I. INTRODUCTION
1.
The
developments in South-East Europe have continually featured on the NATO
Parliamentary Assembly's agenda in recent years. At its Rome meeting, the Standing Committee therefore recommended
that the recent developments in the region should be the subject of a
report. This chapter is a response to
this recommendation, and therefore has less direct relevance to the core topic
of this report, i.e. the future of transatlantic relations.
II. THE
FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF YUGOSLAVIA (FRY)
2.
The
ousting of the Milosevic regime on 5 October 2000 has created the opportunity
for a radical transformation of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY). Through the provision of emergency
assistance and the re-admission of Yugoslavia to international organizations,
the international community played its part in consolidating the victory of the
18-party coalition, the Democratic Opposition of Serbia (DOS), in the December
2000 elections. There are already signs
of a move towards democracy, the rule of law and economic reform in many areas.
Yet nationalist myths and political patterns continue to have an impact,
presenting the Alliance partners with a number of problems.
3.
In Bosnia,
President Kostunica's support for the radical nationalists during the November 2000 elections helped to secure
their victory in the Republika Srpska. This prompted a hostile response from the
Croat side in spring 2001, culminating in its withdrawal from the Federation's
joint institutions, including the army.
4.
Similarly,
President Kostunica has been restrained, and even opposed, to cooperation with
the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) in The
Hague on the prosecution of Serbian war criminals. In particular, he has
rejected the possibility of extraditing indicted Serbian war crimes
suspects. By contrast, the Prime
Minister of the Republic of Serbia, Zoran Djindjic, signalled a willingness
early on to cooperate on this matter, as well as on the issue of relations with
Montenegro. Yet Milosevic's arrest and indictment on charges of corruption in
Serbia at the end of March/early April did not take place until Washington
threatened Belgrade with a suspension of $100 million in US aid. Milosevic's
extradition to the ICTY is essential for the prosecution of war crimes. However, there needs to be flexibility on
the issue of time scale to give the Serbian people time to overcome their
reservations about the ICTY and to enable a prosecution to take place through
the national courts. *First of all, however,
the Serbian constitution must be amended to create a legal basis for the
extradition of Yugoslav citizens.
5.
A rigorous
examination - from a social, political and legal perspective - of Milosevic's
role in the warmongering and his regime's complicity in war crimes is an
essential prerequisite for a truly radical transformation of Yugoslavia. At
present, there is a danger that the responsibility for every injustice will be
dumped on Milosevic and a small group of his cronies, even though tens of thousands
of individuals were involved in or profited from the atrocities. Germany's history after the Second World War
has shown that self-critical analysis of the crimes committed by the National
Socialist regime was crucial in stabilizing democracy and rebuilding
society.
The escalation of the conflict in
Southern Serbia
6.
The
escalation of the conflict in Southern Serbia [which was referred to by the
Rapporteur in his earlier report in November 2000] has proved the greatest
challenge for the Yugoslav Government so far. The Albanian guerrillas of the
"Liberation Army of Presevo, Medvedja and Bujanovac“ (UCPMB) have launched
their incursions from within the 5-km-wide demilitarized buffer zone (the
"Ground Safety Zone" - GSZ) along Serbia's border with Kosovo. After December 2000, the number of attacks
on the lightly-armed Serbian police and assaults on Serbian civilians increased
dramatically. These operations were
facilitated by KFOR's failure to disarm the KLA and secure the border,
especially in the US sector,
for most of the weapons and guerrilla fighters were supplied via Kosovo.
7.
Fortunately,
the Serbian Government did not allow itself to be provoked into a military
response with regular troops, which would have violated the GSZ. Instead, it sought to gain control of the
situation through cooperation with NATO. Serbian Vice-Premier Covic has
presented a phased plan whose purpose is to achieve a political solution. During the first phase, the aim is to
initiate dialogue with political - and military - representatives of the
Albanian minority. During the second
phase, i.e. once the violence has ended, the Serbian armed forces would be
replaced by a multi-ethnic police force, which would include Albanians. During the third phase, the economic
reconstruction of the region would begin.
In response to this plan, the North Atlantic Council agreed on 8 March
2001 to allow the controlled return of Serbian security forces to the buffer
zone and the progressive reduction of the GSZ.
On this basis, a cease-fire with the UCPMB - brokered by NATO mediators
- was agreed on 12 March 2001, Serbian troops entered the GSZ, and
negotiations commenced. As KFOR has now
tightened up border controls significantly and clamped down on the supply
lines, there has been some easing of tension in the region once more.
III. The former Yugoslav
Republic of Macedonia
8.
Since
January 2001, the military clashes have quite unexpectedly spilled over into
the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia as well. On 22 January, the hitherto
unheard-of "National Liberation Army" ("Ushtria Clirimtare
Kombetare" - UCK) claimed responsibility for an attack on a police station
in Tearce the previous day, which killed one policeman and injured three
others. The attacks intensified over
subsequent weeks, prompting violent reactions from the security forces of the
former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, which gradually reinforced the Albanian
community's solidarity with the guerrillas. At the same time, the calls for a
resolute approach met with growing support among the population of the former
Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia.
9.
Most of the 300-400
guerrillas are believed to have fought for the KLA They entered the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia via
Southern Serbia and Kosovo, bringing their weapons with them. As in Southern Serbia, KFOR's failure to
impose adequate border checks here has contributed to the escalation of the
conflict. NATO should have acted earlier
to curb this development. When Lord George Robertson, Secretary General of NATO,
requested reinforcements for the KFOR units in March 2001 in order to secure
the border, there were very few positive responses from Member States. Yet the threat to the former Yugoslav
Republic of Macedonia's territorial integrity could have a devastating impact
on stability in the region. NATO should therefore also be prepared to provide direct
support for the security forces of the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia if
the Government of the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia requests such assistance
in the event of a further escalation of violence.
10.
The former
Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia was long regarded as a model for peaceful
relations in a multi-ethnic society.
Parties representing the Albanian minority have been included in several
successive governments, including the present administration under Prime
Minister Georgievski. As a result, a number of improvements have been achieved, but overall, the former Yugoslav
Republic of has missed its chance to bring about essential reforms in its
relations with its Albanian minority.
Various key issues arise in this context:
§
equality
for all ethnic groups in the constitution.
This could be achieved by abolishing the preamble to the constitution,
which refers to people of the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia;
alternatively, the Albanians should be mentioned specifically alongside the
Macedonians and the other minorities;
§
recognition
of Albanian as the second official language;
§
citizenship
rights (until now, citizenship is only granted after 15 years of residence);
§
effective
decentralization and local self-government;
§
expansion
of Albanian education institutions, especially the University in Tetovo;
§
more
opportunities for Albanians in public services, especially the police.
11.
According
to UN projections, the Albanian population - currently standing at 25%
according to official figures - will constitute the majority of the population
within 25 years. In anticipation of this situation, it would also be in the
interests of today's majority population to give all residents citizenship
rights on the basis of equality, and to safeguard the political and cultural
rights of ethnic minorities on a comprehensive basis.
12.
Now that
the Government of the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia has successfully
quelled the UCK during its military operations at the end of March 2001, urgent
political action is required to ensure that the extremists do not capitalize on
the Albanian community's feelings of frustration. The Government of the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia’s
talks with representatives of Albanian groups - which were launched in
mid-April 2001 under pressure from, and mediated by, the European Union - offer
a framework for this process. When signing
the Stabilization and Association Agreement (SAA) with the EU on 9 April 2001,
Prime Minister Georgievski announced that tangible reform proposals would be
presented by the end of June.
IV. Kosovo
13.
Here, the
peaceful staging of the municipal elections on 28 October 2000 - which resulted
in a clear victory for Ibrahim Rugova's moderate LDK with 58% of the vote -
sent out a positive signal. However,
the situation remains highly unstable. Attacks by Albanian extremists on the
Serbian minority are still routine, as are clashes between KFOR and UNMIK with
Serbs in Mitrovica.
14.
Following his visit
to Kosovo in December 2000, the Rapporteur has changed his position on one key
issue compared with last year's report.
Holding Kosovo-wide elections and establishing institutions of
self-government are crucial to stabilize the situation. This would offer a
credible perspective with which to clarify Kosovo's status, for it would equip
the political leadership with a clear mandate to initiate negotiations with
representatives of the FRY and/or the Republic of Serbia on bilateral relations
and the future status of Kosovo. While the current situation - effectively a
permanent "pre-election campaign" - continues, the parties vie to
outdo each other with their nationalist demands and cannot compromise in their
calls for Kosovo's immediate independence.
15.
If the
current uncertainty about the future of Kosovo continues, the situation
threatens to destabilize the entire region, as we have witnessed in Southern
Serbia and the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. In order to counter this destabilization effectively, all the
Alliance partners must be prepared to commit themselves to a long-term military
presence in Kosovo. Debates about
possible troop reductions, especially the US units, are quite inappropriate at present. They would send out the wrong signal, i.e.
that violence could offer the prospect of success.
V. Montenegro
16.
The
parliamentary elections on 22 April 2001 ended in a surprising result for
President Djukanovic. The parties supporting his course towards independence
secured only a small majority, with 52%, while the pro-Yugoslav parties won
40.7% of the vote. This stalemate at
domestic level is likely to prompt President Djukanovic to rethink his current
strategy.
17.
With the
change of government in Belgrade, the threat that Montenegro's quest for
independence would be crushed violently disappeared. However, President
Djukanovic also saw the international community's support for his country
evaporate. He therefore set a course
early on to achieve full independence by summer 2001. In light of these circumstances, the first contacts with Yugoslav
representatives at the start of the year did not lead to serious negotiations
about the shaping of relations in future, but merely to an exchange of
views. Since December 2000, Montenegro
has been striving for a loose union of two independent states, with their own
seats in the United Nations. This union
would have joint institutions, such as a single currency, and cooperate in the
fields of foreign and defence policy. President Kostunica's counterproposal
envisages the co-existence of two independent republics within a federal state.
The Federation's competencies would be restricted to foreign and defence
policy, the economy, communications structures, and the protection of basic
rights. Apart from the fundamental
issue of statehood, there is therefore a great deal of overlap between the two
concepts.
18.
Montenegro
has the right to secede from the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. Belgrade does not dispute this fact. It
merely insists that the procedures set forth in Montenegro's constitution must
be upheld. If the majority of the
population votes for independence in a free and fair referendum, this decision
must be endorsed by a two-thirds majority in Parliament.
Above all, the secession process must be shaped in a way which ensures that
Serbia and Montenegro, as neighbour states, can cooperate effectively in future
too, for they are highly dependent on each other economically.
19.
In light of the current situation, the NATO Members should
encourage Montenegro and the FRY/Serbia to resume negotiations on the
restructuring of their relations and conduct these negotiations seriously. If they were able to reach a mutually agreeable
solution, this would be a model for the region as a whole, for it would
demonstrate how the quest for independence can be handled peacefully. However, unilateral measures by Montenegro
could strengthen the demands for immediate independence in Kosovo and, via
Kosovo, could have an adverse effect on the situation in the former Yugoslav
Republic of Macedonia.
VI.
Conclusions
·
Holding
Kosovo-wide elections and establishing institutions of self-government are
essential to stabilize the situation.
·
All the
Alliance partners must be prepared to commit themselves to a long-term military
presence in Kosovo. Discussions about KFOR troop reductions encourage extremist
groups to continue their military escalation.
·
KFOR's
failure to disarm the KLA and secure the border has exacerbated the violence in
Southern Serbia and the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. A resolute approach is required in order to
prevent a recurrence in future.
·
In the event of the
former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia's territorial integrity being threatened
by extremist Albanians, NATO should be prepared if necessary to provide direct
support for the security forces of the former Yugoslav Republic of
Macedonia.
·
The
Government of the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia must initiate reforms
as soon as possible to safeguard the full equality of all citizens and the
political and cultural rights of ethnic minorities on a comprehensive basis.
·
Montenegro
should refrain from taking unilateral steps.
The NATO Member States should encourage Montenegro and the FRY to resume
negotiations on the restructuring of their relations, and conduct these
negotiations seriously.
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