently been announced. The future nuclear planning of the United
States might include far fewer missiles and atomic warheads, and could also
lower the level of preparedness, as well as the number of targets. Depending on how deep the cuts will be, the
revision of the nuclear arsenal will have a likely impact on the structure of
the US nuclear forces. It remains to be
seen whether the concept of the so-called "triad" (the stationing of nuclear weapons on land-, air-,
and sea-based delivery platforms) will be kept.
63.
Drastic reductions of the US nuclear arsenal can also
help to dismiss or at least allay concerns of BMD critics, in particular Russia
and China, as well as some allies. In
fact, should the United States opt for a drastic reduction of its nuclear
arsenal, Russia might follow, even without the ABM treaty in place. Russia’s strategic arsenal appears much less
determined by arms control and disarmament agreements, e.g. START, than by the
declining Russian economy.
64.
Although Senior State and Defence Department
officials have expressed different views, the Bush administration appears to
put less emphasis on arms control than its predecessor and its allies. It is too early into the Bush administration
to tell which approach will prevail.
However, it is conducting multiple reviews of arms control and
non-proliferation policies, and will complete reviews on the biological
weapons, nuclear testing, and strategic nuclear agreements.
65.
America’s allies are nonetheless concerned that the
United States holds different views towards arms control, as well as toward
multilateralism in general. Drawing
from their lessons learned historically, Europeans hold a strong conviction
that their interests are best preserved by the development of rules to govern
international behaviour. The United States
also supports multilateralism where possible, but appears more ready to pursue
its perceived interest unilaterally if necessary. This may be explained by historic, or possibly cultural,
differences between the United States and its European allies. Over the centuries, Europeans have learned
to live with strategic vulnerability in a way that Americans never have
66.
Nevertheless, an abrogation of the ABM treaty could
have significant implications on the whole system of nuclear arms control, as
it is considered the basis on which the SALT and START treaties are built. A unilateral deployment of a nation-wide BMD
without a carefully constructed sheath of diplomatic assurances is likely to
make further co-operation on all aspects of non-proliferation much more
difficult. The future arms control
process faces a number of important challenges. Among the central questions that need to be addressed are: Who are the players? What could be the organising principle? How to deal with countries that do not comply
with agreements?
67.
The ABM, as well as the SALT and START treaties are
bilateral agreements between the United States and Russia. They were successful because only the United
States and the Soviet Union had significant nuclear arsenals. In today’s world, however, a number of
countries have joined the "nuclear
club". A re-consideration of the organising principle of arms control is
especially important as there is no longer any meaningful balance or symmetry
between military capabilities. Cold War
style deterrence based on visible balance cannot work between highly
asymmetrical or ad hoc opponents.
This is why ballistic missile defences can increase security. However, introducing a new element –
defence - into the equation is likely to trigger profound changes for the
current arms control system. Your
Rapporteur holds the view that arms control should remain a key component of
the international security system of the future. As concluded at the 40th Rose-Roth seminar of the NATO
PA in Slovenia in May 2000 was that negotiated bi- and multilateral agreements
can 1) contain the extent of the threat (as in the case of the NPT); 2)
actually eliminate major portions of the threat (as in the case of the INF and
CFE treaties); 3) introduce elements of transparency in military plans and
movements, and 4) build a framework of norms of international behaviour putting
moral pressure on states to conform, and legitimise a response in the event of
treaty violation.
68.
It is unclear how a future arms control regime could look, but the issue of
compliance will be key. The 1990s have
seen a number of "compliance
crises", such as Iraq’s violation
of its NPT commitments, the North Korean violation of the safeguard agreements,
with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), as well as the former
Soviet Union’s violation of the 1972 Biological and Toxin Weapons
convention. None of these challenges
have been fully resolved. This does not
only pose serious problems about security, but undermines the international
community’s confidence in the efficacy of multilateral arms control
instruments. Non-compliance will remain
a crucial issue which the allies and the international community will have to
tackle.
69.
The European Union’s European and Defence Policy
(ESDP) is another key determinant for the transatlantic partnership. This section sketches out the current status
of the developments and will be updated in the autumn report. While not directly linked to one another,
the EU’s headline goal can be seen in relation with NATO’s Defence Capabilities
Initiative.
70.
The
Headline Goal, endorsed at the EU’s Helsinki Summit in December 1999 states
that by the year 2003, the EU will be able to deploy a corps of three brigades
(50-60,000) troops to maximum strength within 60 days and sustain this force
for up to a year. This Rapid Reaction
Force (RRF) will be used for fulfilling the Petersberg tasks, ranging from humanitarian
relief, search and rescue, peacekeeping and peace enforcement. These tasks are essentially "lower-end
tasks", and of these, the EU will only be able to become involved in very
low-end operations (disaster relief) in the near future. Later on it will be able to conduct larger
missions such as peace enforcement. It
will not be responsible for collective defence.
71.
In order to have the right capabilities and assets
for this range of tasks, the EU compiled a capability catalogue of all troops,
equipment, etc. it would need to be able to undertake these missions. Nations were invited to make pledges towards
the catalogue during the November 2000 Capabilities Pledging Conference. All EU members, with the exception of
Denmark, pledged troops. All nations
made pledges of equipment including aircraft, ships, support capabilities and
land armaments. Other non-EU countries
were invited to make pledges. The EU
reported that this was a positive step in non-EU country relations with the EU,
but that the capabilities offered by these countries, among them Turkey, did
not significantly improve the range of capabilities the EU has at its disposal.
72.
The Capabilities Pledging Conference revealed a
number of capability and assets shortfalls, notably in areas already
highlighted through NATO's Defence Capabilities Conference (DCI) described
below. These shortfalls will have to be
met in order for the RRF to be fully operational by its deadline of 2003. The shortfalls, however, principally include
strategic items such as surveillance, satellites and large-transport
vehicles. As these will take time to
acquire, the RRF will have a staggered operational capability, performing
lower-end missions (as explained above) in the first few years, leading up to
the full range of missions in later years.
73.
The DCI was endorsed by NATO’s heads of state and
government at the Washington Summit in 1999.
It is an initiative which is designed to address the capability
shortfalls inside the Alliance, which were highlighted in previous defence
reviews, but most clearly demonstrated through the Kosovo air campaign where
NATO countries were not capable of maintaining full interoperability. Thus, the DCI is an initiative aimed at
increasing the capabilities of mainly the European allies. The DCI can also be seen in relation to the
NATO European Security and Defence Initiative (ESDI), which seeks to enhance
the transatlantic link.
74.
The DCI is a catalogue of 58 items subdivided into
five headline categories. The 58 items
are classified, but basically outline a key capability enhancement area. The five headline categories are:
Deployability and Mobility (for example, air- and sea- lift capabilities);
Sustainability and Logistics (logistic support, such as food, shelter and
equipment); Effective Engagement (development of adequate firepower);
Survivability of Forces and Infrastructure (for example, chemical, biological
and nuclear attack); and Command and Control (C2) Information
Systems, (improving allied communications systems, such as secure radios).
75.
The DCI is said to be progressing well, although
several items, notably Alliance Ground Surveillance (AGS), are being held up
because of pending political decisions.
That is to say, the arguments for acquiring the equipment are not always
defined in terms of military requirements, but political preference. The DCI is managed by the High Level
Steering Group. This group is mandated
to continue its work on progressing the DCI until 2002, although some NATO
officials believe that its work should continue longer to maintain the kind of
political direction and momentum, necessary to see that some items reach
fruition.
76.
Following the Nice Summit of 8 December 2000, several
decisions were made in relation to the development of the Common Foreign and
Security Policy (CFSP) and the nascent European Security and Defence Policy
(ESDP). This included, among other things, the strengthening of military
capabilities, civil crisis management capabilities and provision for the
transition of the interim European Union bodies into permanent structures.
77.
During the Nice Summit, the member states signalled
their determination to elaborate on the headline goal, and to make the
necessary efforts to improve their military capabilities, in accordance with
the goals established in Helsinki, in order to be capable of carrying out in
full the most demanding of the Petersberg tasks. In particular, this related to
"availability,
deployability, sustainability and interoperability". As for their collective goals, the member states
agreed to pursue their efforts in the areas of command and control,
intelligence and strategic air- and naval-transport capabilities.
78.
The aim of the EU Review Mechanisms, as outlined in
the "Presidency Report on the
European Security and Defence Policy"
submitted at the Nice conference, is to enable the EU to make progress towards
the realisation of its headline goal commitments and to contribute to ensuring
compatibility between the EU and other organisations' mechanisms, such as the
NATO force planning and NATO Planning and Review Process for the Partnership
for Peace.
79.
In relation to capabilities in the field of civilian
crisis management, the EU continued at Nice to develop civilian capabilities in
the four priority areas (established by the Feira European Council). These
included police, strengthening of the rule of law, strengthening civilian
administration and civil protection. Of these four areas, the most developed is
the intention to establish a rapid reaction force of up to 5,000; 1,000 of whom
would be deployable within 30 days. This force would either support local
police officers, or replace them, depending on circumstances.
80.
The Committee for Civilian Aspects of Crisis
Management established a four-step method through which phased targets can be
met and maintained through voluntary contributions. These four steps are:
·
Preparation of generic planning scenarios and
identification of the resultant missions;
·
Definition of the capabilities needed for the
performance of the missions identified;
·
Call for contributions from member states and
identification of the capabilities on offer; and
·
Possible measures to ensure follow-up for concrete
targets.
81.
As regards strengthening the rule of law, particular
attention has been paid to enhancing the effectiveness of police missions by
parallel efforts to strengthen and restore local judicial and penal
systems. In this framework, a database
designed to record member states’ ability to make available specialist judicial
and penal staff has been compiled.
82.
A follow-up to the work undertaken on strengthening
civilian aspects of crisis management will be continued, in order that the EU
can make more effective use of its civilian instruments for the objective of conflict
prevention and crisis management. The member states’ commitment will be put
into practice with a call for voluntary contributions. Scenarios will be considered in order to set
specific targets and to spell out the capabilities required.
83.
In relation to the establishment of
permanent political and military structures, the following political and
military bodies will be established: the Political and Security Committee; the
Military Committee of the EU; and the Military Staff of the EU. Of these; only
the Military Staff remains an interim body. It is expected that by the summer
of 2001, the EU Military Staff will be a permanent body. The former EU Council
Political Committee will be replaced by the Political and Security Committee,
which will meet at least once per Presidency with NATO's North Atlantic
Council. The Military Committee will report to the Political and Security
Committee, and will generally act as a liaison between the military staff and
the political committee.
84.
One area of deadlock includes arrangements which will
permit in the EU’s military crisis management the consultation and
participation of non-EU European NATO members and other countries which are
candidates for accession to the EU. While the EU wishes to receive
contributions from the non-EU European NATO members and other candidate
countries, it states that this openness must respect the principle of the EU’s
decision-making autonomy. Turkey, on the other hand, has staunchly opposed to
allowing the EU access to NATO capabilities without having what it considers
adequate participation in the decision making process.
85.
The Nice Summit produced only little on ESDP, rather
it focused on the institutional framework and voting procedures for
enlargement, as established in the Amsterdam Treaty. However, Nice revealed areas of deadlock in the realm of European
security, particularly after the Capabilities Commitment Conference in November
2000. Consequently, certain challenges
must be overcome in order for the ESDP to progress.
86.
Capability
Shortfalls: as a result of November's
pledging conference, a number of capability and asset shortfalls have been
highlighted among armed forces of the EU member countries. These shortfalls must be addressed before
the EU is capable of performing all of the Petersberg missions. The pledging conference gave the opportunity
for EU members to see what other countries had available, pinpoint
inconsistencies and begin an EU-wide method of co-operation to attain the right
mix of capabilities and assets for the rapid reaction force. It is generally accepted that a monitoring
mechanism of some form should be established to provide feedback and progress
on development of capabilities. The EU
interim military staff has set in place a number of staggered goals as a
guideline for procurement prioritisation.
The next pledging conference is thought to be scheduled for November
2001.
87.
Establishment
of Permanent EU Security & Military Structures: the Nice Summit set a mandate for the Swedish presidency to
establish permanent ESDP decision-making bodies within the Council of
Ministers. In particular, the now
permanent Political and Security Committee (PSC) was tasked with any areas
falling within CFSP and today maintains a privileged link with the Secretary
General/High Representative Javier Solana.
According to Major General Messervy-Whiting, Head of the interim
Military Staff, the Swedish Presidency will implement the organization and
status of the EU interim Military Body, contribute to the development of an
exercise policy/programme and to the proposals for NATO consultation, and draw
on Western European Union (WEU) Military Staff acquis. However, decisions such as drafting a new
priority list for the next capabilities conference are rather difficult without
the formal participation of the EU Defence Ministers in the process. The debate is ongoing regarding efforts to
create an EU Defence Ministerial Council parallel to the EU General Affairs
Council or the PSC.
88.
Addressing
Consultation and Participation of Non-EU European Members: following the disbanding of the WEU, which
allowed for an "innovative range of arrangements to enable broad
participation in European defence matters", this set of arrangements are
now obsolete. Arrangements set out at Nice intensified problems among three
groupings of countries involved in the ESDP process: non-EU European NATO
allies, EU applicant countries and non-NATO EU members. The overlap in
membership to the groupings that have arisen, has deepened certain sensitivities.
Turkey is a case in point. Under the decision-making processes of the WEU, only
a majority vote could prevent the participation of another member in WEU
missions. Under ESDP, one single vote can block participation of other states.
Turkey is concerned that certain countries (Greece, in particular) might use
this to veto Turkey's involvement.
89.
NATO-EU
Consultation and Co-operation: closely
linked to the above is the challenge of resolving problems related to NATO-EU
consultation and co-operation. While the NAC and PSC met for the first time on
5 February 2001, representing a significant development in dialogue and
co-operation, the two organisations are working on a basis of "nothing is
agreed until everything is agreed". As this is the case, progress made in
one area could be prevented by stagnation in another. It is conceivable that
unless the Turkish question is resolved, progress in other areas of NATO-EU
relations might be held up.
90.
Inclusion
of the WEU into the EU: as the WEU will
close in June 2001, questions have been asked about how their collective
expertise might be included in the EU. There is an understanding that EU
country employees of the WEU will be employed by the Union. Many of them should
start work in their respective missions. Turkey, however, has been dissatisfied
with developments as it stands to lose the rights and representation it once
had through the WEU (see above).
91.
The possible security benefits of ESDP and US missile
defence plans remain unclear, but the political problems and implications they
raise are already apparent today.
92.
According to Lord Robertson, in the specific
case of missile defence and ESDP, transatlantic "common sense" has
led to the realization of three fundamental points:
·
ESDI is as inevitable as missile defence. The United States cannot impose permanent
military abstinence on the EU, just as Europeans cannot impose a policy of
permanent vulnerability on the United States.
·
Those willing to take a closer look will realize that
both issues can be made fully compatible with Alliance interests. Once these issues are deprived of their
novelty value and of their surrounding hype, a large part of the alleged "controversy"
will be found to be more about process than about substance.
·
When it comes to skilful management and political
leadership on transatlantic issues, NATO is key. Despite missile defence being driven by Washington and ESDI – or
ESDP – it is in large part an EU-driven project, NATO is the crucial "transmission belt"
for transatlantic defence co-operation and policy coordination.
93.
As to missile defence, Europe has the option to
co-operate with the United States in the development and deployment of what
could eventually become a Global Missile Defence (GMD) system. The new US administration should involve its
allies early, often and sincerely in its deliberations. Though building long-range BMD is ultimately
an American decision, its deployment without allied agreement might diminish
the political legitimacy of the programme, deny the United States valuable
resources (especially forward based radar sites) and make it harder to persuade
Russia and China to accept the inevitability of it. What is more, building a national long-range BMD without European
support, might leave Europe (and the US troops deployed there) vulnerable to
missile attacks or threats thereby possibly undermining the protection of the
US homeland.
94.
NATO has kept a remarkable degree of consensus on
nuclear weapons during the Cold War, even though it had to overcome serious
spats over the modernisation of those weapons in the late 1970s and early
1980s. The end of the Soviet threat led
to a radical reduction in the reliance on nuclear forces and only little
attention has been devoted to the role of nuclear forces recently. US plans to build a long-range missile
defence system implies moving away from mutual deterrence towards relying on a
mix of offensive and defensive weapons.
What is more, it will have an impact on nuclear strategy, not only on
that of the United States but also of NATO as a whole.
95.
The
United States, supported by its allies, should pursue an agreement with
Russia. President Bush’s 1 May
statement that he is willing to reach an agreement with Moscow and to
significantly reduce the US nuclear arsenal are highly welcome. Moscow’s proposal is a useful starting point
on missile defence talks. The
"Allies should increase efforts to prevent Russia, China and other
countries selling nuclear and missile technologies to third countries. Recently, Lord Robertson has emphasized that
there was a joint diagnosis of the disease between the United States and
Russia, and even a developing common ground as a possible prescription to rein
in proliferation. Such a prescription
requires effective political and diplomatic mechanisms to govern and legally
strengthen global processes that create an international atmosphere of
stability and predictability. Russia
and the United States must concentrate on creating such mechanisms while it is
still possible to prevent and neutralize new threats.
96.
Building limited defences against attacks by ballistic missiles armed
with WMD weapons could create a net gain in security. However, it would be fatal if a commitment to build these
defences would incidentally lead to more or less giving up on efforts to curb
proliferation. NATO’s newly created
Weapons of Mass Destruction Centre can play an important role. By establishing a database on proliferation,
it will lay the groundwork for a joint transatlantic approach toward this
challenge.
97.
Your
Rapporteur is convinced that arms control has an increasingly important role to
play in the current and future security environment. The post-Cold War period has witnessed a progressing downgrading
of the importance attached to arm control and disarmament. The international security system will not
run on "auto pilot", no single power alone can guarantee global
security. This is why arms control
should continue to be a prime concern.
Without the transatlantic partners’ active co-operation, adjusting and
re-invigorating international security arrangements will not be possible.
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